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Nervous Shock: Liability for Psychiatric Injury- pre-Hillsborough Disaster…

- - - - Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1951]
        
        Crane driver witnessed load dropping from his crane into hold of ship and feared injury to his workmates; a duty was held to be owed
        
        Hunter v British Coal [1998]- C accidentally knocked badly sited water hydrant in coal mine
        
        30 metres away, hydrant exploded and 10 minutes later, ld co-worker was dead
        
        C blamed himself and developed psychiatric illness as a result. D not liable, as C not present at the time of injury
        
        D not liable, as C not present at the time of injury
- - - - Brice v Brown [1984]
        
        A girl and mother injured in accident in taxi
        
        Mother, emotionally unstable, suffered nervous shock
        
        Refined the test for "normal fortitude"- would a person or ordinary phlegm or fortitude have suffered nervous shock in these circumstances?
        
        If not then no claim, If yes, then C can recover for full extent of shock, even if person of "customary phlegm" (Refers to the expected stoicism or emotional restraint within a specific group or profession) wouldn't have suffered shock to that extent
        
        What about the thin skull rule???
- - - - D) Rescuers- a new approach from Chadwick
        
        Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999]
        
        CA decision—actions brought by number of police officers on duty during Hillsborough disaster
        
        Rescuers exempt from requirement to show close tie of love and affection with primary victim
        
        Duty extends to injury resulting from C being exposed in course of duty to exceptionally horrific events, during incident caused by negligence of employer
        
        D owed rescuer owed rescuer a duty of care in respect of psychiatric injury sustained during rescue even if rescuer was a secondary victim, and employer owes employee the same duty where psychiatric injury caused in the course of their employment
        
        White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] (same case as Frost just different name on appeal)
        
        Claim for psychiatric injury rejected
        
        To allow employees to claim damages as primary victims of injuries caused by employer to third parties would not be fair, just and reasonable
        
        Duty of employer to protect employee from physical injury did not extend to psychiatric injury where no breach of duty to protect from physical injury
        
        Rescuers who are not exposed to physical injury, and did not reasonably believe themselves to be so exposed, are secondary victims
        
        Key legal takeaways from White:
        1) Primary victim test is narrow:
        To qualify as a primary victim, you must be
        a) involved in the event, and in actual danger, or
        b) believe you were in danger of physical harm (e.g. Page v Smith)
        The officers did not meet this criteria
        2) Being a rescuer does not equal automatic entitlement
        
        Previous cases like Chadwick v British Railways Board allowed rescuers to claim, but in Chadwick, the claimant had been exposed to physical danger
        
        In White, rescuers were NOT in danger, so they couldn't leap over the hurdles that apply to secondary victims
        
        3) Policy considerations—Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffman expressed concerns about
        - Extending liability too far
        - Creating inconsistent outcomes (why should police receive compensation when relatives of victims could not)
        
        - The law needing coherence and consistency