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COMPETITION LAW - Coggle Diagram

- - - - 2 scenarios
        
        Merged entity has >= 40% market share
        
        Merged entity has market share between 20-40%
        AND
        Post-merger, CR3 >= 70%
    - - Unilateral / Non-Coordinated Effects
        
        Potential for merged entity to raise prices or reduce output, quality, or innovation independently, without needing to coordinate with other firms in the market.
        
        Where competitors are ineffective competitive constraints
      - Coordinated Effects
        
        Post-merger firms find it profitable to raise prices etc. in a way that limits competition
      - Market Foreclosure
        
        Prevent rivals from accessing SS or DD side markets
      - Defence of Efficiency
        
        Merger increases efficiencies, such that no SLC results
        
        NEEs >> SLC
  - - - S54(7) Exceptions
        
        Liquidator acquiring control
        
        Merging firms under same control
        
        Control acquired by death
        
        Securities
      - Fourth Schedule Exceptions
        
        Mergers approved by Government
        
        Specified Activities e.g. letters, water, wastewater,, bus, rail and cargo terminal operations
        
        Net Economic Benefit >> SLC
    - - Legal Control
        
        More than 50% voting rights
        
        30-50% = presumption of ownership;
      - De Facto Control (influence in other ways)
      - Joint Venture - Joint control by 2 or more parent undertakings - Autonomous economic entity - Lasting basis
      - Acquisition of influential Minority Shareholding
        e.g. veto powers over key matters
- - - - Test: Ability to sustain prices above competitive levels
      - 60% Market Share = Presumption of Dominance
      - Collective Dominance
        (2 Cos acting tgt)
  - - - DD Side
        
        All products on the DD side that the buyers regard as substitutes for the product under investigation
      - SS Side
        
        How quickly, undertakings could start supplying a market in response to a HM attempting to sustain supra competitive prices
    - - DD Side
        
        Ask if a 10% increase in price of a product in one area would lead to buyers switching to sellers in neighbouring areas.
        
        Continue adding neighbouring areas till supra normal profits cannot be sustained
      - SS Side
        
        Where Suppliers within the same geographic market are able to enter (1) quickly, (2) effectively, and (3) with no sunk investments
- - - - Presumed to always have an appreciable adverse effect on competition, regardless of the subject intent of the parties : Price-fixing - Market-sharing - Bid-rigging - Output limitation - Information exchanges
    - - Test: Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition Test
        
        Information sharing (non-price or historical data)
        
        Standardisation Agreements
        
        Conduct via Industry Associations
  - - - Para 1
        
        Entrusted with operation of service by public authority
        
        Services of General Economic Interest
        
        Required to perform the task in economically unacceptable conditions
        OR Undertaking granted an exclusive right to provide the service, rendering it the monopoly provider of that service.