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Homicide and defences - Coggle Diagram

- - - - R v Byrne- defined this as if they had a ‘state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal’
    - - The abnormality in functioning must be caused by the recognised medical condition and not something else
      - R v Dowds- voluntary intoxication (acute voluntary intoxication) is not a RMC but alcohol dependency syndrome is (alcoholic)
    - - S2(1A) to understand the nature of their conduct, to form a rational judgement, to exercise self-control
        
        Understanding nature of their conduct: Law Commission Report 304 example; if a little boy played violent video games all his life and when killing someone, did not understand that they couldn’t simply be revived like in the games
        
        Form a rational judgement: Law Commission Report 304 examples: woman suffering from PTSD following violent abuse from her husband, believes only burning her husband to death will rid the world of his sins
        
        To exercise self control: Law Commission 304 example: the devil takes control of him and implants a desire to kill, a desire that must be acted on before the devil will go away
      - R v Golds- ‘substantial’ should have it’s ordinary meaning and no direction to the jury should be required, but if it is, they would say substantial means greater than merely trivial
    - - S(1B) for the purposes of subsection (1)© an abnormality of mental functioning provides an explanation for D’s conduct if it causes or is a significant contributory factor in causing D to carry out that conduct
      - Dietschmann- defence can still operate if alcohol has played a part
      - R v Brennan- expert psychiatrist evidence is important and if the expert psychiatrist evidence is uncontested then they should not be convicted
    - - Where D has an abnormality of mental functioning separate from the intoxication: R v Dietschmann- the jury should consider if D would have, despite the drink: be suffering from mental abnormality and his mental abnormality substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his fatal acts? Defence can stand if alcohol still played a part
        
        R v Dowds: intoxication itself is still not capable for DR to be relied upon, a different recognised medical condition is necessary
      - Where D is intoxicated due to alcohol dependency syndrome: R v Wood- Jury must decide whether ADS was a significant factor leading D to consume the alcohol. If ADS was a significant factor, they can conclude D’s responsibility was impaired as a result of the abnormality of mental functioning
        
        R v Stewart- further guidance: jury should decide if there is an abnormality of mental functioning (ADS may assist). It would however be open to them to conclude at the time of the killing, D was not suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning
        
        factors to take into account when deciding if it substantially impaired them to do one of things in (1A): extent and seriousness of alcohol dependency, extent to which his ability to control drinking was reduced, whether capable of abstinence, whether he was choosing for a particular reason separate from the condition to drink more than usual, like an event
  - - - R v Clinton, Parker and Evans- look at the literal meaning of loss of self control
      - R v Richens- the loss of control does not need to be complete, but D must be unable to restrain themselves. Loss of temper is not enough
      - S54(2) the loss of control need not be sudden
      - S54(4) defence will not stand if it arises out of a considered desire for revenge
      - R v Ahluwalia- the longer the delay between between the qualifying trigger and the loss of control, the less likely it was actually a loss of control (old case law for provocation, but likely to still apply)
    - - S55 the qualifying trigger must be identified as the cause of the loss of control
      - S55(3) if D’s loss of self control was attributable to D’s fear of serious violence from V against D or another identified person
        
        S55(6)(a) D’s fear of serious violence is to be disregarded to the extent that it was caused by a thing D incited to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse for violence
        
        Seems this trigger could cover for self defence where the use of force was unreasonable so self defence cannot be used
      - S55(4) if D’s loss of self control was attributable to a thing or things said or done, or both, which
        
        S55(4)(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character and (b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged
        
        S55(6)(b) a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing said or done is not justifiable if D incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse for violence
        
        R v Clinton shows it is not enough for D to ‘start it’ to invoke S55(6), D must have had the intent to provoke the reaction that then led to the killing. It is only in rare cases that these subsections will apply
        
        Clinton- shows this should be evaluated objectively
        
        S55(6)(b) cannot use sexual infidelity as the things said or done for the anger trigger
        
        Clinton re sexual infidelity- if the main thing said or done was sexual infidelity, this is disregarded, even if someone is taunting about it. If it is contextual and is integral to understanding other aspects of the qualifying trigger, it can be taken into account- e.g. If there are other main qualifying triggers, and infidelity is just another contextual element, it can be taken into account to understand the whole picture. Likely where sexual infidelity has caused a loss of control, there will be other factors which could make a qualifying trigger, such as fear of losing the children, lose the home, then the infidelity must be taken into account so the jury knows ‘the whole story’
        
        Circumstances on their own are not enough (something must be said or done)
        
        circumstances of an extremely grave nature:
        
        R v Acott- driving in slow moving traffic caused by snow would not count as anger trigge
        
        Clinton- shows high standard for this and they should be considered objectively. Circumstances must be unusual and not a part of normal trials in life
        
        justifiable sense of being seriously wronged:
        
        Clinton- judged objectively
        
        Journal of Criminal Law 254- the word justifiable shows the sense of being wronged must accord with contemporary society’s norms and values in Britain
      - S55(5) applies if D’s loss of self control was attributable to a combination of matters contained in (3) and (4)
    - - S54(3) in reference to circumstances of D- refers to all D’s circumstances other than those whose only relevance is they affect D’s capacity for tolerance or self restraint
        
        bad temper, intoxication, extreme sensitivity, PTSD (Rejmanski), personality disorders
        
        These are circumstances and characteristics which will be considered in assessing the magnitude of the qualifying trigger, but ignored in assessing how much tolerance and self restraint the normal man would have
        
        Rejmanski: If a mental disorder has relevance to D’s conduct other than a bearing on capacity for tolerance, it will not be excluded under (3) so it is relevant to circumstances of D, but not relevant to degree of tolerance and control referred to in S54(1)©
        
        R v Wilcocks- If they are taunted about the characteristic that’s only relevance is to effect tolerance and control, then it can be taken into account under circumstances of D as it is now wholly relevant e.g. taunted about a personality disorder
        
        Things that affect tolerance and self restraint can be taken into account for circumstances, but disregarded for self restraint e.g. if D has PTSD, this is taken into account for magnitude of the qualifying trigger and circumstances, but disregarded when considering the degree of tolerance and self restraint D may have- they must always have NORMAL degree of tolerance and self restraint
        
        If D is an alcoholic, is drunk and taunted about being a pathetic drunkard- being an alcoholic is taken into account in that the taunting is more painful if it is true, it is considered for magnitude of qualifying trigger, and it is taken into account under the background circumstances of the normal person text, but the fact they are an alcoholic is not taken into account in how it would affect self restraint (if they could have a shorter temper, more moody due to withdrawal or the general condition). Intoxication itself (being drunk at the time) is always disregarded- you go through all the elements as if they are sober
        
        Clinton- sexual infidelity can be taken into account provided it does not ONLY go towards the capacity to exercise self restraint
      - Consider two things: (a) The gravity of the qualifying trigger to a person in D’s relevant circumstances (subjective)
        (b) Whether as a result of that trigger, a normal person might have done what D did or something similar (objective)
      - DPP v Camplin- to taunt a person because of his race, his physical infirmities or some shameful incident in his past may well be considered more offensive if the facts on which the taunt is true
    - - R v Asmelash: D is not necessarily barred from using loss of control just because they are intoxicated. Loss of control must however be approached without reference to the intoxication. If another sober person in D’s circumstances would react the same way they can still use it. If it were a person who had a severe alcohol problem and was taunted about it to the extent it formed a qualifying trigger, then then the alcohol problem can be considered as part of the circumstances
      - R v Morhall: The fact that he was addicted to glue was relevant as he was taunted about it so it was taken into account that it was true, in the gravity of the provocation, but the intoxication itself is excluded.