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Anti Trust - Coggle Diagram
Anti Trust
History
Common law
Early Days 19 teens
Structuralism
VOn's Grocery
Chicago and Chicago Reaction
Neo Brandeisian
Enforcement
FTC
States
DOJ Antitrust Division
Private Parties
Three Pillars of Anti Trust Liability
Prohibition on agreements "in restraint of trade"
Sherman Act Section 1
Elements
The Agreement constitutes an unlawful restraint of trade
Standards of Review
Rule of reason review
prima facie burden on the plaintiff
direct evidence. So demonstrated competitive harm.
Market power + something with a tendency to harm competition
Rebut
Plaintiff has a sur rebuttal
Quick look review
Per se or naked violations
Trenton Pottery
Vacuum, "Hot Oil" just fixing prices is anti competitive, and price fixing goes beyond picking an exact price.
an agreement
Threshold inquiry about their being more than one entity involved
Still, sometimes different aspects of the "same entity" can agree or conspire for the purposes of section 1.
American Needle
A multiplicity of actors is required
Copperweld
Open question: Split ownership or partial ownership?
Evidentiary standards for conspiracy (circumstantial standards)
To avoid a motion to dismiss. Mere parallelism observed parallelism is not sufficient for an agreement.
Twombly
Text messaging
Litigation by Posner. Circumstantial facts were sufficient in this case. Opportunity, sudden price change and price hike,
Direct evidence. Emails about "colusive" conduct
Matsuhita v. Zenith
Evidence must tend to exclude the possibility of independent action. (quoting Monsanto)
Monsanto v. Spray Rite
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine to conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize..."
Sherman Act Section 2
&
Hart, Scott, Rodino
Mergers and acquisitions. Clayton Act Section 7
Market Definition (more or less required in all antitrust cases) ("reasonably interchangeable")
Brown Shoe Approach. More intuitive. "Practical Indicia"
SSNIP Approach. Economics based and more technical. Hopefully makes use of cross price elasticity data. Is the imagined market one that it would be worthwhile to control, or is the proposed "market" just a part of a wider market, and so a part of that market's vigorous competition.
Examples: Dupont (Cellophane), FTC v. Facebook, U.S. v. H&R Block