R v Mohan (1976):

• Facts: Charged for attempt to cause bodily harm done to a police officer.
• Note: "attempt: - must show specific intent
• Held: Specific intent - a decision to bring about, insofar as it lies within the accused's power, the commission of the offence...
  [No matter whether the accused desired that consequence of his act or not]

Steane (1947):

• Facts: 2 possible views of his intent - to assist the enemy or to save his family
• Held: jury should convict only if satisfied by the evidence that the act complained of was, in fact, done to assist the enemy. If it was done to save his wife and children, not to assist the enemy

Natural consequence - R v Moloney (1985):

• Judge should do no more than invite the jury to consider

  
  

  • (i) whether the relevant consequence that must be proved (e.g. death/really serious injury to murder) is a natural consequence of the accused's voluntary act, and

    
    

  • (ii) whether the accused foresaw that it will be a natural consequence of his act, and then direct the jury that,

  • (iii) if so, proper for them to draw the inference that the accused intended that consequence
    
    

• Held: appeal allowed - murder to manslaughter

Probable consequence - R v Hancock (1986):

• Held: The direction should not merely refer to the 'natural consequence' of the accused's voluntary act but should also refer to the 'probable consequence' of his act

Virtual certainty - R v Nedrick (1986):

• The jury are not entitled to infer the necessary intention unless they are sure that

1. death/serious bodily harm is a virtual certainty (barring some unforseen intervention) as a result of D's actions; and
2. D appreciated that such was the case

• mens rea for murder to kill or intention to cause SBH

Steane:

• Facts: C brought a claim against the authority and the department of health seeking against both the department and area health authority a declaration that the advice in the circular is unlawful. Bc it means that doctors can cause/encourage sexual intercourse with girls u16, contrary to 28(1) Sexual Offences Act 1956 or the offence of being an accesory to unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl u16, contrary to 6(1) (b) of that Act
• Held: Bona fide exercise by the doctor of his clinical judgement negated the mens rea

Matthew and Alleyne (2003):

• Foresight of virtual certainty is merely evidence for jury to find contention
  [Good purpose and bad effect on the same principle]

Re A (2000):

• Foresight of virtual certainty is proof of oblique intention
  [Good purpose on A bad effect on B]

Shorrock (1994):

• Acid House Party
• Held: D = liable, no need to prove he had actual knowledge of nuisance, but merely that he's responsible for a nuisacne that he knew/ought to have known about it (knowledge available to him), would be the consequence of acitvities on his hand

Idu Beg's Case (1881):

• Criminal rashness: Hazarding a dangerous/wonton act with the knowledge that it'll cause injury but with no intention to cause injury / knowledge that it will probably cause. Liability lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness / indifference as to the consequences
  
  
  

• Criminal negligence: is the gross and culpable neglect / failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to public / individual, having regarded all circumstances where the charge has risen. Its the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted

• Latimer (1886)
• Mitchell (1983)
• Pembilton (1874)
• AG's Ref (No.3 of 1994) (1997)

Per Lord Denning:

• "If a man, whilst sane and sober, forms an intention to kill and makes preparation for it, knowing its a wrong thing to do, and then gets himself drunk so as to give himself Dutch courage to do the killing, and whilst drunk carries out his intention, he cannot rely on this self-induced drunkeness as a defence to a charge of murder, nor even as reducing it to manslaughter".

Thabo Meli (1954):

• If a death is caused by 1 act in a series of acts, its irrelevant that D lacked the necessary intent for murder when the act was done, if he had that intent when an earlier act in the series was done

DPP v Smith (1961):
The jury must satisfy that:

• The accused must, as a reseasonable man, have contemplated that grievous bodily harm was likely to result to that officer
• That such harm did happen;
• The officer died in consequence; then the accused is guilty of capital murder
• Basis - presumption of law that a man intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts
  

Held:

• Judge's direction was wrong
• "Accordingly, if an accused in fact believed that the woman had consented, whether or not that belief was based on reasonable grounds, he could not be found guilty of rape"
• whether the victim actually had consent

Horton v Gwynne (1921):

• Facts: D was charged with having unlawfully and wilfully killed a pigeon in such circumstances as did not amount to larceny at common law. D shot it while it was on the ground at a distance of 40 yards from him. His explanation he thought was a wild pigeon, but he didn't deny he intended to kill this particular pigeon.
• Held: D's act was both willful and unlawful. Offence was proved when it was shown that he killed this pigeon intentionally, although he mistook it for a wild pigeon. NOT ACCIDENTAL

R v Smith (1974):

• Facts: causing criminal damage s1(1) CDA 1971
• Held:
  
  • no offence is committed under this section if a person destroys / causes damage to property belonging to another through mistaken belief that the property is his own,
  • and provided that the belief is honestly held its irrelevant to consider whether or not its a justifiable belief

CA held:

• mens rea of the offence was the intent to use violence against her without her consent
• it was a good defence to show that he had honestly believed that the victim had consented to his actions
• On facts, judge's drection had been wrong
• a reasonable jury properly instructed would still have found that C had not honestly believed that the woman had consented
• There's no miscarriage of justice in this case. Appeal dismissed, D convicted