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Lit review (the thought of MB and Hamas) Or maybe analysis, I might need…

- - - - Although all three of these schools of thought provide credible analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood, I will argue that whilist in terms of Islamism the Muslim Brotherhood remain committed to its core tenants when it comes to democracy their stance lies closer to the optimistic school then its challengers.
      - Do i want to talk about saying that all three schools have credibility and whilist I side more with the optimists, the issue defies simplicity and clear conclusions are hard to obtain?
  - - - The important written works of both Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, the two main thinkers for the movement (Arafat, 2017, p65), highlight the importance of Islam within the movement's ideology.
        
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        The two keys thinkers of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb) outline clearly Islamist doctrines within their works. Both present arguements that place Islamic law and Sharia at the heart of politics and life (Moussalli, 2012, pp131-140 and pp11-15). Qutb went further arguing that all governments that did not follow Islamic law were apostates that people needed to return to Islam (Akhavi, 2013)
        
        Both thinkers advocate for political systems inwhich Shariah law and Islam provide the back bones of their new Islamic states. This method of thinking aligns perfectly with our definations of Islamism with both argeuing for an Islamic state that is governed by Shariah law.
      - When we look further in the political works and actions of the Muslim Brotherhood we see that the ideology of Islamism remains key to thr group's thinking.
        
        Reviews of the group in more recent times support the claims that the Muslim Brotherhood viewed the implementation of Shariah law as fundamental to ensuring that Muslim societies retained meaning (Mitchell, 1993, pp234-240). The group called for the establishment of an Islamic state inwhich the Quran would form the basis of the constitution and the government would be bound by Islam and the people (Mitchell, 1993, pp245-250).
        
        Other key thinkers and leaders in the group built on this further argueing the necessity of introducing Sharia law, but further arguing that many powers that were traditionaly held by the state (such as banning things and arresting people) was not held by the state, but by God (Halverston, 2010).
        
        Even as the Muslim Brotherhood worked to produce draft election platforms the Islamist nature of the group was not lost. In the Draft Platform the group contuined to press its support for the introduction of Sharia law, but they further clarified there once vague stances with the call for the introduction of a council of religous scholars to advise politicans in keeping laws aligned with Sharia (Brown and Hamzawy, 2008, pp1-6).
      - There is little doubt about MB's commitment to Islamism. The group has a long history of commitment to the ideas of introducing Sharia law, the Quran acting as the backbone of the state and the creation of an Islamic state.
  - - - On the topic of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship to democracy we can largely see two schools of thought develop in regards to their views of MB and democracy: the optimists that view the civil state as an embrace of democracy and the pessimists who do not believe that the group has accepted pluralism or equality and see them as either power hungy or theocrats.
        
        The pessimists
        
        This school of thinking largely rejects the idea that the convept of the civil state marks any meaningful commitment to key elements of the democracy, espically the issue of pluralism (equal political voice).
        
        Within this school of thought concerns are raised on two main topics: the degree to which Shariah law will infleunce what political parties can say and the vagueness of MB's platform on democracy and Islamism (Arafat, 2017 and Tadros, 2012).
        
        Shariah and party freedom
        
        One concern highlighted by the pessimists is the arguement made by most theorists involved in the Muslim Brotherhood that the place of Islam and Sharia in the state can not be removed and that once the Islamic state is created parties can not seek to over turn Shariah (Tadros, 2012, pp78-79). Within these confines of Sharia law the Muslim Brotherhood is willing to accept a free political system and debate (Halverston, 2010, pp70-73).
        
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        Vagueness of their politics
        
        The seccond key concern highlighted by pessimists is the vagueness of the Muslim brotherhood on many issues including the role of women in politics (Arafat, 2017, pp77-78) and how the civil state would be implemented to ensure laws abided by Shariah without establishing a theocracy (Arafat, 2017, p80 and Trados, 2012), an idea that MB leaders reject (Halverston, 2010, p75)
        
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        Whilsit the complete conclusions of this school of thinking are different, what they all agree on is that the Muslim Brotherhoods civil state is a flimsy concept that does not protect pluralism and equality and instead advocates for a controlled democracy more similar to that of Iran.
        
        This could see the creation of a religious, clerically-elected institution that wieled effective veto powers over the elected bodies, emulating a political system close to the Iranian system, and reducing both the equality of political voice by empowering religous scholars over people. Whilist some have raised concerns that this pivot would amount to turning Egypt into a theocracy (Brown and Hamzawy, 2008, p4), I would argue that this principle is only anti-democratic because of the group's belief that Sharia law should be above constitutional amendment. This provides further areas of comparison to Iran (Constitute Project, 2024, p40).
        
        Much of the debate around MB's relationship to democracy focuses on the group's concept of the civil state. This concept emerged durring the Muslim Brotherhoods own political changes in the 1980s and can be briefly understood as a belief in the protection of civil liberties and democracy within the boundaries of and by Islamic law (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009).
        
        The optimists
        
        This school of thinking posses a far more positive, but not blindly positive, view of the Muslim Brotherhood; in particular the concept of the civil state and pluralism.
        
        Whilist this mode of thinking does not argue that the Muslim Brotherhood has moved away from the issue of Shariah law and implementing it (Mitchel, 1993) it presents the group as closer to a conservative party within the Muslim world then psuedo-theocrats (Masoud, 2013, p497).
        
        They argue that the group sees democracy as a principle element of Islam, drawining on statements of key moderates such as Dr Essam al-Erain who argued 'The Brothers consider constitutional rule to the closest to Islamic rule' (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009, p191). They argue that there has been a change in the group from a view that Shariah law will bring about towards arguing in favour of democracy in its own right (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009).
        
        Although they do not view MB as anything close to a liberal political movement, and highlight their willingness to work with the even more conservative Salafis (Masoud, 2013, p489) even on some of the positions they argue they have adopted a more liberal stance. In particular before the overthrow of Mubarak MB and the Salafis called for a council of religous scholars, that could be overturned by parliament, to ensure laws are in light with Sharia (Masoud, 2013, p489).
        
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        Overall, this school of thought sees them as flawed democrats instead of pseudo theocrats which the pessimists do.
        
        Whilist both schools of though present compelling arguements, and it is impossible to make completly definative statements on the matter, I would argue that the optimist school carries more credance.
        
        The core arguement of the pessimists is undermined in the 2012 Egyptian constitution which broke with many Islamist positions. In particular, it states 'The people are the source of all authority' (Constitute Project, 2012, p3) and 'Soverignty belongs to the people' (Constitute Project, 2012, p5). When combined with a constitutional amendement process which provides no special garuntees to Sharia, unlike that of Iran which prohibts the removal of Islamic law from the constitution in article 177 (Constitute Project, 2024, p40), the idea that MB are theocrats seems weakened.
        
        Although MB were not the sole powers in the constitution drafting process the Islamist blocs won the 2011 elections and coalitions led by MB and al-Nour (a Salafi party) won over 60% of the vote (Coleman and agencies, 2012) showing a strong Islamist, and in the eyes of the pessimists anti-democratic bloc, which produced a constitution, which discussed Shariah law (Constitute Project, 2012), but did not meaningfully enshrine it through religous councils or special protections.
- - - - Therefore, before outling the multiple stages of Hamas political thought I will first outline the Muslim Brotherhood's thinking on the tw key themes of democracy and Islamism.
- - - - Hamas and Islamism
        
        Durring this period Hamas clearly outline's itself as an Islamist movement. Within their 1987 Charter Hamas outline thier commitments to Islam and their desire to establish an Islamic state in Palestine (Euben and Zaman, 2009 and Armajani, 2011).
        
        Hamas views Palestine as a waqf, arguing that the region was a gift from God to all Muslim poeple and that this position means that the soverign power over it shold be God (Euben and Zaman, 2009, pp361-362). They rejected political ideals such as Arab nationalism as simply Christian political thought dreamt up in Western schools and argued that the only ideology that gives Arabs a civilistion is Islam (Zahhar, 1995, pp83-84).
        
        This posisition is enhanced by the groups self-proclaimed ties to the Muslim Brotherhood (Euben and Zaman, 2009). Drawning from our understnading of the Muslim Brotherhood as an Islamist movement, the position of Hamas as the Palestinian branch of the movement and the importance attached to understanding MB in understanding Hamas (Mishal and Sela, 2000, p6) strengthens Hamas' ties to Islamism.
      - Like their parent organisation, Hamas' attitudes to democracy durring the pre-2004 period are more complicated and they failed to clearly outline their position to democracy and pluralism in this period (Mishal and Sela, 2000, p17).
        
        Although we can turn to look at the Muslim Brotherhood's idoelogy to support some of this research, it is important to differenaite between the Egyptian and Gazan MBs. Whilist in Egypt they have a long history of political actvisim (Armajani, 2011 and Masoud, 2013, pp482-484), MB in Gaza has a much more quitist trend (Hafez and walther, 2012, p63).
        
        By the time of Hamas' breakaway the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, a firmly not quietist movement, had moved back away from the militism of Qutb and returned to a greater embrace of politics (Masoud, 2013) leading to its establishement as a pro-democracy party.
        
        This provides some context to a further study of early Hamas doctrine and would point to a degree of MB democracy within the Hamas leaders as they had subcribded to that as prvious supporters.
        
        Before the 2004-6 period of democracy the only opportunity to see Hamas' attitude towards democracy are the 1996 elections that span out of the Oslo process and professiona and student elections throughout Palestine (Harub, 2000).
        
        These different elections result in two different attitudes from Hamas.
        
        Hamas viewed the professional and student elections as non-political votes that Hamas could comfortably particpate in whilist the 1996 Palestinain Legislative Council elections were autonomy elections that could not be participated in (Zahar, 1995).
        
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        In the pre-04-06 period Hamas articulated an opposition to Western styled democracy which they argued was form of dictatorship (Zahhar, 1995). However, they did not totaltiy reject elections arguing in favour of national elections, although not autonomy elections (those in line with Oslo) (Zahar, 1995).
        
        They presented these elections as ones that would be pluralist and democratic within an Islamic framework (Dunning, 2015, p293), these aligned with calls made by the group for respecting those that disagree with them (Harub, 2000, pp209-211). However, this position does not provide a clear sentiment towards democracy in this period because this same position is what is argued by hardline MB members who qualify the idea by outling the Islamic framework as uncontestable (Tadros, 2012, pp76-80).
        
        The democratic attitude picture is not cleared up by the group's interaction with the minimal elections that were held in the region before 2004.
        
        Little conc
        
        Conclusions on Hamas' attitudes towards democracy pre-2004/06 have to recorgnise the murky waters of Hamas' pro-democracy stance. What is clear was that the group had some pro-democracy leaning which would become more devleoped in the lead up to 2004/06.
      - Pivot towards democracy and the 2004-06 elections
        
        Whilist Hamas before these elections remained a relativly opque political philosophy, escially towards democracy, the group's particaption in the 2004 to 2006 elections (muncipal and parlaimentry, but not president) sees a clarification and modification of the group's thought.
        
        Hamas and Islamism
        
        In terms of Islamism shifts away from the ideology without completely detaching themselves from the way of thinking. Hamas contested the election clearly outlining their belief that Islam was their frame of reference (Harub, 2006, p9), however, they presented an election platform that was largely secular (Gunning, 2023, p167).
        
        Hamas' election campaign did not focus on Islamic virture or Sharia law, but instead on the bread and butter issues of corruption and law and order (Gunning, 2023, p151 and Zweiri, 2006).
        
        Furthermore, whilist Hamas wanted candidates that demonstrated religosity, most of its candidates came of secular backgrounds (Gunning, 2023)
        
        Whilist Hamas did outline a commitement to impelement Sharia law as the guiding system for Palestinian law, this was not paired with calls for religious bodies to implement it and instead calls for an elected judicary (Harub, 2006, p14). This points to a stance on Sharia and Islamism closets to the most moderate MB members who argue that when people oppose politicans' interpretions of Sharia they can remove them (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009, p197).
        
        Also talked for some Islamising policies and Islamic viture (Harub, 2006).
        
        Hamas did not abonded Islamism and could credibly fit the description of Islamists through their calls for Shariah law and the promotion of Islam. But durring these elections they moved away from more hardline stances and embraced a softer form of Islamism that supported some Islamistation and the streghening of Islam, but without moving towards theocracy.
        
        Hamas and democracy
        
        Like in their attitude to Islamism, Hamas' involvement in these elections helps to clarify their stances towards democracy.
        
        With the 2006 elections Hamas ended its boycott of national elections and moved to full cooperation with politics. Hamas' policies that aligned with political reform called for a democratic and pluralist democracy in line with many demands that had been made by Western governments (Harub, 2006, pp9-15).
        
        Hamas demonstrated its commitment to pluralism quickly following the elections when, despite having won a majority, they turned to Fatah to form a unity government (Schwarze, 2015). This indicated the group held respect for the opposition and willingness to enage them in the political process, this aligns with one of the elements of Wolterstorffs defination of democracy in which he outlines a respect of the oppositon as an element (Wolterstorff and Cuneo, 2012)
        
        Its commitements to pluralism were also demonstrated in its alliance building process durring the elections. Hamas formed alliances with candidates who had ties to Israel and those who were non-Muslims, secularists and even Marxists (Gunning, 2023, pp157-160).
        
        Whilist Hamas' platform did contain a commitement to Shariah law (Harub, 2006) there Islamist policies do not stretch far enough to be consider enfringing on democracy.
        
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        By the end of the 2004-06 election period Hamas' domestic idoelogy had been largely devleoped, articulated and actualised through supporting and particating in elections. By the end of this period Hamas reflects the moderates MB, they call for a greater role for Islam within the state, but maintian power in the people by supporting elections to both parliament and the judicary, giving people a say over Sharia. This ensured a garuntee of equal political voice and meant not introducing an institution that would have contorlled politics from outside popular control.
  - - - Hamas ideology following the 2007 takeover moved away from the Muslim Brotherhoods through a complete abdonement of democracy.
        
        Instead they created a political system that mirrors that of Franco's Spain, but within an Islamic context. Franco developed a political system that positioned itself as a Christian government as a way of providing it with legitmacy outside of democracy (Payne, 2000, pp362-369). During Franco's rule the Church saw its role in governance exapnded with it ebing granted control of censorship and education (Welles, 1965). Furthermore non-Church Catholic groups became increasingly important in the provision of political figures and supporters (Cooper, 1975).
        
        Whilist Franco did not create a theocracy, he did create a political system where religous bodies were key to the running of the state and the governemnt's idoelogy.
        
        Hamas has followed this pattern. Islam has not been placed in control of the Gaza strip and an armed group maintians full control, but it relies heavily on Islam. Hamas has promoted Islam and expanded its role in the legal system (Kear, 2020), the economy and education (Spyer, 2009). Whilist not a theocracy religion plays a disticntive role in government.
      - Talk about autocracy
        
        The presence of religion was mixed with an autocratic political system that centralised power under Franco and saw the regime crackdown on oppositition groups, even those aligned with the loyal church (Welles, 1965).
        
        Hamas channelled these elements as well, leaning into an autocratic governance stragety that saw a crackdown on journalisrs and opposition groups both immediatly after the take over and then indefiently onwards (Berti, 2015 and HRW, 2018).
      - Secular leaders?
    - - Hamas' pivot towards pluralism and democracracy comes to an abrubt end following the collapse of the Palestinain government and Hamas' takeover of Gaza.
        
        Following the take over Hamas sheds its democratic ideals and embcraces an autocratic goverance style; meanwhile their relationship with Islamism sees little change with the group retaining a soft-Islamist approach.
        
        What emerges is an ideology that mirrors fascist and in particualr Francoist politics, an idoelogy that we could term (for want of a better phrase) Islamic-Francoism.
        
        Following the take over of Gaza Hamas quickly implements a security crackdown designed to restore law and order on the streets of Gaza, a territory plagued by lawlessness (Berti and Gutiérrez, 2016). This security crackdown is also used to target the political opposition and civil liberties, with particular focus Fatah members (Brenner, 2016, pp178-179
        
        These policies contuined after the immediate take over period and Hamas contuined a policy of arresting and imediating opposition juouranlists and activists to restrict dissent (HRW, 2018 and Schanzer, 2009).
        
        In the political sphere Hamas maintained a facard of democratic institutions by recovening the PLC and granting it the role of creating governments, approving budgets and legislating (Brenner, 2016, ECFR, no date, and Brown, 2012).
        
        However, the presence of parlaiment meant little in meaningful terms. Follwoing the take over all Fatah members were removed and replaced by Hamas appointees (Brenner, 2016, p188) ensuring a rubber stamp parliament.
        
        Since the takeover all aspects of the defination of democracy have disapated from the political system. Equal politics voice and participation have collapsed following two decades of governemnt without elections and the right to knowledge has been undermined by the contuined attack on the press. -- (Not sure on) Finally the ability of the government to operate freely has been greatly reduced by the operations of Hamas the movement and espically the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades that act as defacto army outside the control of the civilian government (Berti, 2015)
        
        Whilist Hamas pivoted towards autocracy, the group made little changes to its policies relating to Islamism.
        
        Since the takeover Hamas have moved to implement greater levels of Islamic politics. Hamas have pursued a soft-Islamising approach to their goverance (Kear, 2020, pp152-155)
        
        There has been the expansion of morality enforcement with the creation of a new police force the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (Spyer, 2009 and Al-Arabiya, 2007). This body has been acused of enforcing elements of Sharia law and morality such as attacks against male hairdressers cutting womens hair (HRW, 2011) and assulting singers (Al-Arabiya, 2007).
        
        However, Hamas has not fully Talibanised. Whilsit promissing the implementation fo Sharia the group has not delivered, whilist it has seen an expansion within the judical system and politics Hamas has reainted a secular legal system (Brenner, 2016).
        
        Furthermore following the immedaite take over that saw an increase in the enforcement of morality (Spyer, 2009 and Al-Arabiya, 2007) some of these policies have had to be relaxed (Brown, 2012).
  - - - These pivots occur at two critical junctures in modern Palestinian politics: the period of democracy between 2004 and 2006 and the 2007 Hamas take over of Gaza. Durring the 2004/6 period we see Hamas move firmly towards democracy and embraced a softer form of Islamism. In the post-2007 era we see Hamas firmly pivot away from democracy and embrace a form of soft Islamism, forming an idoelogy that could be described as Islamic-Francoism.