Dealignment or realignment theses: The structural base of the 1920s cleavages has eroded: secularization, deindustrialization, rise of service and knowledge economy, educational expansion, women entering labor force, immigration, European integration, decline of churches and mass parties.
Dealignment: Class and religious voting decline. Voters become better educated and more independent. Electoral volatility rises. Politics becomes more individualized and issue-driven rather than group-based. Parties compete for "customers".
Realignment: Old cleavages are fading away, but new one is forming along the cultural dimension of competition. Different labels: "national vs transnational" / "communitarian vs cosmopolitan" / "people from somewhere" vs "people from anywhere" / "integration" vs "demarcation" / "winners" vs "losers" of globalization.
The new divide is rooted in education and occupation, putting Green / Left parties against the radical right and its poles (i.e., GAL vs TAN) and cutting across the left-right economic dimension.
Denninson and Hunger's skepticism: the divide, if real, is lopsided: there is stronger anti- than pro-transational. The divide is dominated in Europe by just two issues, immigration in the north and east, unemployment in the south (and all of these issues are not new).
Party systems in Western Europe have become volatile and fragmented, but voting is still anchored in social structure. Why? Group identities are the glue between social structure and political behavior.