There are two-well established and accepted rules of criminal law.
(a) If D causes the actus reus by a different method than they intended they are nevertheless liable. Thus, if D intended to kill V by stabbing them but after the first stab V fell and struck their head on a kerb, the blow killing them, D is clearly guilty of murder and cannot claim that the death is accidental. They intended to kill V; by theur actions they have killed V; they have mens rea in relation to the actus reus; they are liable
(b) If D is mistaken as to the identity of V, they are nevertheless liable. Thus if D shoots at V thinking they are Smith but in fact they are Jones and Jones dies, D is clearly guilty of murder. Again, D has committed the actus reus of murder; they had the requisite mens rea; they are liable
However, what of the following scenarions?
(a) What if D fires their gun at Smith, but misses and hits a passaing stranger, Jones, and kills them? If D was unaware of the existence of Jones, can they nevertheless be liable for murder?
(b) What if D throws a brick at SMith, but misses and breaks a wondow near Smith? If D was unaware of the existence of the window, can they be liable for criminal damage?
The response of English law to these situations is clear.
(a) D will be liable for murder. They intended to cause the actus reus of murder. Their malice against Smith is transferred to Jones. The actus reis of murder is killing. ahuman being. This they have done intentionally; the identity of the victim is irrelevant. The leading illustration of this principle is Latimer where D swung his belt at a man with whom he was quarreling but the belt hit the face of a woman to whom he was talking. Lord Coleridge CJ held:
"... if a person has a malicious intent towards one person, and in carrying into effect that malicious intent he injures another man, he is guilty of what the law considered malice against the person so injured."
(b) D will not be liable for criminal damage because the doctrine of transferred malice does not apply where the actus reus (criminal damage) is different from the mens rea (of an offence against the person). Only if the actus reis intended and the actus reus caused are the same can the malice be transferred from the one to the other. In Pembliton, where the facts were similar to the hypothetical example, D was acquitted (on appeal) of malicious damage to a window.