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Actus Reus - Coggle Diagram

- - - - (ii) Human intervention
        
        (a) Acts of a third party
        
        The text discusses the legal principles surrounding causation in criminal law, particularly focusing on the concept of "novus actus interveniens," which refers to a new intervening act that can break the causal chain between a defendant's actions and the resulting harm. It emphasizes that judges must guide juries on these principles, allowing them to determine if a causal link has been established. In a case involving police actions deemed "involuntary," it was concluded that these actions did not break the causal chain, despite being negligent. The text also explores scenarios involving medical professionals' conduct, highlighting that their actions typically do not sever the causal link unless they are deemed "abnormal" or grossly negligent. Key cases are analyzed: R. v. Jordan: A defendant's conviction was quashed because the medical treatment provided was palpably wrong and directly caused the victim's death, overshadowing the original injury. R. v. Smith: The court maintained that the defendant's actions remained a significant cause of death despite negligent medical treatment. R. v. Cheshire: The court ruled that negligent medical treatment did not break the causal chain, as the defendant's actions were still a significant contributing factor to the victim's death. The text concludes that medical professionals' actions are generally seen as fulfilling their duty to patients, and thus do not constitute a voluntary act that would break the causal chain, except in extraordinary circumstances. The discussion raises questions about the interpretation of "voluntariness" and the implications of policy considerations in these legal determinations.
        
        R v Jordan (1956)
        
        In Jordan, D stabbed V, and V nearly recovered when a doctor administered a drug (Terramycin) that V was known to be intolerant to, causing his death. The court quashed D’s murder conviction, with Hallett J stating that: "Death resulting from any normal treatment employed to deal with a felonious injury may be regarded as caused by the felonious injury... but this was not normal treatment. Not one, but two separate features of the treatment were palpably wrong and these produced the direct cause of death.”
        
        R v Smith (1959)
        
        D stabbed V, who received poor medical treatment, contributing to his death. Despite the treatment, Lord Parker CJ held that D remained responsible for V’s death because the original wound was still a substantial cause at the time of death: “If at the time of death the original wound is still an operating and substantial cause, then the death can be said to result from the wound, even if other causes are also operating... Only if the second cause is so overwhelming that it makes the original wound merely part of the history can it be said the death does not result from the wound.”
        
        R v Cheshire (1991)
        
        D shot V, who later died from complications due to negligent medical treatment (a tracheotomy). The trial judge instructed that only recklessness, not negligence, could break the chain of causation. On appeal, Beldam LJ upheld the conviction: “The accused’s acts need not be the sole cause or even the main cause of death; it is sufficient that his acts contributed significantly to that result. Even if the immediate cause was negligent medical treatment, it would only exclude responsibility if it was so independent of the accused's acts and so potent in causing death that the original acts were insignificant.”
        
        These cases illustrate that grossly negligent medical treatment, like in Jordan, can break the chain of causation, but only in exceptional cases. In Smith and Cheshire, the courts maintained that the original injuries remained significant and operative causes of death despite negligent treatment.
        
        (b) Acts of victim: Much like the actions of a third party can break the chain of causation, so too can the actions of the V. The general rule is that the consequences of V’s intervention, after D’s unlawful conduct, remain attributable to D provided that: (a) V’s intervention was not voluntary (FDI); and (b) V’s conduct was a reasonably foreseeable possibility. The cases involving V interventions can be divided into three categories: V response, V escape and suicide cases and V vulnerability cases. We will review each in turn
        
        (i) Victims responses
        
        The courts have established that if a victim (V) responds to a defendant's (D) unlawful conduct in a way that worsens their situation, and this response is voluntary, it constitutes a novus actus interveniens. This principle, which has evolved from drug-supply manslaughter case law, means that D is relieved of causal responsibility for the resulting harm.
        
        Historically, courts debated whether D's supply of a controlled substance that V self-administers could be considered a legal cause of V's death. In earlier cases like Kennedy (No.1), D was deemed to have caused V's death through the supply of drugs. However, in Dias, the court ruled that V's choice to inject could break the causal chain. This was later reaffirmed in Finlay, where D was seen as a "joint principal" in V's act, but the principle was ultimately overruled in Kennedy (No.2).
        
        In Kennedy (No.2), the House of Lords clarified that when a fully informed adult voluntarily self-administers a drug, D cannot be held responsible for the consequences. The law generally assumes that informed adults act autonomously, and unless there are exceptional circumstances (like vulnerability or coercion), D's actions do not cause V's voluntary decision to inject.
        
        The ruling emphasizes that for D to be liable, V's actions must not only be voluntary but also not reasonably foreseeable. In cases where V's decision is influenced by factors like mental health or coercion, the courts may find D liable. However, if V's actions are deemed voluntary and informed, D's responsibility is negated, as established in the Kennedy cases and further illustrated in subsequent rulings like Field and Rebelo, where the courts grappled with the nuances of causation and voluntary actions in the context of drug use and administration.
        
        (iii) Victim vulnerabilities
        
        The "thin skull" rule in criminal law dictates that a defendant (D) must "take his victim as he finds him," meaning that D is responsible for the full extent of harm caused to a victim (V), even if V has pre-existing vulnerabilities that contribute to the severity of the injury or death. This principle is illustrated in the case of McKechnie, where D's violent attack led to V's severe brain damage, and V's pre-existing duodenal ulcer ultimately caused his death. The court held that D remained causally responsible despite V's health issues.
        
        In the case of R v Blaue, D stabbed V, who subsequently refused a blood transfusion due to her religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness. The court ruled that D's act of stabbing was the direct cause of death, and V's refusal of treatment did not break the causal chain. The court emphasized that D could not argue that V's decision was unreasonable based on differing standards of reasonableness. The ruling reinforced that both D's actions and V's refusal of treatment contributed to the death, but D's conduct was significant enough to establish legal causation.
        
        The interpretation of the thin skull rule has been debated, particularly regarding whether V's refusal of treatment could be seen as a novus actus (a new intervening act) that absolves D of responsibility. However, the court concluded that V's refusal was a concurrent cause of death, not a break in the causal chain. The principle asserts that D's responsibility remains intact regardless of V's vulnerabilities or decisions, as long as those decisions were voluntary and reasonably foreseeable. Thus, the thin skull rule applies primarily to pre-existing physical vulnerabilities, while subsequent actions by V do not alter the causal path established by D's initial wrongdoing.
        
        (ii) Victim escape and suicide
        
        The text discusses various legal cases where a victim's actions in response to a defendant's unlawful conduct contribute to the resulting harm, particularly focusing on the concept of causation in criminal law.
        
        R. v Roberts (1972): In this case, the victim (V) jumped out of a moving car to escape the defendant's (D) sexual advances, injuring herself. The court examined whether V's actions were a natural and foreseeable consequence of D's conduct. The judge emphasized that if a victim's response is so unexpected that no reasonable person could foresee it, it may break the chain of causation. D's appeal was dismissed.
        
        R. v Williams and Davis (1992): Here, V jumped from a moving car to escape an alleged robbery, resulting in fatal injuries. The court highlighted the need for proportionality between the threat posed by D and V's reaction. The jury was instructed to consider whether V's actions were a reasonable response to the threat. The failure to direct the jury on causation led to the quashing of the convictions.
        
        R. v Dear (1996): In this case, D inflicted wounds on V, who later died, allegedly by reopening his wounds. The court ruled that D's actions were a significant cause of death, regardless of V's subsequent actions. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the injuries were a substantial cause of death.
        
        R. v Wallace (2018): This case involved D pouring acid on V, leading to severe injuries. V later chose voluntary euthanasia. The court debated whether D's actions were a substantial cause of V's death, considering the nature of V's decision and the circumstances created by D's conduct. The jury ultimately acquitted D, finding that V's euthanasia was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of D's actions.
        
        Overall, these cases illustrate the complexities of establishing causation in criminal law, particularly when a victim's response to a defendant's unlawful act is involved. The courts emphasize the need to assess the foreseeability and reasonableness of the victim's actions in relation to the defendant's conduct.
      - (iii) Approaches to causation
        
        (a) Common sense approach
        
        (b) Policy approach
        
        (c) Mens rea approach
      - (i) Natural events
        
        What is the position if D attacks V and leaves them unconscious in a field where they are struck by lightning and killed? The rule here is that if the supervening natural event (being struck by lightning) is unforeseen by D and unforeseeable to the reasonable person, it will break the chain of causation. As Hart and Honoré describe, such an event is a “coincidence”. 104 On the other hand, if the supervening natural event is reasonably foreseeable, the causal chain will not be broken. In Hart, 105 D attacked V and left her unconscious on a beach below the high-water mark. V subsequently drowned by the incoming tide. Such an event was reasonably foreseeable, and D’s conduct (assault) was held to have caused the result (death). However, if D attacks V and leaves them in a seemingly safe environment, but V is subsequently killed by an unforeseen and unforeseeable event (e.g. a falling tree), the natural event will break the chain of causation. The natural event is described as being “extraordinary”. In such circumstances, D’s criminal liability is limited to the harm from the initial attack