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From the A-Bomb to the Truman Doctrine - Coggle Diagram
From the A-Bomb to the Truman Doctrine
Sources of Tension
2nd Front.
Soviets face the brunt of fighting for most of WW2 in Europe.
Stalin's calls for a 2nd Front went unacted on for a long time.
Soviets know they are being left out of the development of the atomic bomb
Soviets are not invited to any of the ceremonies when Italy leaves the war.
Americans seen as sacrificing the USSR for their own capital
In Germany, Russians take revenge in retribution for German atrocities
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe
Ideology
Mutual suspicion as American and British troops on the side of the Whites in the Russian Revolution
Common enemy has been defeated.
Concept of Red Fascism.
The real enemy is totalitarianism, no matter what sort it is
Making the Peace
Wrangles at Potsdam
Truman's first conference where he meets the first leaders for the first time.
Churchill starts the conference and is replaced by Attley halfway through
Germany becomes sticking point of post-war cooperation
Meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers September 1945-July 1946.
Role of Byrnes, Bevin, Kennan, Churchill
IMF and World Bank
Iran as early flashpoint
Sometimes missed out as its not in Europe
Occupied by Britain and USSR during WW2
Soviets are slow to leave the North of Iran
Diplomatic pressure is exerted, and Soviet troops leave March-April 1946.
The Bombs, Byrns, and 'Atomic Diplomacy'
Transition from Roosevelt to Truman
Independent line of James F. Byrnes
Secretary of State
Not operating under direction
Frustrated for being overlooked for VP in 1944 in favour of Truman.
Did not see Truman as a serious politician
Takes a consistently harder line towards the Soviets from 1946
Truman gets annoyed with his inconsistency and is maybe suspicious of Byrnes ambition to get into the White House
Tired of Byrnes 'babying' the Soviets
Byrnes suggested US atomic monopoly could be used to manoeuver the Soviets into a better position in Eastern Europe
Hoped American atomic monopoly would last longer than it did - Soviets exploded their first bomb in August 1949
He had thought it would last into the 1950s.
Byrnes very open about the way he talked about the atomic bomb in diplomatic meetings
'Is that an atomic bomb in your pocket, or are you just pleased to see me?'
Reminds the Soviets they are susceptible to American military power
Failure of Baruch Plan
From Acheson-Lilienthal Plan
Attempt to prevent conflict over nuclear weapons and put atomic power into international control
No clear agreement on how to set up atomic colaporation
Capabilities and Intentions
Demobilisation
Concerns with domestic issues
Nuclear Deterrent
The US only had one bomb before 1947
13 bombs by June 1947, so increasing capability in the US to engage in nuclear warfare
Different from intention
One thing to know the Soviet Union could have fought a war, another to know the Soviet Union want to fight a war.
Initially able to differentiate between capability and intention, but capability begins to be stressed over intention
The Rhetorical Cold War
February 1946 - Stalin suggests WW2 was capitalist war
March 1946 - Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, talks of an 'iron curtain' descending across Europe
Very public, and aimed at a Soviet as well as Western audience
Truman's hometown
Uses this occasion to coin the term 'iron curtain' and denounces the Soviet Union's actions in Eastern Europe
Truman had seen the speech beforehand but clearly did not anticipate the negative fallout from the speech
Americans seen as being drawn into WW1 and WW2 by the British.
Positive reaction comes afterwards, as they start to question the actions of the Soviet Union
Beginnings of the Cold War emerging in a public way among the people of the United States
September 1946 - Byrnes at Stuttgart seems to recognise de facto division of Germany
Byrnes called it the 'Speech of Hope'
Byrnes took a hard line towards the Soviet Union, suggesting that if the Soviets did not cooperate, the Allies would combine their zones.
'Maximum possible unification'
Does lead to the merging of the British, French, and American zones in the December - the British were leading that
'The Architect of Containment'
Kennan sent his Long Telegram in February 1946
Suggests USSR convinced it couldn't achieve permanent modus vivendi with US
Clifford-Elsey Report in September 1946 was a more hard-hitting version of the Long Telegram
'X' Article in Foreign Affairs July 1947 coins the phrase 'containment'
'X' article in July 1947: 'the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.... Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can only be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy.'
A Declaration of Cold War?
$400m in aid to Greece and Turkey
Truman told he needs to 'scare hell out of the country'
Potential misinterpretations
The Evolution of Containment
NSC 20/4 - global commitment without a military budget to match
National Security Act 1947
Stridency of Truman's speech
Turning point?