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Michaelian, Sutton 2017 - "Memory" Stanford Encyclopedia…

- - - - SIMULATION theory of memory:
        
        [integrazioni da altre fonti]
        
        Memoria ricostruttiva
        
        Mazzoni
        
        Della Sala
        
        Episodic simulation of future events - Schachter 2008
        
        Generative Memory
        
        Schachter? Against the storehouse account of memory
        
        Constructive memory
        
        Christopher McCarrol 2018 "Remembering from the outside"
        
        Construction during encoding vs during retrieval
        
        Then a response by Sant'Anna e Michaelian 2022
        
        Nel consolidamento la memoria è ancora in fase non solo di consolidazione, ma di mutamento, le relazioni con gli altri ricordi ancora non sono stabilizzate
        
        Neisser
        
        Bartlett
        
        "Radical generationism revisited" Michaelian youtube 2023
        
        Generationism vs preservationism vs transmissionism
        
        Lackey 2005: generationism diventa l'ipotesi di default soppiantanod il preservazionismo
        
        Generationism links epistemology of memory with metaphisic of memory
        
        Michaelian propone un "full-spectrum generationism" compatibile con le teorie della conoscenza reliabilists a con la simulatoin theory of memory
        
        2 tipi di preservazionismo (Frise 2023)
        
        Historical p.: la memoria conserva giustificazioni esistenti
        
        Antigenerationist p.: la memoria non produce nuove giustificazioni
        Questo preservazionismo è quello in opposizione al generazionismo
        
        Preservationism: the content of a retrieved memory cannot exceed the content of the corresponding earlier experience
        
        Superficially similar views to preservationis
        
        Transmissionism
        
        weak t.: remembering draws on stored content
        
        strong t.: remembering an event draws on stored content originating in experience of that event
        
        Anticonstructivism: remembering doesn't involve reconstruction
        
        Tipi di generazionismo
        
        Generationism about Ultima facie justification (G della giustificazione): Michaelian says it can be set aside
        
        Generationism about Prima facie justification can be set aside if it is supported with the phenomenological argument
        
        Belief generationism (debate started with Lackey 2005)
        
        Moderate generationism: memory can produce new justification because it can produce new believes
        
        Episodic remembering is a form of constructive time travel.
        rather than distinct capacities for episodic memory and episodic imagination, humans in fact have a single general capacity for mental time travel (Suddendorf & Corballis 2007)
        
        In filosofia della mente
        
        proposed in 2011 Michaelian's paper
        E/o 2016 monography
        
        Continuismo tra immaginazione e ricordo: non c'è distinzione qualitativa, ma solo quantitativa tra le due
        
        La condizione proposta dalla teoria causale della memoria non è considerata una condizione necessaria qui
        
        In psicologia
        
        research on representational and phenomenological overlap between remembering the past and imagining the future (Klein 2013; Schacter et al. 2012; Szpunar 2010)
        Cfr. Shacter, Addis 2007 sulla constructive episodic simulation hypothesis
    - - EMPIRICIST theory
        
        Hume. Legame diretto, derivazione della memoria e dell'immaginazione dall'esperienza sensibile. Markers per la distinzione:
        
        Flessibilità: la memoria rispetta l'ordine e la forma delle impressioni sensoriali originali
        
        Vivacity: la memoria è più dettagliata dell'immaginazione
        
        Spontaneità: i ricordi arrivano in modo più spontaneo alla mente, invece l'immaginazione dev'essere usata deliberatamente
        
        Poi Russel 1921, Broad 1925 e Byrne 2010.
        Problemi: questi sono criteri solo in 1 persona e sono validi solo in media, non sempre, a volte il ricordo non rispetta l'ordine, non è dettagliato e non è spontaneo.
        Inoltre, non vengono forniti criteri per distinguere tra falsi ricordi e corretti
      - EPISTEMIC theory
        
        remembering something as being a matter of having known it continuously since once first learned it. The epistemic theory of remembering may capture important features of our ordinary use of the verb “to remember” (Moon 2013).
        
        One problem is that, because the epistemic theory is couched in terms of propositional knowledge, it applies to episodic remembering only if we take episodic representations to be propositional in character. Even if the theory is entertained as a theory of semantic remembering, moreover, it remains problematic. Semantic memory may correspond roughly to propositional memory, but this correspondence is only rough: on most accounts, semantic memory includes nonpropositional representations of various kinds. Thus the theory applies at best to a subset of semantic memories.
        
        Another problem is that, since knowledge requires truth, justification, and belief, the epistemic theorist must claim that memory requires truth, justification, and belief, and each of these claims has been persuasively challenged. As we will see in section 6, there appear to be cases of memory without truth. There are likewise arguably cases of belief without justification (Audi 1995; Bernecker 2011). Lackey (2005), for example, describes a case in which, after initially forming a belief, the subject acquires defeaters which undermine his justification for it. And there are arguably cases of memory without belief. Martin and Deutscher (1966) illustrate one kind of nonbelieved memory by means of the hypothetical case of a painter who paints a scene that he takes to be imaginary but that turns out to correspond exactly to a scene that he witnessed as a child; intuitively, this is an instance of remembering without believing. Since the subject lacks the phenomenology characteristic of remembering, the epistemic theorist might in principle deny that this particular case is an instance of remembering. [...] the existence of nonbelieved memories of this kind is well-established.
      - CAUSAL theory
        
        Martin and Deutscher 1966.
        An appropriate causal connection between the subject’s apparent memory and his original experience is both necessary and sufficient for remembering.
        Memory trace: subject’s experience must give rise to a stored representation which exists continuously in the interval between experiencing and remembering and which contributes to the production of the retrieved representation.
        
        Challenges to the sufficiency of the condition
        
        One such challenge appeals to the epistemic relevance of memory. Debus (2010) argues that genuine memories are necessarily epistemically relevant to the remembering subject, in the sense that he is disposed to take them into account when forming judgements about the past. In the most straightforward case, the subject remembers a given event and therefore forms a belief that the event occurred.
        
        Given that epistemic relevance is necessary for genuine memory, this argument suggests that the appropriate causation condition must be supplemented with a condition explicitly requiring epistemic relevance.
        
        Es. ricordo qualcosa senza essere convinto che sia un ricordo, ma scambiandolo per immaginazione: la teoria causale, basandosi sul solo criterio della causa appropriata, direbbe che si tratta effettivamente di un ricordo, anche se io non ne sono consapevole e quindi quel contenuto non è epistemicamente rilevante per me (cioè non sarei disposto a considerarlo quando parlo del mio passato)
        
        1 more item...
        
        Natura delle tracce mnestiche: locale (individually stored entities with explicit content) o distribuita (superpositionally stored entities with implicit content, a la Rumelhart e McCllland).
        
        If the distributed conception is right, then individual experiences do not, strictly speaking, result in enduring individual traces but, instead, modify connection weights in networks of event features. Robins (2016b) has argued that, for this reason, a causal theory relying on distributed representations lacks any means of singling an individual event out as the one that is remembered. [Ci sarebbe problema a individuare singolarmente i ricordi, che pare essere fondamentale per l'esistenza di una memoria episodica]
        
        Any causal theorist who acknowledges the constructive character of remembering must acknowledge that, when one remembers, while some of the content of the retrieved representation presumably originates in one’s experience of the remembered event, the remainder may originate in one’s experience of other events. This implies that one may satisfy the appropriate causation condition with respect not only to the remembered event but also with respect to the other events in question. Given that one does not remember the other events, satisfaction of the appropriate causation condition cannot be sufficient for remembering
        
        Challenges to the necessity of the condition
        
        tension between the causal theory and the constructive character of remembering. The classical version of the causal theory treats the content of a retrieved memory representation as deriving entirely from the subject’s original experience of the remembered event. Causal theorists do not require that the content of a retrieved representation exactly match that of the corresponding experience. In particular, they do not require that the retrieved representation inherit all of the content of the experience.
        
        But most do require that the retrieved representation not incorporate content not included in the original experience. Research on constructive memory, however, demonstrates that the content of the retrieved representation routinely differs from that of the experience:
        
        NOT ONLY in that it does not include some information that the latter does include
        
        BUT ALSO in that it does include some information that the latter does not include.
- - - - Problema: anche in memoria semantica possono esserci informazioni su particolari eventi del passato. Inoltre questa teoria non coglie uno dei tratti distintivi della memoria episodica: la sua specifica fenomenologia
    - - Questo criterio implica che la memoria episodica includa anche contenuti (quelli auto-riflessivi) non contenuti nell'esperienza originale, in questo senso la memoria episodica fisiologicamente "generates new knowledge" (Dokic 2014; Fernàndez 2015a).
      - Problemi: è una definizione che richiede sofisticate capacità concettuali. Condurrebbe ad non attribuire m. episodica agli animali
    - - Mental time travel
        
        According to Tulving, self-knowing consciuosness is necessary to mental time travel oriented both to the past and to the future
        
        Suddenford, Corballis 2007: Episodic future thought (future-oriented mental time travel)
        
        De Brigad, Gessel 2016; Klein 2016a; Klein, Steindam 2016; Perrin 2016: question the necessity of autonoesis for episodic future thought
    - - Past-oriented: il ricordo when-where-what si distingue funzionalmente da m. semantica e procedurale perché ha benefici adattivi, permettendo di accedere a ricordi particolari, invece che a schemi e astrazioni da esperienze simili e ricorrenti. Utile per valutare le impressioni sugli altri in contesti sociali.
        
        Non spiega cmq perché associata ai ricordi episodici si sarebbe dovuto evolvere anche la coscienza autonoetica: non si individuano funzioni che potrebbero essere svolte solo quando al contenuto episodico di primo ordine si associata anche la coscienza autonetica
      - Metacognitive accounts:
        
        autonoesis serves as one of several criteria exploited by metacognitive monitoring processes that enable the subject to tell whether he is remembering or imagining.
        
        A related possibility is that autonoesis enables the subject to take epistemic responsibility for his assertions about the past, thus ultimately playing a communicative role (Mahr & Csibra
      - Future-oriented or counterfactual oriented accounts: "it is adaptively beneficial to prepare for future events by directly anticipating them (in episodic future thought) or by considering alternative outcomes to past events (in episodic counterfactual thought); the ability to remember past events can then be explained as a byproduct of the ability to imagine future or counterfactual events."
        [NB simile a Della Sala; e Gatti, Vecchi]
        
        "early human cognitive niche may have involved selection for a capacity for anticipatory planning (Osvath & Gärdenfors 2005), a suggestion that resonates with views that link mental time travel to other cognitive capacities, such as language, that appear to be unique to humans (Corballis 2011; Ferretti & Cosentino 2013; Suddendorf 2013)"
        
        Anche qui non si spiega cmq perché associata ai ricordi episodici si sarebbe dovuto evolvere anche la coscienza autonoetica
- - - - in 1 persona:
        
        Non si può realmente distinguere dall'interno memoria e immaginazione, ma cmq i marker di memoria in 1 persona sono utili per affrontare i:
        
        Problema del processo (Process problem): a volte, basandoci su una medesima esperienza, possiamo sia ricordare, che viaggiare nel futuro, che fare pensieri controfattuali. Come possiamo avere la certezza di saper distinguere tra queste possibilità?
        
        Forse gestiamo questo problema attraverso una 'form of metamemory which might be called “process monitoring”; whereas source monitoring relies primarily on content-based markers, process monitoring may rely additionally on phenomenological markers, such as the feelings of familiarity and pastness discussed above, and formal markers, such as the subject’s intention to remember or imagine (Hoerl 2014; Urmson 1967)'
        
        Ma né la vividezza, né la precisione, né la familiarità del ricordo sono criteri sufficienti per sua veridicità
        
        problema della fonte (source problem): stiamo ricordando qualcosa che abbiamo vissuto o immaginato? In questo senso, come si distingue tra il ricordo di un'esperienza e il ricordo di qualcosa che abbiamo precedentemente immaginato?
        
        Johnson 1997: risolve dicendo che abbiamo una metamemoria, il "monitoraggio delle fonti" (source monitoring) che distingue i ricordi in base alla quantità di dettagli e delle eventuali operazioni cognitive associate. Quindi un ricordo di un'immaginazione sarebbe meno dettagliato e conserverebbe traccia del processo mentale con cui siamo arrivati a immaginare
      - in 3 persona???
- - - - confabulation and successful memory have in common an internal representation of a past event and that it is to this that the subject is related in the first instance in both cases
        
        the cognitive processes at work in memory and confabulation are highly similar, making disjunctive an unattractive option from any broadly naturalistic standpoint
    - - The primary motivations for direct realism about the objects of memory parallel the motivations for direct realism about the objects of perception.
      - Another motivation is the thought that remembering is phenomenologically direct, that is, that, in remembering, we attend to past events, not to internal representations of past events.
  - - - Some have argued that philosophical theories of remembering should not posit memory traces on the ground that philosophical theories ought not to dictate to scientific theories and that traces belong to the province of the latter (Zemach 1983)
        
        response advocates the development of a conception of traces based on current scientific theories of remembering (Sutton 1998). This response, in turn, motivates the distributed conception of traces
        
        Wittgensteinian (1980; see also Malcolm [1963] 1975) antirepresentationalist arguments, which often presuppose a local conception of traces (Sutton 2015)
    - - relationship between traces and perceptual representations
        
        Semidirect representationalism: perception is indirect and traces are the same as the representations involved in perception
        
        Indirect representationalism: perception is indirect and the traces are distinct from the representations involved in perception
        
        Content invariantism: the content of the trace is the same as that of the perceptual representation
        
        Content variantism: the content of the trace may differ from that of the perceptual representation
        
        Direct representationalism: perception is direct and traces are created after perception occurs
        
        Variante antirappresentazionalista: la percezione è diretta e il ricordo non richiede l'uso di tracce
      - relationship between traces and retrieved representations
        
        the standard form of content variantism permits the addition of second-order content concerning the subject’s relationship to the remembered event but forbids the addition of first-order content concerning the event itself. Most theories of remembering thus remain preservationist in spirit.
        
        Another possible form of content variantism permits the addition of both second-order content and first-order content. Generationist theories of remembering entail this more radical form of content variantism.
- - - - Authenticity: rapporto memoria/esperienza passata del soggetto
        
        Un ricordo può essere autentico ma falso, come nei casi di illusioni percettive o semplicemente nei casi in cui un soggetto ricorda una situazione in maniera diversa da come è andata fattualmente
      - Truth: rapporto memoria/realtà fattuale (?)
        
        Un ricordo può essere vero ma inautentico: cases of boundary extension (discussed above) or field-observer perspective switching (Debus 2007b; McCarroll 2017; Sutton 2010b) illustrate the possibility of inauthenticity without falsity.
        
        In cases of perspective switching, the subject perceives an event from one perspective (field perspective) but remembers it from another, perhaps even seeing himself in the scene (observer perspective); while many or most observer memories are inauthentic (since they fail to correspond to the subject’s original experience), they are not necessarily false (since they may correspond to what an observer would have seen). For these reasons, generationists do not hold that genuine memories are always authentic.
        
        Fattività (factivity): si ritiene che la memoria sia fattiva se si afferma che non possano esistere ricordi veri ma inautentici (non si prende proprio in considerazione il criterio di autenticità come separato da quello di verità).
        Standard arguments for the factivity of memory are linguistic, appealing to the apparent incoherence of asserting both that one remembers an event and that the event did not occur (Bernecker 2017; cf. Moore’s paradox).
        
        Controfattività (memory is counterfactive): psychologists have sometimes gone too far in the opposite direction, assuming that, because remembering is constructive, it is bound to be false (Ost & Costall 2002)
        
        While the fact that remembering is generative does not imply that memories are bound to be outright false, it does suggest that they are frequently false in some respects. This, in turn, suggests that remembering need not be fully accurate in order to be fully adequate, thus pointing towards a need for a criterion that acknowledges that truth in memory comes in degrees
- - - - what makes a person at a given time count as the same person as a person at an earlier time is that he remembers the earlier person’s experiences
        
        Critiche metodologiche
        
        Critiche sostanziali
  - - - when one has certain feelings or moods in response to certain stimuli due to certain past experiences, without being able to bring any information about those experiences to mind
    - - bodily and behavioural dispositions, such as when a runner adopts a certain posture due to past injuries
    - - Conway, Pleydell-Pearce (2000): autobiographical memory as emerging from what they refer to as the self-memory system, including an autobiographical knowledge base containing information about specific events, general events, and broader life periods
        
        Personal semantics
        
        Narratività
        
        rather than seeing autobiographical memory in terms of stored information, Brockmeier (2015), for example, sees autobiographical remembering as a process in which autobiographical memories themselves emerge through the subject’s active construction of a life narrative
        
        Cosentino (2011) has argued that the linguistic capacity at work in the construction of life narratives itself depends on the capacity for mental time travel, including episodic memory
      - Some philosophers have held that all episodic memories are autobiographical (Hoerl 1999)
    - - we routinely experience emotions when we remember. These emotions may be understood as themselves being memories, namely, memories of past emotions, or they may be understood as being present emotions directed at past events. Debus (2007a) argues for the latter possibility but, even if she is right, we do presumably sometimes have memories of past emotions
      - N.B. certain emotions, such as nostalgia, are necessarily past-directed. Such intrinsically past-directed emotions raise interesting questions. Howard (2012), for example, argues that nostalgia can arise in connection with memories that are known to the rememberer to be nonveridical
- - - - Extended cognition: Clark, Chalmers 1998
        
        Critiche:
        
        One response to these disanalogies is to retreat to a more moderate alternative to extended cognition, such as embedded (Rupert 2009), scaffolded (Arango-Muñoz 2013; Sterelny 2010), or situated (Sutton 2009) cognition, on which external resources may play a vital role in remembering without themselves literally taking part in the memory process
        
        Another response is to move away from parity-based arguments for extended cognition of the sort offered by Clark and Chalmers to the complementarity-based arguments advanced by Clark in subsequent work (e.g., Clark 2003). While the former appeal to functional analogies between internal and external memory, the latter appeal to functional disanalogies, suggesting that external memory comes to play a role in remembering precisely because it does not mimic internal memory (Sutton 2010a)
      - Distributed cognition, Hutchins 1995
  - - - Conservative view: while remembering may be affected by the social context in which it occurs, it is itself always a strictly individual-level process
      - New view: a promising place to look for robustly collective forms of memory is in transactive memory systems (Wegner 1987): stable, ongoing groups characterized by a division of responsibility for remembering and a shared metacognitive awareness of that division (Kirchhoff 2016; Theiner, Allen, & Goldstone 2010; Tollefsen, Dale, & Paxton 2013). [...] the group has a memory capacity of its own, over and above those of its individual members.
    - - central question concerning memory in large-scale groups is whether such groups are capable of remembering in anything like the sense in which individuals are capable of remembering
        
        Anastasio et al. (2012), for example, have argued that the concept of consolidation (referring to the process through which unstable, short-term memory representations are transformed into stable, long-term memory representations) applies both at the level of individuals and at the level of societies, but this argument may overlook the disanalogies between internal and external memory noted above
        
        Tanesini (forthcoming) has argued that the concept of amnesia (referring to the inability of an agent to retrieve memories that would normally be retrievable) applies both at the level of individuals and at the level of societies, but there is little evidence that patterns of remembering and forgetting at the social level correspond particularly closely to patterns at the individual level
        
        Szpunar and Szpunar (2016; cf. Merck, Topcu, & Hirst (2016)) have argued that the concept of episodic future thought (introduced above) applies both at the level of individuals and at the level of societies, but it is unclear whether societies are able to imagine their futures in ways analogous to those in which individuals imagine their futures