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- - - - strategies of key states in the regime complex of their respective issue areas. States have interests that frequently differ from the functional requirements of problem solving in
        financial stabilization and economic development.
        They seek to correct the ‘drift’ on the part of global multilateral and regional institutions away from member-state preferences. Creating new institutions and introducing them
        into the institutional mix can be an effective means to control such drift.
        But prioritizing control can come at the cost of conflict among the several institutions within the complex and thus at the cost of substantive efficiency.
        
        regime complexity in the euro crisis: dynamic among the troika and the other institutions that were involved in the formulation and implementation of the financial rescue programmes.
        Examining the interplay between multilateral and regional institutions, this study introduced the framework of regime complexity to the analysis of international finance. As detailed in the sections below, this approach privileges states’ strategies to control their institutions as a principal motivation to evolve complexes and predicts that they will sometimes tradeoff substantive gains in pursuit of this strategy.
        control Is the motivation for mixing institutions together to solve a particular substantive challenge is theoretically
        novel.
      - GERMANY AND THE EURO CRISIS
        large gaps emerge between the preferences of powerful states and the behaviour of international financial institutions. This was also abundantly true of the European institutions in the euro crisis. By introducing the IMF into the institutional
        mix, as we shall see, Germany prevented the European Commission from drifting outside the set of solutions that were politically acceptable domestically. The choice increased institutional complexity, but Northern creditor
        states made it deliberately. Germany distrusted the European Commission.
        TROIKA:
        
        IMF
        
        EC
        
        European Central Bank
        
        Germany introduced the IMF to rein in the EC and align it with domestic politically acceptable solutions. It was not experimentalism, but deliberate startegic choice.
        Germany (key creditor countries) called upon the IMF
        mainly because they did not trust the European Commission to negotiate the programmes that they preferred. In these cases, regime complexity was therefore a consequence of states’ strategies to control agency drift.
        The European Commission’s role as the negotiating agent for the government creditors was severely complicated by the fact that it was responsible for advancing the interest of the
        European Union as a whole.
        Creditor and debtor states had opposing interests (preference heterogeneity), which inevitably engendered creditors’
        distrust of the Commission.
        They sought intergovernmental institutional solutions that operated outside the regular legislative process (the Community
        method) and reserved national vetoes over financial assistance. Under the unanimity decision rule, creditors like Germany were in a position to insist on including the IMF as a condition for approving such assistance.
        
        These institutions collaborated in providing loan packages for the crisis-stricken countries and defining the policy reforms that would be exacted from the borrowing governments as a quidpro quo. But each of the institutions in the troika had its own constraints and imperatives. So, while they signed off as a group on programmes and periodic reviews of countries’
        implementation, the troika institutions often disagreed on analysis, forecasts,
        and specific policy measures.
        
        Conflict as a Tool for Mediation: The frequent public disagreements between the IMF and European institutions (e.g., over Greek debt restructuring) were not a sign of failure but a consequence of state strategy. Such conflicts allow powerful states to act as mediators, ultimately tilting the final decision toward their own domestic political preferences.
      - complexity for control
  - - - ORCHESTRATION: Research on multilateral development finance should consider the ascending role of the EU as an orchestrator of blending facilities to finance infrastructure development in all the regions of the world.
        A mode of indirect governance where an IO mobilizes intermediaries to achieve goals that neither could reach alone. The EU has increasingly adopted this role to manage its own development facilities.
      - FOCALITY: This represents the degree to which an international organization (IO) is the single leader in a regime complex, where its standards and expertise are accepted by others. The author argues that focality is a matter of degree rather than a fixed state.
    - - 2000-2006: cooperative competition and the neutralty-control dilemma. Following the institutional shock of the Santer Commission's resignation and the geopolitical impact of 9/11, the EU became more assertive. This phase was defined by a "neutrality-control dilemma". While the EU used WB trust funds to maintain "neutrality" in fragile regions, it simultaneously pushed for more control and visibility to ensure funds aligned with EU human rights and security agendas. A major investigation by OLAF into funds for Palestinian territories in 2003 highlighted the EU's growing demand for accountability.
      - 2007 and beyond: EU orchestration-by-interaction and the new EU apporach of blended finance (strategic mix of EU grants and private resources). EU africa infrastructured Trust fund. This signaled a shift where the EU replicated WB practices to create its own institutional tools, effectively challenging the WB's monopoly on non-core lending.
      - 1990-1999: cooperation and complementarity and the EU largely supported World Bank leadership.
- - - - Weaker regulation for capital and low taxes
      - Downward pressure on labour standards
      - Pressure on lowskilled workers in rich industrialized countries
        
        upskilling effect and automation
      - EMBEDDED LIBERALISM: In a
        special issue of International Organization published in 1982, Ruggie argued that this blend of liberal multilateralism and domestic interventionism had guided the international
        regimes for money and trade since the conclusion of World War II
        By actively managing the domestic economy, providing a robust social safety net, and otherwise taking steps to buffer the domestic effects of multilateralism, governments had prevented a globalization backlash and fostered support for the liberal international economic order.
      - Challenges to EL: The Distributional Consequences of Global
        Digital Interdependence
        
        Less-Skilled Workers As Distributional Losers
        
        hallenges to Regulating Capital
        
        Challenges to Regulating Labor: In addition to harming lower-skilled workers and increasing the impediments to regulating capital, global digital interdependence has weakened the ability of governments to regulate and safeguard labor.
  - - - IDENTITY POLITICS: reshape of identitites; racial capitalism, BLM, Differential impact of covid based on the social class you belong to; hierarcy and not anarchy depending on issue areas (new authority sites).
        Implications of the nature of globalization today: the role of power and culture and the institutionalization of transnational political authority in both formal and everyday ways
      - INEQUALITY AND COVID. It not income related: gender and etnicity.
        The gap between super rich and super poor people has been widening.
        Girl's education opportunities in low-income countries went down.
      - AUTHORITY
        In the past, many assumed that contentious politics were firmly
        anchored around the political authority of the nation-state—as the international realm meant state-to-state negotiations or technocratic delegation to international
        organizations.
        Now political authority is now exerted and contested from the town level through state levels, regional levels, national levels, transnational, and supranational levels.
        Globalization has simultaneously broken the monopoly of authority held by the nation-state and created new opportunity structures for change and sites for contestation.
        
        As the pandemic has demonstrated, the scale and level of political authority is becoming ever more fluid, while at the same time dramatically more contested.
- - - - Mercantilism sought to enrich nations by restricting imports and encorauging exports. Smith argued that such policies hurt national welfare, because they distorted production and consumption for the benefit of special interests (producers), at the expense of consumers.
        Smith advocated for free, competitive markets guided by individual self-interest naturally maximize a nation’s wealth and efficiency.
        Mercantilist restrictions, in contrast, hinder growth, misallocate resources, and privilege producers over consumers.
    - - Mill gave his qualified endorsement to temporary protection for “infant industries,” defined as industries that were not initially capable of surviving in the face of import competition but with time and experience could grow to compete successfully in world markets. Mill caused great consternation among economists by sanctioning this argument for protection, although he eventually (but quietly) recanted his endorsement of tariffs as the means of supporting such industries.
        Support was acceptable if it:
        
        protection might be defensible in a "young and rising nation" to help it acquire the skill and experience necessary to compete
        
        The protection must be strictly temporary
        
        The industry must eventually be able to survive without it
        
        Duties should be on a gradually diminishing scale
      - List criticized the cosmopolitan school and liberal political economy as it neglected the impact of history on growth and ignored political insecurity. Learning economies.
  - - - hinder substitutions
      - discourage the opportunities for closure/exit
- - - - instrument: rules and procedures (power). When instruments change, we witness a norm-governed change as norms and social purposes remain the same
      - normative framework: norms and principles (ideas)
  - - - moral hazard
        Moral hazard is particularly acute for countries
        that anticipate generous treatment from the IMF because of direct overrepresentation
        or strong political or economic ties to influential states within the institution.
        
        countries that are politically influential vis-à-vis the IMF will
        hold a lower level of precautionary international reserves because the IMF offers a readily available and attractive insurance mechanism. On the other hand, countries
        with limited political influence vis-à-vis the IMF will purse self-insurance by holding a higher level of reserves.
        
        Political influence vis-à-vis the IMF will be associated with more frequent financial crises. This follows from the asymmetrical
        moral hazard generated by expectations of generous treatment by the IMF.
        Expectations of IMF favoritism create incentives for policymakers to pursue risky policies—for example, holding low levels of reserves, loosening financial regulations, or promoting short-term capital inflows—and for private actors to pursue
        risky lending and investments on the assumption that a generous bailout will be forthcoming in the event of a crisis.
      - greater political influence vis-à-vis the IMF is associated with:
        
        more generous treatment by the IMF (higher likelihood of receiving IMF lending with fewer conditions);
        
        underinsurance (lower level of international reserves);
        
        more frequent financial crises (higher likelihood of currency and banking crises).
        
        All this has consequence in the international trade regime
    - - that Taiwan’s reserves increased sharply after its expulsion from the IMF in 1980.
        Taiwan’s expulsion shifted its status from a relatively privileged member of the IMF (overrepresentatio and voting shares) to maximal absence of privilege, that is, no expectation of IMF assistance what soever. This change should be associated with a buildup of international reserves as IMF moral hazard was abruptly removed.
        
        by 1991,Taiwan’s reserve holdings exceeded much larger economies such as Japan, the United States, and Germany to become the largest in the world in absolute terms.
- - - - The exporter-led regime bolstered trade liberalization and finessed labour’s opposition. The result was economic growth. But the regime was never deeply internalized, and there was insufficient attention to the domestic consequences of deep market liberalization and the growth of inequality.
        The absence of
        
        either meaningful limits on trade liberalization or
        
        compensating mechanisms for those hurt by the LIO
        
        sowed the seeds of organized resistance at home and abroad. The regime suffered an original sin: by purposefully ignoring the voice of import-sensitive firms and workers at the start, it failed to develop the means to balance its drive toward deep integration with the social costs of global competition.
      - Adjustment Policies Were Weak and Ineffective
        The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) was chronically underfunded and poorly designed, as provided short-term income support but failed to retrain workers or restore long-term earnings.
        Absence of strong adjustment policies, the US relied on trade remedies such as antidumping and countervailing duties
      - The US-led trade regime succeeded economically but failed politically. By prioritizing exporter interests and sidelining labour, US institutions generated deep liberalization without adequate domestic compensation. As globalization intensified—especially after China’s WTO accession—this design produced backlash across the political spectrum. The erosion of US support for the WTO is therefore a predictable outcome of the regime’s original institutional foundations, not a deviation from them.
  - - - But these trade agreements, numerous as they are, also vary substantially one from another. These differences include the
        
        coverage of the agreements,
        
        the balance of concessions between the parties to the agreement,
        
        whether the agreement forms part of an ongoing process of wider economic integration.
        
        whether or not freer factor flows are included (as in the EU)
        
        whether agreements seek to go beyond the
        coverage of GATT at the time (services in CUSTA; environment and labor standards in NAFTA)
        
        whether financial transfers are included;
        
        whether industrialization objectives (including production-sharing agreements) are included;
        
        whether payments arrangements are a central feature of the agreement.
- - - - the erosion of American hegemony during the 1970s was not accompanied by an immediate collapse of cooperation, as the crude theory of hegemonic stability would have predicted. Since the level of institutionalization of postwar regimes was extremely high by historical standards, with intricate and extensive
        networks of communication among working-level officials, we should expect the lag between the decline of American hegemony and the disruption of international regimes to be quite long and the "inertia" of the existing regimes relatively great.
        international regimes are easier to maintain than to construct. The principles, rules, institutions, and procedures of international regimes, and the informal patterns of in teraction that develop in conjunction with them, become useful to governments as arrangements permitting communication and there
        fore reducing transaction costs and facilitating the exchange of infor mation. As they prove themselves in this way, the value of the functions they perform increases. Thus even if power becomes more diffused among members, making problems of collective action more severe, this disadvantage may be outweighed by the agreement-facilitating effects of the information provided by the regime.
      - International regimes provide
        
        decrease in transaction costs
        
        certainty and information
        
        assymetrical information;
        
        moral hazard
        
        irresponsibility
        
        legal liability, even in the absence of a centralized government
    - - cooperation: Cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations—which are not in pre-existent harmony—be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as "policy coordination."
        A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made
        in them, such that the adverse consequences of any one decision
        for other decisions are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, or counterbalanced or overweighed.
        Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination. To summarize more formally, intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination.
        Cooperation, different form harmony, is highly political:
        somehow, patterns of behavior must be altered.
      - discord: a situation in which governments regard each others' policies as hindering the attainment of their goals, and hold each other responsible for these
        constraints.
        Discord often leads to efforts to induce others to change their pol
        icies; when these attempts meet resistance, policy conflict results.
        Each actor's policies are regarded by others as hindering the attainment of their goals.
        
        discord can lead to cooperation or to conflict, depending on the attempt to adjust the policies.
        Cooperation takes place only in situations in which actors perceive that their policies are actually or potentially in conflict, not where there is harmony.
        Cooperation should not be viewed as the absence of conflict, but rather as a reaction to conflict or potential conflict. Without the specter of conflict, there is no need to cooperate.
      - harmony: Harmony refers to a situation in which actors' policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others) automatically facilitate the attainment of others' goals. Where harmony reigns, cooperation is unnecessary.
      - International regimes: Ruggie (1975) and Krasner (1982).
        sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules
        and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.
        Principles, norms, rules, and procedures all contain injunctions about behavior: they prescribe certain actions and proscribe others. They imply obligations, even though these obligations are not enforceable through a hierarchical legal system
- - - - neoliberalism: states are atomistic actors concerned with absolute gains and where the utility function equals the payoff U=V. They only seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating,
        the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action.
        
        Even if Neoliberals acknowledged the starting point of international anarchy and the absence of a regulator superior governmetn, they fail to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy.
        
        duration is a positive factor in pursuing a cooperation agreement
      - neorealist: states are positional in character, and realists argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain more
        from cooperation than they do. Relative gains and cheating problem.
        Realism's identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that states in anarchy fear for their survival as independent actors.
        U= V-k(W-V) where W is the rival payoff and k>0 the sensitivity coefficient which gets larger as the rivalry becomes stiffer. W-V is the gap in the payoff
      - according to the realist thinkers, cooperation can still exists under relative power constrains, when:
        
        the agreement has a short duration;
        
        issue linkages impede cooperation;
        
        there is a big number of players.
        
        Exit from the agreement if the counterparts start to gain more
- - - - finance, knowledge, production and security
    - - There has been a fundamental change in the nature of diplomacy. Governments must now bargain not only with other governments, but also with firms or enterprises, while firms now bargain both with governments and with one another. As a corollary of this, the nature of the competition between states has changed, so that macroeconomic management and industrial policies may often be as or even more important for governments than conventional foreign policies as conventionally conceived.
    - - Consequences of structural change:
        
        south-south divide: Developing countries are now acutely aware that they are competing against each other, the laggards desperately trying to catch up with the successful newly industrialized countries
        
        post-soviet transition and the role of telecomunications
        
        shift in FDI-MNCs directions: US-Japan relations
      - STATE-FIRM diplomacy The net result of these structural changes is that there now is greatly intensified competition among states for world market shares. That competition is forcing states to bargain with foreign firms to locate their operations within the territory of the state, and with national firms not to leave home, at least not entirely.
      - FIRM-FIRM diplomacy Firms bargain with each otehr to enhance their chances of success in the competition for world market shares. Firms increasingly form strategic alliances and partnerships with one another—even while remaining competitors—to share risks and expertise in global markets. Risk management and benefits sharing.
  - - - 1995-2003
        During this time, private creditors were hostile to the creation of explicit rules for sovereign debt. They initially rejected Collective Action Clauses (CACs), fearing they would encourage defaults and undermine creditor rights. They only eventually accepted CACs as a strategic "lesser evil" to prevent the implementation of the more radical, treaty-based Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)
      - 2012-2014
        In contrast, during this later period, creditors became proactive proponents of even stronger "aggregated CACs". This shift occurred following the "shocks" of the Greek and Argentine debt crises, which demonstrated how "vulture funds" (holdouts) could hijack the restructuring process, harming the collective interests of the broader financial market
    - - constructivism : interpret
        
        logic of meaning
        
        logic of congnition
        
        logic of uncertainty
      - historical institutionalism : anticipate
        preference change is a "point-to-point" comparison where actors judge new changes against their experience with past institutional arrangements.
        Experience of Greece and Argentina external shocks
- - - - the Nexus policy concept is an example of
        increased regime complexity. On the one side, it possesses post-hierarchical features, such as
        
        indirect governance by orchestration,
        
        exhibits several experimentalist traits, such as open-ended goals, a networked approach to policy definition and monitoring, and a strong emphasis on the role of local knowledge and agency
        
        Originally orchestrated by the UN, the Triple Nexus relies on the contribution of multiple actors (local communities, states, IOs, NGOs) at different governance levels.
        “orchestration entails the creation, support and
        integration of a multi-actor system of indirect governance, to pursue common goals that neither the orchestrator nor the orchestrated players would be able to achieve separately”.
        
        GLOBAL EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE
        GXG is characterised
        
        by a shared perception of a common problem: common perspection that challenges in fragile contexts would
        be best addressed as a common problem. poverty-reducing, democracy-enhancing post-conflict reconstruction efforts of the 2000s, were rooted in widely shared understandings of the interdependencies between HDP challenges;
        
        by the creation of a framework for a common understanding on how to respond to such problem to achieve open-ended goals: develop a common framework towards the
        definition of open-ended goals to address cross-policy challenges in fragile countries. Collaborative endeavours followed, with the creation of a UN-WBG Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations (2017) and a UN-WB Joint Steering Committee on Humanitarian and Development Collaboration (2018). Most notably, the elaboration of an OECD-DAC Joint Recommendation on HDP linkages was the first multilateral document that provided both principled and operational guidelines to bridge the gap between high-level goals and existing processes on the ground;
        
        by the implementation of those goals by actors at lower governance levels, based on their knowledge of and adaptability to local contexts;
        
        by the constant production of feedbacks from local contexts on outcomes that are peer-reviewed horizontally;
        
        by a regular reassessment and redefinition of goals and practices
    - - The humanitarian-development ‘leg’ of the Triple Nexus was the first to be engaged multilaterally, during the African food crisis in the 1980s (Singer 1985). However, it was the
        post-Cold War (apparent) success of the US democratic unipole and the rise in number and severity of civil wars that provided traction to include the peace component.
        Two major turning-points redefined the debate between HDP practitioners at the turn of the century: the UN-sponsored millennium development goals (MDGs) and the ter
        rorist attacks of 9/11.
    - - both Myanmar and the DRC are challenging scenarios to
        analyse Nexus performance, ranking first in East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively, on major conflict and fragility indicators (namely, number of refugees and intern
        ally displaced persons [IDPs], intensity of state-based violence, number of armed groups and active conflicts, level of internationalisation of domestic conflicts: see Uppsala
        Conflict Data Program [2022]; UNHCR [2023])
  - - - Identifying practices: Analyzing recurring patterns of action and the "anchoring practices" that structure the policy.
        
        goal setting as an anchoring practice
        
        seven key practicies
        
        holding a high-level plenary meeting
        
        creating an interagency coordination mechanism
        
        holding public hearings
        
        launching a worldwide survey
        
        establishing a panel of eminent persons
        
        establishing an experts group
        
        goal setting (anchoring practice)
      - Mapping value debates: Uncovering ideological conflicts (cleavages) and the "polysemous compromises" used to bridge them. Mapping the key value debates that structure the process.
        
        problem definition, cleavages and polysemous compromise
      - mapping the global policymaking space. This essentially involves identifying the key actors and sites of policymaking
- - - - Keohane and Nye: concept of complex interdependece "Power and Interdependence (1977)".
        
        Multiple channels of communications
        
        absence of hierarchy among issues
        
        the state in so longer the only relevant actor in IR
        
        power fragmentation
        
        transational dimension
        
        diminished role for military force.
        
        These two intellectual entrepreneurs, are called as weak neo-liberals, as they kept recognizing that the State and power and security consideration remain importnat (that's the root of their thought)
        
        The key, they contended, lay in the increasing fragmentation and diffusion of power in economic affairs, stemming from the growing interconnectedness of national economies.
        The liberalization of trade and nance was widening the range of
        “transnational” relations, adding new cross-border contacts, coalitions, and interactions beyond those controlled by the foreign policy organs of government.
      - Robert Gilpin. He recognized the role of States. He was a chief defender of the older realist tradition and Transnationalism could only be understood within the context of the traditional state
        system.
        In Gilpin’s words “Politics determines the framework of economic activity and channels it in directions which tend to serve . . . political objectives”
        
        “the reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power.” By the pursuit of wealth, Gilpin had in mind the realm of economics: the role of markets and material incentives, which are among the central concerns of mainstream economists
    - - Susan Strange questioned the role of the US as a benevolent agent/hegemon--> question authority.
        "International Economics and In
        ternational Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect” (Strange 1970). She wanted to fill the gap between political scientists and economists.
        By the mid-twentieth century, the relationship between the two disciplines could best be described as nonexistent, a dialogue of the deaf.
        The void between international economics and IR had endured for too long, she declared, leading scholars from both traditions to neglect fundamental changes in the world economy
  - - - OEP is an inside out approach where everything starts a the domestic level, neglecting non-material, ideational drivers, structural power and relational dynamics.
        Economic rationality and micro-economic analysis.
- - - - DEMOCRACY with legislative power (C) and executive (P). The legislative power wants to raise tariffs to protect its lobby interests (Legislators are generally assumed to be more protectionist than executives because they represent smaller, interest-group-focused constituencies), while P, pursuing the whole country's interest will bargain to lower the tariffs.
        In addittion, P needs the approal of the legislative body to enact the preferred trade policies. Role of domestic legislative in the democracies
        
        Democracies contribute to a greater tendency for pairs of democratic countries to agree upon lower trade barriers, than pairs comprised of a democracy and an autocracy (mixed-pairs). Even if the legisaltive body is more protectionist, yet pairs of democracies are more likely than mixed pairs to liberalize commerce.
        The paper posits a counterintuitive finding: the presence of a protectionist legislature in a democracy can actually lead to lower trade barriers.
        Accountability
        
        In international negotiations, the threat of a legislative veto forces democratic executives to seek more significant trade concessions from their partners. A democracy lowers its trade barreirs more when it seeks mutually acceptable concessions with another democracy than when it deal with an autocracy. Compromise to avoid trade war.
        "the possible veto of a trade deal by one or both legislatures in the dyad may lead the executives to search for lower mutually acceptable levels of trade barriers" than they would if those legislatures didn't exist.
      - AUTOCRACY with executive power (A)
      - differences between democracies and autocraceis:
        
        competitive process through which a country's chief executive is selected;
        
        the openness of that process;
        
        there are constrains on a chief exectutive's decision making authority;
        
        the competitiveness of political participation within a country;
        
        the degree to which binding rules govern political poarticiaption within it,
  - - - A large and widening gap opened up between the West’s
        international ambitions and its domestic political capacity to support them.
        Gap bewteen commitments and willing to bear them
      - We trace these pressures back to decisions that Western
        governments made after the Cold War ended. The key decisions were to globalize markets and pool sovereignty at the supranational level, while at the same time relaxing the social protections and guarantees that domestic support for international engagement had long rested upon. As we show, this combination of policies succeeded in expanding the Western- led system, but at the cost of mounting domestic discontent and division.