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Intergroup Cooperation & Aggression - Coggle Diagram

- - - - Prosocial Giving & What Usually Do (Engel, 2011)
        
        Give 28.4% initial endowment
        
        36% people give nothing
        
        17% people make fair split
    - - Social Dilemma (Van Lange et al., 2013)
        
        Conflict between personal & collective interest
        
        Mutual cooperation maximise collective earnings
        
        Stem from betrayal/silence vignette
        
        Split into two problems
        
        Vignette
        
        Ash & Kat arrested for stealing car
        
        Police don't have enough evidence for crime but can charge w. trespassing
        
        To get confession put Ash & Kat in separate jail cells & make offer
        
        If both betray each other (confess) each get five years
        
        If both silent each get one year
        
        If one betrays but other stays silent former gets 0 years and latter gets 20 years
- - - - Study: Dictator Game in Minimal Groups (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008)
        
        R: Amount of money depend on group status
        
        Less money to outgroup recipient
        
        More money to ingroup recipient
        
        I: Group membership change prosocial actions a lot
      - Study: Dictator Game in National Groups (Fielder et al., 2018)
        
        A: Money distribution in own & other recipient nationality
        
        P: P & recipients of diff nationalities
        
        R: Distribution to other nationality depend on own nationality
        
        Give higher to own than other nationality across all nationalities
        
        M: Nationalities
        
        Chile
        
        Peru
        
        Colombia
        
        Venezuela
        
        USA
      - Study: Dictator Game in Morality-Based Groups (Bilancini et al., 2020)
        
        M: Moral & non-moral minimal group
        
        R: Transfer amount depend on group and morality
        
        Amount higher in ingroup regardless of moral
        
        Morality not a significant predictor
        
        Methods
        
        Non-moral minimal group
        
        Moral minimal group
        
        Non-Moral
        
        Where do you prefer going during vacation
        
        Where do you prefer to watch movies
        
        Where do you prefer to do physical activity
        
        Which social network do you prefer
        
        Which animal do you prefer
        
        Moral
        
        Abortion
        
        Doctor assisted suicide
        
        Death penalty
        
        Gay/lesbian relations
        
        Prostitution
    - - Study: Prisoners' Dilemma in Minimal Groups (Yamagishi et al., 2008)
        
        M: Japanese & New Zealanders
        
        R: Telling depend on nationality
        
        More likely to tll if not own group
      - Study: Prisoners' Dilemma in National Groups (Romano et al., 2021)
        
        P: Large number nations
        
        R: Telling depend on group
        
        All more likely to tell on other than own nationality
      - Study: Prisoners Dilemma in Morality-Based Groups (Imada et al., 2021)
        
        R: Cooperation depend on group
        
        Higher cooperation in ingroup regardless of morality
        
        Higher cooperation in outgroup & unknown moral than immoral
    - - A:
        
        Israeli kibbutz a community w. socialist eglatarian norm/function
      - Method
        
        Dilemma where each take money from bag w. 100 points
        
        If collectively take less than 100, win money
        
        If collectively take more than 100, get 0
    - - Study: Meta-Analysis (Balliet et al., 2014)
        
        R:
        
        k = 125
        
        d = .32
      - Study: Meta-Analysis (Lane, 2016)
        
        R
        
        k = 441
        
        d = .26
      - Study: Meta-Analysis (Lazic et al., 2021)
        
        P: Childs & adolescents
        
        M: Number of stickers given to children
        
        R: Ingroup favouritism a consistent phenomenon
        
        k = 69
        
        d = .22
  - - - Perspective
        “At its core, it proposes that individuals define themselves not only as a unique individual but also in terms of group memberships (i.e., social self: Turner, 1981). This foundational insight has given rise to a broad family of theories and perspectives that explore how group-based self-definition and corresponding psychological processes shape cognition, motivation, and behaviour. Given its theoretical breadth, we refer to this body of work and the theoretical framework as the social identity perspective.“
      - Accounts
        
        Depersonalitsed love
        
        Self-esteem
        
        Depersonalised Love Account
        
        My welfare = Group members welfare
        
        Self-Esteem Account
        
        Ingroup favouritism = Better collective self-esteem
      - Tajfel Matrices & Ingroup Bias
        
        Traditional paradigm
        
        People allocated money between in & outgroup member
        
        P not gain
        
        Found Ps display favouritism to maximise payoff
      - Historical Accounts
        
        1970s
        
        Tajfel et al. (1971)
        
        Billig & Tajfel (1973)
        
        Tajfel & Turner (1979)
        
        1980s
        
        Turner et al. (1987)
        
        1990s
    - - Study: Group & Biased Expected Cooperation (Jin & Yamagishi, 1997)
        
        M: Knowledge types
        
        R: Cooperation depend on group & knowledge
        
        Higher in ingroup in both knowledge types
        
        Method
        
        Two knowledge types
        
        Common
        
        Unilateral
        
        Common Knowledge
        
        Know partners group
        
        Unilateral Knowledge
        
        Don't know partners group
      - Study: Meta-Analysis (Balliet et al., 2014)
        
        A: Analysis of group & biased studies
        
        R
        
        Common knowledge had d = .32
        
        Unilateral knowledge had d = .004
      - Extension of Account
        
        Group & biased expected cooperation
        
        Bounded generalised reciprocity
        
        Bounded Generalised Reciprocity (Imada et al. (2024); Yamagishi et al. (1999)
        
        People intuitively assume indirect reciprocity bounded by group membership
        
        Group heuristic
        
        Bounds
        
        Reputational concern
        
        Expectation about cooperation
        
        Expectation About Cooperation
        
        High expected cooperation from ingroup members
        
        Less from outgroup members
        
        Reputational Concern
        
        Experienced while interacting w. ingroup members
        
        Less so w. outgroup members
        
        Hypotheses
        
        Expectation hypothesis
        
        Reputation management hypothesis
        
        Reputation Management Hypothesis
        
        Increased reputational concern
        
        In eyes of ingroup members
        
        Correlaional evidence of positive correlation between fear of negative evaluation & ingroup favouritism
        
        But not replicated
        
        Study: Reputation Management Hypothesis (Mifune, 2008)
        
        A: Eyes & group mixed design
        
        P: 142 undergrad students
        
        M: MGP of Klee/Kandinsky w. DG of 900 yen
        
        R: Cue of watching eyes triggers reputational concern
        
        Study: Reputation Management Hypothesis (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008)
        
        A: Knowledge & group
        
        P: 155 undergrad students
        
        M: MGP of Klee/Kandinsky w. DG of 900 yen
        
        Expectation Hypothesis
        
        Expectation that ingroup members will be cooperative
        
        Individuals expect others to be more cooperative w. ingroup members
        
        Well-replicated in many empirical studies
        
        Study: Expectation Hypothesis (Yamagishi et al., 2008)
        
        A: Mixed design of country, group, and common/unilateral bet
        
        N: 48 Japanese & 55 New Zealanders
        
        M: MGP of Klee vs Kandinsky w. PD of 200 yen each & any amount gets doubled
        
        R:
        
        Indirect Reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Rand & Nowak, 2013)
        
        System in which participating members cooperate w. others based on reputation
        
        Cooperation only w. those w. good reputation
        
        One of mechanisms that led to evolution of cooperation
        
        Group & Biased Expected Cooperation (Jin & Yamagishi, 1997)
        
        Common & unilateral knowledge
        
        Individuals expect others to be more cooperative w. ingroup members
      - Historical Research
        
        1960s
        
        Rebbie & Horwitz (1969)
        
        1980s
        
        Horwitz & Rabbie (1982)
        
        Rabbie et al. (1989)
        
        1990s
        
        Karp et al. (1993)
        
        Rabbie & Lodewijkx (1994)
        
        Jin et al. (1996)
        
        Yamagishi et al. (1999)
  - - - Implication
        
        Replicated previous findings about identification
        
        Provided evidence for expected cooperation
        
        Provided evidence against reputational concern
        
        Provided no evidence for social identification
- - - - Method
        
        6 players
        
        Each player have 10 points to invest/keep in between/within group pool
        
        Between should be more popular as maximise difference
        
        Within show ingroup cooperation alone
      - Interpretation
        
        Parochial altruism intuitive rather than deliberate
        
        Dissociation between ingroup cooperation & outgroup aggression
  - - - Biological Roots
        
        Role of oxytocin
        
        Alleviate social stress
        
        Increase intensity of social rewards
        
        Promote prosociality/trust
        
        Study: Biological Roots (De Dreu et al., 2010)
        
        M: Inject Oxytocin
        
        R: Increase ingroup cooperation but not do anything when coupled w. outgroup aggression
      - Anthropology Glowacki et al. (2016); Glowacki & McDermott (2022)
        
        P: 91 men in Ethiopia
        
        M: Ethnographic data from hunter-gatherers w. 36 raiding records
        
        R: Key motivator to join a friend in friendship over leadership
      - Leading-By-Example (Imada & Mifune, in prep)
        
        M: Randomly selected leader maked decision first & other three make own after seeing leader decision
        
        R: Following leader show similar pattern regardless of nationality
        
        Leader investing in conflict increase intergroup conflict
        
        Same patterns found if leader/random person in group
        
        Interpretation
        
        One person in group being aggressive seems to be enough to make others start being aggressive
    - - Method
        
        Two players get 15
        
        30s to decide to press button
        
        Pay 1 and reduce 10
        
        If booth press whoever press earlier win
        
        If both not press each get 15
    - - Interpretation
        
        Don't expect outgroup to be more aggressive
    - - Interpretation
        
        Explained by Japanese being not cooperative & aggressive
- - - - Study: Correcting Biased Expectation (Koloğlugil & Tekeş (2021)
        
        M: Ps told previos study about cooperation between in/outgroups
        
        R: When didn't expect others to be cooperative regardless of group membership were less cooperative
        
        But when expected cooperation were more likely to cooperate
        
        Method
        
        Told not cooperative
        
        Told highly cooperative
        
        Not told information
      - Study: Share Subordinate Group Membership (Imada et al., 2025)
        
        A: Pre-game survey w. eight decisions
        
        P: 55 players
        
        M: Pre-league survey for data from Israeli female professional vollyball league
        
        R: Cooperation depend on games
        
        Less cooperation in high conflict salience
        
        More self-other overlap w. former ingroups than outgroups
        
        National team membership increase ingroup cooperation when more national team members in own team but not affect outgroup
        
        Method
        
        Sports players vs fans
        
        Strong identification
        
        Varying levels intergroup conflicy
        
        Match opponent
        
        Transfer & past ingroup membership
        
        High intergroup mobility
        
        National team call-up
        
        Subordinate identity
        
        Aims
        
        Two-player PGG
        
        Minimum effort game
        
        Target player from opponent
        
        High conflict salience
        
        Three players trom three
        
        Low conflict salience
        
        Interpretation
        
        Whether people face outgrouop in next game not influence cooperation
        
        Psychological representation not equal cooperation
        
        Subordinate identity boost ingroup cooperation but not increase outgroup cooperation
  - - - Intergenerational Cooperation (Kamjo et al., 2017)
        
        One person = one generation
      - Climate Change Actions (Imada et al., under review)
        
        Is 'Tuvalu sinking' a good strategy to encourage pro-environmental action
        
        Your behaviour impact future of ingroup vs outgroup members
        
        Framing backfires