Balanced realism acknowledges that legal reasoning can be indeterminate, granting judges some flexibility in interpreting and applying the law, while also emphasizing the constraints that promote predictability in judicial decisions. It recognizes that judges, especially in complex cases, exercise discretion and may manipulate legal rules and precedents to some degree, aligning with the realist view that judicial decisions are not purely mechanical but influenced by factors beyond legal rules. However, unlike more radical forms of legal realism, balanced realism highlights several limiting factors on judicial discretion. These include practice-related constraints, such as precedent, consistency, and professional norms; social influences, like public opinion, societal values, and potential backlash; and institutional factors, including the structure of the judiciary, the judicial appointment process, and the possibility of review by higher courts. As a result, balanced realism asserts that while judicial decisions are not entirely determined by legal rules, they remain generally predictable and tend to fall within a range of legally justifiable outcomes, avoiding purely subjective or politically motivated judgments. Tamanaha argues that this perspective is not exclusive to legal realists but is also shared by many judges and scholars, including formalists, thus blurring the traditional distinction between formalism and realism.