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Mens Rea (INTENTION) - Coggle Diagram

- - - - A defendant demonstrates direct intention when they aim for a specific result or are willing to take actions to achieve that outcome, even if they do not emotionally desire it. R.A. Duff explains that to intend a result means it is part of the defendant's reasoning for their actions. For instance, in the case of Mrs. Hyam, her actions of setting fire to a house could be seen as intentional if the act was aligned with her reasons for acting.
        Duff suggests using a "test of failure" to assess direct intention: if the defendant would not consider their actions a failure if the intended result did not occur, then they may not have intended that result. In Hyam's case, she did not intend to kill or injure anyone because she would not have viewed her actions as a failure if no harm resulted.
        Additionally, a defendant can intend a result even if the likelihood of it occurring is low. For example, if someone shoots at a distant target, they still intend to kill, as that is their objective. However, true intention requires the recognition of a possibility that the desired outcome could occur; without this belief, one cannot genuinely be said to be trying to achieve that result.
    - - In the normal case, the term “intention” should not be given a legal definition. Judges should refrain from giving juries guidance as to what it means. This is particularly true in common cases where there has been a direct attack upon V. 35 Whether a D intended a result is a question of fact which only the jury, applying their common sense to an ordinary English word, can answer. It is thus impossible to define intention or to know precisely what it means. It could well mean different things to different juries. Presumably, although one is only guessing, most juries will opt for the ordinary, common-sense meaning, namely, “as ‘a decision to bring about a certain consequence’ or as the aim”
    - - (i) Definitional interpretation
        
        A new extended definition of intention was laid down. If a consequence is foreseen as virtually certain the jury may be told that this amounts to intention. This view is supported by two passages in Woollin. First, Lord Steyn cited with approval from Moloney that “if a person foresees the probability of a consequence as little short of overwhelming, this will suffice to establish the necessary intent” (Lord Steyn’s emphasis). Secondly, after citing the italicised passage from Nedrick (p.152), Lord Steyn added: “The effect of the critical direction is that a result foreseen as virtually certain is an intended result” (emphasis added). This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that in Woollin the Crown did not contend that D desired to kill or seriously injure his son. The case proceeded on the basis that there could be another species of intention apart from direct intention.
      - (ii) Evidential interpretation
        
        The text discusses the legal concept of intention in criminal law, particularly through the lens of the case R. v Steane and the doctrine of double effect. In Steane's case, a British actor was convicted for broadcasting for the Germans during WWII under duress, as threats were made against his family. The court emphasized the distinction between motive and intention, stating that while Steane's actions were aimed at saving his family, the jury needed to determine if he intended to assist the enemy. The judgment highlighted that juries should have "moral elbow-room" to acquit if the act was done under duress, allowing for a flexible interpretation of intention.
        The text also references the case of Re A, where doctors faced a moral dilemma in separating conjoined twins, knowing it would result in the death of one. The judges debated whether the doctors intended to kill, with some arguing that the intention was a psychological state while others viewed it as a moral conclusion. The doctrine of double effect was discussed, which allows for actions with harmful side effects if the primary intention is good. Ultimately, the text raises questions about the nature of intention—whether it should be viewed as a psychological state or a moral judgment—and how moral assessments should influence legal outcomes, particularly in cases involving duress or necessity
      - However, there may be other cases where a D has a purpose other than causing the prohibited harm—but where that result is an inevitable or likely consequence. For example, D’s main aim in Nedrick was to burn down the house in order to frighten its occupant but, in so doing, causing death was a likely result. In Woollin, it was again emphasised that a direction was only necessary in cases where D does not desire the consequence that has occurred. In Moloney, Lord Bridge thought such guidance would only be necessary in “rare” and “exceptional” cases. However, Lord Scarman in Hancock stated that such cases would not be at all rare or exceptional—and, accordingly, guidance to the jury will be necessary in most cases where D has a primary aim in acting other than causing the prohibited harm. Despite this, more recent cases have stressed that a Woollin direction will only be required in “rare circumstances”. Furthermore, giving a Woollin direction when it is not appropriate can amount to a misdirection providing grounds for quashing a conviction because it can lead to the trial judge analysing the evidence differently from how it should be analysed in the normal cases of direct intention.
        So, in rare cases it is permissible to give juries some guidance. However, it is far from clear precisely what intention does mean in such cases. The central problem is that there are two possible interpretations of Woollin
    - - 1) Direct Intention: A consequence is intended when it is the actor's aim or objective. 2) Oblique Intention: A consequence is intended if it is either the aim or is foreseen as virtually certain.
      - Historically, courts held that a consequence could be considered intended if it was foreseen as a probable result of D's actions, as seen in the case of Hyam, where the defendant's actions led to a conviction for murder despite her claims of not intending to kill. However, the legal stance has shifted, clarifying that mere foresight of a probable consequence does not equate to intention.
      - In R. v. Moloney, the House of Lords emphasized that for specific intent crimes like murder, the foresight of a consequence must be overwhelmingly probable to establish intent. The judge should avoid complicating the definition of intent and allow the jury to use their judgment based on the evidence presented. In R. v. Hancock and Shankland, it was noted that the probability of a consequence is crucial and should be explicitly addressed to the jury, as it can significantly influence their understanding of intent. The Nedrick case further clarified that juries should only infer intent if they are sure that death or serious harm was virtually certain as a result of D's actions and that D recognized this certainty.
        
        Overall, the legal interpretation of intention remains complex, with ongoing debates about the definitions and implications of direct and oblique intention in criminal law.
      - The Criminal Justice Act 1967, section 8, establishes that intention is a subjective state of mind, focusing on whether the defendant (D) intended the result rather than what a reasonable person would have intended. Courts must draw inferences from all relevant evidence to ascertain D's intention. However, English law lacks a statutory definition of intention, leading to two main interpretations:
  - - - The text argues for semantic precision in the legal definition of "intention" to align with common understanding, emphasizing that the criminal law should reflect societal values. Duff asserts that using ordinary language is essential for moral responsibility and legal liability, making it easier for juries to interpret terms like "intention" based on their everyday meanings. While some, like Lord Bridge in the Moloney case, believe juries do not need guidance on this term, others, like Lacey, question the reliability of ordinary usage without guidelines. The difficulty in defining "intention" is highlighted by differing interpretations, such as Lord Cross's controversial view in the Hyam case, which conflated foresight of injury with intentionality. Despite these challenges, the general understanding of "intention" as aiming to achieve a specific outcome remains clear. The text critiques the concept of "oblique intention," suggesting it represents a different mental state rather than true intention. The discussion raises the question of whether "intention" should be legally defined or left to jury interpretation. While juries are seen as appropriate for expressing community values, relying on ordinary language can introduce ethical considerations into legal judgments. Ultimately, the text advocates for a legal definition of "intention" that reflects its ordinary meaning to provide clarity and consistency in its application within criminal law.
    - - One of the main problems with the old Hyam formulation that foresight of a probable or highly probable consequence amounted to intention was that no principle could be discerned to establish the cut-off point between recklessness and intention. Foreseeing a consequence as probable or likely was intention but foreseeing it as less than probable was recklessness. Such a test involved having to define “probable” and “likely”. 63 While these problems are perhaps reduced after Woollin, they have not been eradicated. The boundary between intention and recklessness has simply shifted. If a consequence is foreseen as extremely likely this will presumably still amount to recklessness whereas if it is foreseen as virtually certain it can count as intention (or intention can be found). No principled basis for distinguishing between these two states of mind exists because, in both situations, the consequence is not the objective of the action. In both, it is simply a by-product of the actor’s actions that is foreseen as having varying chances of occurring. The only clear basis for drawing the distinction would be to limit intention to direct intention
    - - The concept of intention in law is complex and involves moral considerations regarding the distinction between foreseeing a consequence as likely, virtually certain, or aiming at it. The prevailing view is that intention should encompass foresight of a consequence as a virtual or practical certainty, known as "oblique intent." This perspective suggests that if a person is aware that a consequence is a virtually certain result of their actions, it should be considered as intended, even if it is not the primary aim. For example, if a villain sends a time-bomb on an aircraft intending to collect insurance, he may not desire the deaths of passengers, but he foresees them as a virtually certain outcome. Thus, this consequence should be regarded as intended. The Law Commission has recommended that intention be defined legally, suggesting that a person acts intentionally if they aim to bring about a result, and that juries should consider whether the defendant believed the result was a virtually certain consequence of their actions. However, there are arguments against expanding the definition of intention to include oblique intent, emphasizing the moral implications of distinguishing between those who foresee a result as certain and those who aim to achieve it. The moral character of actions is deemed more reprehensible when they are deliberate and purposeful. This distinction is crucial in legal contexts, as it influences perceptions of culpability and the severity of offenses. In summary, while the law increasingly recognizes the need to include foresight of virtually certain consequences within the definition of intention, there remains a debate about the moral implications of this approach and the necessity of distinguishing between different states of mind in legal judgments.