Please enable JavaScript.

Coggle requires JavaScript to display documents.

Theories of Wellbeing - Coggle Diagram

- - - - determine this by a panel of judges, who rank based on: intensity, duration, source of pleasure, complexity of experience
    - - abandoning hedonistic principles
      - introducing subjective measurment
      - creating incommensurable pleasure categories
      - Mill's counter argument
        
        quality is not mystical but an empirical property
        
        both quality and quantity contribute to overall value
        
        preferences of the judges reflect developed human potential
  - - - falsely assumes pleasure and pain are distinctly seperate
      - ignores interconnected nature of experiences
    - - pain is an unwanted experience - intensity is proportional to unwantedness
      - GRIFFIN's case of Freud preferring mental clarity over pain relief
  - - - explores comparative value: world where there are many lower pleasure, and a world where there is a single higher pleasure with numerous sufferings
  - - - confuses desirable with what can be desire
      - fails to distinguish between means and ends
      - overlooks complexity of human motivations
      - can pleasures be qualitatively different
        
        if they vary in quality, they cannot be the sole good - they have to vary in something which is the main criteria for desiring them
      - Naturalistic fallacy - good is an undefinable concept and we could replace it with another descriptive property under this fallacy.
        
        misses the essential, ineffable quality which is what we measure goodness in - links to different goods being qualitatively different
  - - - explains human motivation through pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidance - actions are driven by this ultimately
    - - pleasure is the sole good; pain is the sole evil - evaluates actions based on their capacity to generate pleasure or reduce pain
    - - not all pleasurable experiences are identical or easily comparable.
      - people care about more than just internal mental states - references the experience machine by Nozick
    - - welfare is connected to experience, but not reducible to simple pleasure calculations
      - the quality and context of experiences matter more than just their sensory qualities
      - enjoyment and suffering are more complex then just pleasant or painful sensations
      - "nothing can make our lives go better or worse unless it somehow affects the quality of our experiences"
  - - - happiness consists in large part in the exercise of higher capacities that distinguish us from other animals - DELIBERATIVE CONCEPTION OF HAPPINESS
    - - often thought that Mill uses a subjective conception of happiness - depends on psychological state of the individual. - hedonism - happiness consists in pleasurable mental states or sensations
      - HOWEVER - implies a desire-satisfaction or preference-satisfaction theory - happiness depends on what she wants and the satisfaction of this want
      - HOWEVER - we can explain this with preference hedonism - pleasure and pain are functional states: pleasure is a mental state or sensation such that the personal having it wants to continue and will undertake actions to prolong it (opposite for pain)
        
        Mill - higher or more valuable pleasures exist and links them with the preferences of a competent judge. - objective reading means that pleasures would appear to be intellectual activities and pursuits, rather than mental states
        
        however, hedonism argues that only mental states can have intrinsic value, and so these activities can only have extrinsic value
        
        MILL'S CLAIM GTHAT THE DOCTRINE OF HIGHER PLEASURES TRANSCENDS THE QUANTITATIVE HEDONIST CLAIM ABOUT THE GREATER EXTRINSIC VALUE OF INTELLECTUAL PURSUITS
- - - - defines utility through preference fulfillment
      - interprets desires propositionally or behaviourally
    - - desires change over time
      - difficulty in predicting long-term satisfaction
      - loose connection between desire fulfilment and actual well-being
  - - - aims to fulfill all desires throughout life
      - problematic when disconnected from experience or knowledge
    - - focuses on preferences about one's entire life
      - consideres deception as negatively impacting welfare
      - false beliefs make life objectively worse
    - - irrational desire exist, and we need to only consider informed desires to make use we understand what truly benefits welfare
  - - - ill-informed desires - desiring to drink from a polluted river when thirsty
        
        how do we evaluate desires with incomplete knowledge
      - irrational desires - avoiding necessary medical treatment
      - base desires - perpetual indulgence in morally questionable activities
        
        distinction between personal welfare and moral value; does this satisfaction contribute to welfare?
      - poorly cultivated desires - preferring Muzak over Mozart
        
        aesthetic and cultural value; potential for personal growth
      - artificially aroused desires - desires created by marketing campaigns
      - desires to be badly off - seeking punishment due to guilt
      - key theoretical distinction
        
        a desire must be informed, rational and have a high moral/aesthetic value to be a non-defective desire
  - - - oversimplifies welfare to market behaviour
      - ignores non-market choices and preferences
      - problematic assumption that choice always reflects true preferences
  - - - taste preferences, social needs and intellectual pursuits - a mix of subjective and objective perceptions of utility that can factor into any decision
  - - - veridical - genuine, real-world experiences (e.g. actually riding a horse)
      - non-veridical - imaginary or dream-like experiences (e.g. dreaming about riding a horse)
      - Coma case - challenges experience-based welfare theories - inability to capture ( authenticity of experiences; broader life context; accomplishment and meaning)
    - - present desire - welfare based on current desires; problematic due to temporal inconsistency
      - comprehensive desire - considers desires across entire life; attempts to maximise desire fulfillment
      - CHALLENGES
        
        desire doesn't alwasy align with actual welfare
        
        potential for irritation or harmful desire fulfilment
        
        lack of objective evaluation criteria
- - - - example - friend defends you without your knowledge - raises questions about whether an event can benefit you if you're unaware of it
      - wellbeing theories must balance - experiential impact; objective goods; personal capacity actualisation
    - - type level - general goods directly beneficial to a person
      - token level - specific events that advance well-being
    - - brute-list - consider general goods as prudential goods; no deeper grounding of goods
      - perfectionist - general goods are both prudential and perfectionist; goods are tied to human nature's fulfilment
  - - - by increasing these in our lives they will go better and we will have more pleasure both subjectively and objectively
        it has the ability to navigate multiple values and recognises that welfare can have multiple sources
- - - - focuses on internal experiences and consciousness
      - values experiences based on their qualitative nature
      - emphasises the importance of authentic experiences
    - - value is not purely experiential
      - do experiences which are disconnected from reality have meaning - coma patent thinks they have an experience, which does not actually happen (it is a dream), but this makes them better off anyway.