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Participation (UK) - Coggle Diagram

- - - - Held:
        
        Per principles of corporate liability and vicarious responsibility, Board = liable for their employee's acts, considered secondary offence committed by the lorry driver.
        
        Employee may not have intended to help the driver commit the offence but you don't have to prove it.
        
        He had committed AR of the crime, and all you need to prove now is the awareness of the risk that the acts and circumstances constitutint the offence existed
    - - R v Bainbridge [1960]:
        
        "... there must be not merely suspicion but knowledge that a crime of the type in question was intended, and that the equipment was bought with that in view".
- - - - S.8 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861:
        
        Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender
        
        aka the Principle in the 2nd degree
    - - R v Bainbridge [1960]:
        
        Facts: D bought equipment for X, where X used it in a crime
        
        Held: "...there must be not merely suspicion but knowledge that. crime of the type in question was intended, and that the equipment was bought with that in view"
        
        R v Bryce [2004]:
        
        Facts: D drove X to a campsite where X killed V. At the time of D's transporting him, X had not made up his mind as to whether to carry out the murder. D contended that his conviction of a murder was flawed, where at the time of his act the principal had not fully decided to murder.
        
        Held: CA ruled that to assist an offence D2 has must intentionally do an act that will help D1 commit an offence that D2 knows/believes there to be a possibility of D1 committing.
        
        For D2 to escape liability he must withdraw from the JCV and do something to counteract his earlier assistance. Simple repentance not enough
        
        There's sufficient causal connection
    - - R v Calhaem [1985]:
        
        Facts: D was convicted of murder under S.8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. She conselled Z to murder the C. D counselled Z to carry out the murder but had gone berserk and eventually killed C anyway. D appealed her conviction
        
        Held: Counsel - "to advise or solicit"
        
        No need for a causal connection between counselling and the killing
        
        As long as the killing was within the authority or advice of the principal
    - - R v Turner [1991]
      - R v Michael [1840]
    - - Right or power
        
        Bland [1988]
        
        Tuck v Robson [1970]
        
        Du Cros v Lambourne [1907]
      - Duty to act
        
        Gibson v Gibson [1984]
        
        Russell and Russel [1987]
- - - - cont.
        
        Per Lord Hutton: "But the rules of the common law are not based soely on logic but relate to practical concerns and, in relation to crimes committed in the course of joint enterprises, to the need to give effective protection to the public against criminals operating in gangs
    - - Held per HoL:
        
        if the course of a JE to cause serious injury (jointly attacking C), one of the participants (the perpetrator) intentionally kills C,
        
        that intention being unknown to and unforeseen by another participant (D),
        
        who only contemplated that the perpetrator would act with intention to cause serious harm and will not make the perpetrator's fatal act fundamentally different from the act which D foresaw as part of a JT
        
        Principal:
        
        To be liable for murder as part of a JE, a person must have realised that the principal offender might kill with the MR for murder
    - - cont.
        
        "...we don't consider that Chan Wing-Siu principle can be supported..."
        
        "...the principle was based on an incomplete, and in somer respects erroneous, reading of the previous case law, coupled with generalised and questionable policy arguments
        
        Held: To equate foresight with intent to assist in an error. The correct approach is to treat it as evidence of intent
        
        Principal:
        
        Must have intention to assist
        
        To equate foresight with intent to assist is an error
        
        The correct approach is to treat it as evidence of intent
    - - Intent:
        
        To assist, encourage, or procure the commission of the offence by principal
        
        Knowledge:
        
        Knowledge of any circumstance required for the AR
      - No common intention?
        
        R v Day [2001]:
        
        Facts: D convicted of manslaughter
        
        Held: 'The fact that D had intended to inflict lesser harm on C than his co-defendants was found not to have negated the existence of such an enterprise where his participation in a common plan to cause some harm had been established"
        
        Appeal dismissed
      - Withdrawal:
        
        A secondary party who has offered assistance to the principal or is a party to a JE may escape liability if he decides not to take part (or take any further part) in the illegal activity
        
        R v Becerra [1976]:
        
        Facts: D, cooper and another set out to commit a burglary. D gave cooper knife to use against anyone who might interrupt them. They heard someone approaching, D said "come on let's go" and went through the window. Cooper stayed and stabbed the man to death
        
        Held: D's words were not enough to constitute a withdrawal from the crime. It was at a very late stage
        
        Rook [1993]:
        
        Facts: D was involved in a plan to murder. He later changed his mind and decided not to take part. On the day of murder, he made sure he was not home when his other friends attended.
        
        Held: Conduct not sufficient to constitute a withdrawal = still liable as secondary party to murder