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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PRETRIAL, Anonymous tip, Plain View, when the police…

- - - - Katz OR
        
        A search occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the government intrudes on a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. A reasonable expectation of privacy means: (1) a person has manifested a subjective intention of retaining a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., like going to a phone booth to engage in a private conversation); and (2) that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
      - Jones OR
        
        physical intrusion by the government into a constitutionally protected area for the purpose of obtaining information.
        
        A trespass may not be required to determine whether a search occurred within the meaning of the 4th amendment, but if a trespass has occurred, that is sufficient.
      - Kyllo (depicted below in thermal imaging case)
    - - Open Fields / Curtilage
        
        There is a distinction between open fields, where the Fourth Amendment does not apply, and searches of a person's home and the areas immediately adjacent to it (the "curtilage"), where the Fourth Amendment applies.
        
        The Curtilage Factors: 1. Proximity to the home itself; 2. Whether the area is enclosed; 3. The nature of the uses to which the area is put; 4. The steps taken by the resident to protect from passerby’s. Dunn. This is not some mathematical formula that yields a perfect answer.
      - Aerial Searches
        
        Observing behavior in a person's home or curtilage using low-flying airplanes is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It is not an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
        
        Cain: "visual observation with the naked eye from where the government is entitled to be is not a search because the government is not physically occupying private property, so it is not a trespass. Moreover, this does not impinge on a persons reasonable expectation of privacy because even if a person subjectively believes that what the government observes would not be observed, is not one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
      - Thermal Imaging
        
        Kyllo: When the government intrudes on the home by using sense-enhancing technology that is not in general public use to learn about the interior of the home that would otherwise not have been knowable without entering the home, that is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
        
        This is a third method for determining whether a search occurred within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
        
        USE THE WORDS "GENERAL PUBLIC USE." The technology can be sophisticated or crude. binoculars are in general public use, but Ferrari's are not.
      - Searches of Trash
        
        The 4th amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of the home.
        
        Only Katz was law here, not Olmstead. So the court said the D's had a subjective expectation of privacy under Katz, but it was not one society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. Why? The trash was in public for a third party to collect it. If you give something to a third party, you forfeit your expectation of privacy.
        
        The trash was not on the curtilage in this case, but even if the trash is left on the curtilage, the analysis is the same.
      - observation and monitoring of public behavior
        
        Knotts: police placed a beeper in a drum used for making meth with the consent of the owner of the chattel. Then, the defendants came into possession of the drum, and police surveilled their movements on public thoroughfares. This was constitutional/not a search. the attachment of the device in Jones was different because police attached a device to a vehicle without the owner of the chattel's consent
        
        The third party doctrine
        
        You have no expectation of privacy of information knowingly given to a third party. Smith v. Maryland.
        
        In Smith, The court said to have service, you have to have a provider, and to make the service available, the provider has to collect certain information, and the provider is a third party. D involved a third party in this information, and when you did, you forfeited the information you shared with a third party. The content of the calls were not handed over, so that was protected.
        
        Miller said you have no expectation of privacy in your bank records becase that information is given to a third party.
        
        Exception to the third party doctrine
        
        Digital data that discloses the intimacies of one's life (religious, familial, etc.) pales in comparison to limited paper data.
        
        Carpenter v. United States: the fact that information is held by a third party does not BY ITSELF overcome the user's claim to Fourth Amendment protections. An individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.
        
        Why? The information detailed a comprehensive chronicle of one's movements. The information implicated here pales in comparison to the above cases. The sheer volume and intimate tie to the D differed from paper records in the past cases, which were fairly limited.
        
        1 more item...
      - Use of Dogs to Sniff for Contraband
        
        Caballas: “Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.”
        
        Once a seizure/any traffic offense is commenced, it can last only so long as the purposes of the stop have been concluded or reasonably should have been concluded. During a traffic stop, if something occurs that provides law enforcement with a reasonably articulable suspicion that crime is afoot that is separate from the reason of the initial seizure, the detention can continue until the officer quells that suspicion or reasonably should have quelled that suspicion. So, the purposes of the stop can escalate beyond the purposes of the stop if, for example, a drug-sniffing dog assesses there may be drugs in the vehicle (or the LEO smells alcohol).
        
        It is nevertheless clear that a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.
        
        An officer cant artificially prolong a stop just to provide an opportunity for a drug dog to arrive.
        
        Cannot use a drug sniffing dog to conduct a search of someone's home where there is a trespass because the area searched was the curtilage and the government brought the dog for the purposes of obtaining information.
        
        The officers exceeded the implied license. Implicit license: typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. The gov. physically occupied D’s property for the purpose of obtaining information. The use of a trained police dog with the objective of uncovering evidence goes beyond the implied license to go up to a house and, for example, drop off mail or knock on the door. It is a physical intrusion on the homeowner's property. Accordingly, in this case, the detective's use of the drug-sniffing dog to detect marijuana constituted a warrantless search of Jardines's porch—the curtilage of his home—in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
- - - - The test for probable cause is objective: If there is an objectively reasonable reason to perform a stop, that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. A pretextual stop is okay -- as long as the D violated some offense, no matter how minor, in the officer's presence, the officer can seize you, no matter the officer's subjective belief.
  - - - What if the officer gets the law wrong? Can a mistake of law give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold a warrantless seizure under the Fourth Amendment?
        
        Yes. AS LONG AS THE MISTAKE OF LAW IS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE. A mistake of law is reasonable if, given how the statute is written, a reasonable officer could have come to the same conclusion as the mistaken officer. Look for ambiguity or no case law in some binding appellate court (that would mean constructive knowledge).
- - - - The warrant has to describe the things to be seized (specificity requirement). Supporting documents, like an affidavit that describe with particularity can validate a warrant that lacks specificity, but it must be incorporated into the warrant.
  - - - There can be no categorical exceptions to the knock-and-announce requirement—WI tried. Whether the requirement needs to be dispensed with will be determined case by case. Under Richards' circumstances, there was a reason to dispense with knocking/announcing because there was reasonable suspicion that Richards would escape or destroy evidence. Also, No knock-announce does not have to be on the warrant because circumstances change. What forms the reasonableness calculus is evaluated when the warrant is EXECUTED.
  - - - In an emergency police can search without a warrant if there is probable cause – there is no time to do anything other than right now. Whether there was an emergency must be determined after the fact based on what the officer faced at the time.
        
        The subcategories of the exigent circumstances exception
        
        Hot pursuit
        
        This means some wild movie car chase and a 2 minute lag from when police receive a call and arrive the place where the alleged incident occurred.
        
        The 4th amendment does not permit, as a categorical matter, warrantless entry into a home to make a routine felony arrest. Payton v. NY. The pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not always, or categorically, qualify as an exigent circumstance. Lange v. California. Whether an exigent circumstance exists depends on the facts of the encounter.
        
        The emergency aid exception
        
        The police may enter a home without a warrant if there is an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an occupant of the dwelling is SERIOUSLY INJURED OR IMMINENTLY THREATENED WITH SERIOUS INJURY.
        
        as long as the circumstances make it objectively reasonable that an officer would believe there is serious injury or imminently threatened with serious injury, it is okay. the subjective intentions of the officer (e.g., "I just want to arrest some people.) does not matter at all.
        
        preventing the destruction of evidence
        
        Does exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement apply to an officer-created exigency if the exigency does not arise from the officer's unreasonable or unconstitutional conduct? Yes.If police did not threaten/actually violate the 4th amendment, knocking and announcing and prompting movement does not negate that that knocking and announcing could nevertheless leave a reasonable officer to conclude that evidence is about to be destroyed. What do you mean actually/violate the 4th amendment? Dont open the door and blow it off its hinges.
        
        LIMITS ON EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
        
        Remember the BAC cases where the person would not submit to a breathalyzer, so the police had to draw blood? The court refused to permit a per se exigency. This must be evaluated on its specific facts. If there's time to get a warrant, the officer must get one. If there's no time to get a warrant, the exigency exception applies.
        
        SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
        
        blood draws BAC
        
        The blood test: is much more serious. Discloses health attributes. A blood draw as a search incident to arrest exceeds the scope. You need a warrant.
        
        However, there is an exigency exception: When police have probable cause to believe a person has committed drunk driving AND the driver’s unconsciousness or stupor requires police to take her to the hospital, and the officer did not have a reasonable opportunity to do a standard test, then law enforcement may almost always order a blood test.
        
        1 more item...
        
        Breath Test BAC
        
        yes, it’s a search, but it's not serious. You're going to breathe anyway. It's similar to a straw,. Given the fact that the government needs to obtain the result, the government's need for this test outweighs the minimally invasive breath test. This is a search that can be conducted without a warrant.
        
        COMMUNITY CARETAKING FUNCTIONS DOES NOT APPLY TO A HOME!
        
        this Court held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Cady v. Dombrowski (1973). In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that police officers who patrol the “public highways” are often called to discharge noncriminal “community caretaking functions,” such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents. The question today is whether Cady’s acknowledgment of these “caretaking” duties creates a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home. It does not. The court said Caddy does not apply to a home! You cannot import community caretaking functions into warrantless home entry.
    - - Generally
        
        What is the automobile exception? When was it announced? In 1925, Carroll v. United States. If there is probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, it can be searched without a warrant. The court concluded that the vehicle’s mobility posed a type of instance where there was no time to obtain a warrant. The vehicle could be removed from the jx of law enforcement if delayed by obtaining a warrant.
        
        There is an additional rationale that would authorize a vehicle search w/o a warrant where probable cause is present. The additional rationale is one has a lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle. Vehicles are persuasively regulated. That regulation invites the government to impact one’s privacy. Also, the vehicle is operated in public. The aggregation of these factors renders one’s expectation of privacy diminished.
        
        Exception: But this case was a home search, even though it was a vehicle. Yes, the vehicle was outside but on the curtilage, which receives a significant degree of 4th amendment protection. Cant use plain view, the law enforcement officer was not somewhere he was legally allowed to be. Where the curtilage boundaries are clearly marked . . . (the porch is the primary example) . . . the automobile exception does not permit an officer to enter a home or a curtilage to conduct a warrantless search. Also, the automobile authorizes the search of a vehicle, not for it.
      - Searches of containers in automobiles
        
        Under the Fourth Amendment, must the police obtain a warrant to open a container in a moving vehicle where they have probable cause that the container, but not the car, contains contraband? Yes. But it is limited to that container.
        
        If there is Probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband – anything in that vehicle is searchable – provided where the search is being conducted could contain the object of the search. If the object of the search is a dead body, it is impermissible to search the passenger glove box. It is impossible for a body to fit in the glove box. The critical question: Is there probable cause to believe that the container can house/conceal the object of the search?
    - - searching automobiles incident to arrest
        
        Do not conflate the automobile exception to the search of an automobile incident to arrest exception.**
        
        When the police lawfully stop a vehicle, they may order the driver and the passengers to exit. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (driver); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (passengers). If the police arrest the driver, may they then search the vehicle as part of a search incident to arrest?
        
        The grab area of the wingspan describes the scope of the search incident to arrest doctrine. Rationale: Ensure he is not armed and that no evidence is destroyed. The scope is limited to the arrestee and his area of control, where the person may conceal/destroy evidence or be armed.
        
        Does the search incident to arrest automobile exception authorize a search incident to a citation?
        
        NO. Iowa has failed to show that the justifications for permitting a search incident to arrest extend to the issuance of a citation. Issuing a citation does not present the same level of danger to officer safety that taking a suspect into physical custody does. Ordering the passengers out of the car may be justified on this ground, but a full search is not. Also what evidence do we need to preserve of a traffic violation? Nothing. once a citation has been issued, there is no further need to find or preserve evidence
        
        A search of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest
        
        narrowed the search of a vehicle as an incident to the arrest of a recent occupant to two scenarios: (1) the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment (can search in this scenario w/o a warrant. The physical location of the arrestee matters AT THE TIME OF THE SEARCH. If the arrestee is not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment, law enforcement cannot conduct a warrantless search of that passenger compartment); (2) when it is reasonable to believe evidence of the crime for which the arrestee was arrested can be found in the vehicle (if police are searching for a dead body, it is not REASONABLE it would be in the passenger compartment
      - Generally
        
        The grab area of the wingspan describes the scope of the search incident to arrest doctrine. Rationale: Ensure he is not armed and that no evidence is destroyed. The scope is limited to the arrestee and his area of control, where the person may conceal/destroy evidence or be armed.
        
        a search incident to arrest is limited by (1) the person of the arrestee and (2) the area within the arrestee's immediate control.
      - whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.
        
        Remember Carpenter: one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s whole movement.
        
        These cases concern the scope of the incident to arrest concerning objects seized from an arrestee that provide a glimpse of a comprehensive deep dive into a person’s life. Roberts said these devices are pervasive. Robin’s Rule makes sense when talking about physical objects, but digital data invokes considerably more privacy concerns. Remember the rationale of the search incident to arrest. Those are not invokable here. (1) There’s no weapon here. This is not the seizure of a device; it’s the SEARCH of it. Can seize it. (2) The arrestee calls friends to cause mayhem or wipe the device. Then put it in a “bag.”
        
        Willie Robin’s cigarette holder was quantitatively different. The stored information on a cell phone could fill warehouses with personal information. It is filled with the intimacies of a person’s private life. Neither rationale tops this. Search incident to arrest allows the seizure of the device, not the search, for the aforementioned reasons. There’s also the exigent circumstances exception (need to find the abducted child example).
    - - Generally
        
        If property is lawfully in the possession of the police, they may inventory the contents to protect the owner’s property while it is in police possession.
        
        What about the ability of police to inventory the contents of a car that has been impounded for a parking violation.The automobile exception does not apply because there was no probable cause to believe that the automobile contained contraband
        
        Automobiles have a lower expectation of privacy than homes due to heavy regulation and public travel. Police may impound and inventory a vehicle’s contents to protect the owner's property, guard against false claims, and ensure officer safety. The Fourth Amendment's probable cause and warrant requirements do not apply to noncriminal inventory searches of lawfully impounded vehicles.
        
        An inventory search of personal effects during the booking of an arrested person.
        
        The police may search an arrestee’s personal belongings in order
        to inventory them before incarcerating the arrestee.
        
        The reasonableness of the search is balanced against the government’s interest in preventing theft, protecting against false claims, identifying dangerous items, and aiding in suspect identification.
    - - when the police arrest a person, they may conduct a protective sweep of the premises if they have reasonable suspicion that a person might be there who poses a threat to them. In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), the Court upheld such protective sweeps but said that such a sweep “may extend only to a cursory inspection of those places where a person may be found.”
        
        Part 1: As an incident to the arrest, the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be launched immediately. Once someone is arrested, a warrantless suspicionless search can take place in the area immediately adjoining the place of arrest, from which an attack could be launched immediately. We are looking for a person.
        
        Part 2: If law enforcement wants to go beyond ^ this, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. Wouldn’t allow search of the toilet tank, drawer, washing machine, desk drawer, etc.
    - - A search is permissible without a warrant or even probable cause if there is voluntary consent.
        
        what is voluntary consent?
        
        There is no rigid test to determine when consent is deemed voluntary. It is just decided after the fact – what were the specific facts? Consent is evaluated based on the reasonable person standard – would a reasonable person have consented?
        Was consent voluntary under the totality of circumstances? When determining this, whether the gov. informed the person whether she can consent is taken into consideration, but there is no affirmative duty.
        
        Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a home when one occupant consents to search the premises while another occupant is present and is expressly refusing to consent to the search?
        
        No. When two occupants of a dwelling are present, one consents to a search by the police, and the other objects to the search, the police may not enter the home and conduct a warrantless search for evidence. A warrantless entry into a home is presumptively unreasonable, but where such an issue takes place, the government bears the burden of articulating one or more exceptions to the warrant requirement – such as, here, consent. Where there is not consent amongst tenants, you cannot go in. When you have present co-occupants and there is a consenter and a nonconsenter, LEOs cannot enter the home.
        
        What if a present co-occupant consents and another co-occupant doesn’t, so the gov. removes the non-consenting occupant? Is the consent binding?
        
        Yes, as long as the removal was lawful. If the removal is legitimate/lawful (meaning, if there is probable cause to believe the present non-conforming co-occupant has committed an offense, then that is authority to arrest that person, and such authority gives police the right to take the person into custody). If the removal is lawful, then removing the person rendered him a non-present co-occupant.
    - - Administrative Needs
        
        Where the privacy interests of the owner are weakened (like in a pervasively regulated business such as liquor, guns, mining, and junkyards), and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For a search to be reasonable, the regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers. To perform this first function, the statute must be “sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.” In addition, in defining how a statute limits the discretion of the inspectors, we have observed that it must be “carefully limited in time, place, and scope.”
        
        the difference between an as-applied (in this particular instance, the statute cannot be constitutional) and facial (the statute is unconstitutional no matter what) constitutional challenge.
        
        facial challenges can be brought under the Fourth Amendment. We further hold that the provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code that requires hotel operators to make their registries available to the police on demand is facially unconstitutional because it penalizes them for declining to turn over their records without affording them any opportunity for pre-compliance review (a hotel owner must be afforded an opportunity to have a neutral decisionmaker review an officer’s demand to search the registry before he or she faces penalties for failing to comply. Meaning here, there was no due process).
      - generally
        
        The special needs doctrine authorizes the warrantless/suspicionless search or a warrantless/suspicionless seizure.The special needs doctrine authorizes warrantless/suspicionless searches/seizures when its programmatic (the purpose of the program itself) purpose is something other than collecting evidence of a crime or general crime control.
      - Border Crossing
        
        The Supreme Court has made clear that the government has broad authority to conduct warrantless searches of people, vehicles, and mail entering the border. The government has the ability to stop all cars at the border and to conduct warrantless searches.
        
        Property
        
        In Flores-Montano (gov took apart gas tank w/o warrant or suspicion), the purpose of the search was to prevent contraband from entering the country. The Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border. “searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”He did have a privacy interest and the government invaded that interest. However, that was balanced against the government’s interest in interdicting dangerous people or things crossing the border to protect the sovereign nation—that deprivation of privacy pails in comparison.
        The bottom line is that officers can conduct a warrantless/suspicionless search of property at the border under the border search doctrine.
        
        General Warrant Allowed for Property searches
        
        mail
        
        Mail entering the country can be inspected without a warrant. In Ramsey, a statute allowed the pose office to search an envelope if the worker has reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise contrary to the law. Reasonable cause to suspect is less than probable cause. The inspector did have probable cause to suspect because the envelope was from a known drug export country, were bulky, were heavier than normal airmail, and he felt like there was something in there. The search, therefore, was plainly authorized by the statute. This authorized a search under reasonable suspicion. But the 4th amendment requires probable cause?? the Flores case told us when it comes to the border, officers can conduct warrantless/suspicionless searches of property*
        
        Individuals
        
        What level of suspicion would justify a seizure of an incoming traveler for purposes other than a routine border search? Reasonable suspicion.What is reasonable suspicion? An “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’”persons at the border can be subject to a search and seizure without a warrant, but reasonable suspicion is required.
        This case required individualized reasonable suspicion; meanwhile, the other cases required a general warrant (warrantless and suspicionless).
        
        Reasonable suspicion required
      - Checkpoints
        
        programmatic purpose is sobriety checkpoint
        
        The programmatic purpose of the checkpoint cannot be for general crime prevention or general crime control. The majority said there is a privacy interest in individuals moving about on the highway uninhibited by law enforcement interference. It also seems like public safety – preventing people from operating a vehicle that could cause death, serious injury, or property damage. This is the government’s interest. The intrusion is slight – but nevertheless an intrusion. The government's interest is compelling. The government’s interest prevailed here – authorizing warrantless, suspicionless searches.
        
        In Sitz, there was an obvious connection between the need for highway safety and the means employed to effect such safety.
        
        programmatic purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics.
        
        The primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint program is to interdict illegal drugs, as plaintiffs have conceded. Since its purpose is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the Indianapolis checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment.
        
        There are circumstances that may justify a checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control. For example, an appropriately tailored road block to thwart an imminent terrorist attack. These exigencies are different from general crime control.
      - Schools
        
        In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the Court held that school officials could search a student’s purse based on reasonable suspicion; there did not need to be a warrant or probable cause. the Court said that it was sufficient under the Fourth Amendment that there be “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.” The court balanced the students diminished expectation of privacy and the school's interest in maintaining order.
        The Court stressed that the search must be reasonable in scope. It explained that “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”
        
        whether a 13-year-old student’s Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra and underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school.
        Holding: Because there were no reasons to suspect the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear, we hold that the search did violate the Constitution.
        
        the school search requirement. You need: (1) warrantless is okay, and (2) reasonable suspicion that the search will produce what you suspect you are looking for. If this exists, the search of the act itself is circumscribed by what you are looking for and how you are looking for it. Also, you have to consider the age/sex of the student and the nature of the infraction (searching for illicit drugs is different than Advil).
      - The Government Employment Context
        
        warrantless search is permissible under the 4th amendment if it is reasonable in scope and justified at its inception by a non-investigatory work-related need or reasonable suspicion of work-related misconduct.
      - Drug Testing
        
        Athletes
        
        The government’s special needs in managing public schools as guardians to the students justify the suspension of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. A person’s bodily functions are associated with privacy. The urine sample is not tested for anything/everything and not shared. If there's a positive, the student is not expelled. The school has an interest as well – we have a school with a drug problem and students are participating in sports. The programmatic program had nothing to do with ordinary crime control or general crime prevention. So this is a special needs case. There is a diminution in students' privacy interests (1) being in school and (2) being in sports—balancing this with the government ferreting out crime, the court sided with the government. Whatever invasion of privacy was slight.
        
        The court considered the relative lack of intrusiveness of the search itself. It was an intrusion/invasion of privacy, but it is less than, for example, a needle. Moreover, the persons subjected to it by participating in athletics did so by giving up a degree of privacy they may otherwise have had. The government's interest was treating a drug problem that particularized in student-athlete participation. Then, there was the fact that the special needs doctrine authorizes warrantless/suspicionless searches where the programmatic purpose is not for general crime control or general crime prevention. The police were not involved here, so the special needs doctrine was allowed.
        
        Extracurricular Activities
        
        The SC said that did not matter as much in Acton, what really mattered was public schools acting as guardians. As discussed in Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), students have a reduced expectation of privacy and are often required to undergo medical exams or vaccinations for the good of all. Students that participate in extracurricular activities, like athletes, voluntarily submit themselves to additional regulation. In this case, the policy intrudes even less upon privacy than the policy at issue in Vernonia. Students are monitored from outside the stall while producing a urine sample, records are confidential, and results are not given to police. Any school’s interest in protecting students from the nationwide drug epidemic is compelling.
        
        whether a city could require drug testing of pregnant women, with results to be used for law enforcement purposes.
        
        NO. LEOs were involved in administering/developing the plan, and the women did not consent to the test or to have the results given to LEOs. Of course, an exception did not apply here bc there was no consent. In Acton and Earls, the result was not given to LEOs, and the programmatic purpose was not general crime control, whereas here it is.
      - searches in jails and prisons
        
        Does a strip search in jail for those who commit minor offenses require reasonable suspicion? No.
        
        in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.’”
        Correctional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake process. The admission of inmates creates numerous risks for facility staff, for the existing detainee population, and for a new detainee himself or herself. The danger of introducing lice or contagious infections, for example, is well documented. Persons just arrested may have wounds or other injuries requiring immediate medical attention. Jails and prisons also face grave threats posed by the increasing number of gang members who go through the intake process (don’t mix bloods with the crips).
        
        The big picture: All jails or prisons may require all arrestees who go to general pop to undergo searches, including but not limited to manipulating the body or going through one’s items.
        
        DNA Testing of those Arrested:
        
        The overriding gov interest here is identity. DNA utilization in identification is undisputed. LEOs must ask whether this person is a risk and cannot assess that w/o DNA. We also need to know if the person has priors and may pose a flight risk. Also need to know for a bail determination. Need to make sure we got the right guy. These are the five rationales that weigh on the gov.’s side of the scale. On the D’s side of the scale, the intrusion is negligible, and he is not tested for anything other than identity (limited use),
        
        Upon these considerations, the Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure. When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is like fingerprinting and photographing a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.