I think this analysis of ‘hegemonic statecraft’ is true in a certain sense, but also seems to want to move away from the fact that the spectacle is definitely still there; just look at Sudan, Congo, Palestine, and even the US comparatively to inarguably fascist regimes like Francoist Spain, Nazi Germany, or Mussolini’s Italy. the change to me seems to be the double-headed nature of fascism means that it can zip between the poles of naked and benign or exist in a superposition of multiple points at once as needed. I worry that the focus on spectacle can actually misapprehend how Spectacle works, which encompasses both slow/mundane violence as described in this paper and the fast/sensational/spectacular violence that we normally associate with fascism. The article hits on the slow violence, which is great, and the tone has a very mobilizing verve to it, but I really worry about how this metamorphic framing, while powerful, obfuscates the actual dynamics at play. That is to say, there is no neat-and-tidy separation between the violence of a fascist machine of yore and the hegemonic statecraft of the present. I think the point I want to make is that liberalism and fascism are not different enough so as to be pitted against each other in a grander sense than any other inter-imperialist type conflicts where non-elites lose no matter what. I think that the unquestioned hegemony of the state limits analysis here since that is a big source of issues in this context. Even in the referring to Fanon (and in positing developmental statecraft as its negation), there seems to be no interest (per usual) in exploring his skepticism of states and what they mean/end up being. Ironically the proposal for a “post-colonial” development kind of serves colonial ends by assuming that statecraft is a necessary component of “modern” ordering, its just about some arbitrary moral commitment that those in power have