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Narratives - Coggle Diagram

- - - - Intnetion and blame
        
        Rational construction of wickedness
        
        For instance why has the law decided to assign terrorims legislation on the higher end of the spectrum, when the imposition of these laws does not even requires an actus reus element,
        We are able to assign culpability based soley on interpetation. Surely a rational construction of wickedness cannot account for how lack of promimate event can make someone wicked and accountable for actions that they have not actually comitted? Its easier to denouce it rather the ask how it works There is a disparity between the intense moral passion felt in condeming something as evil and our ability to give it conceptual meaning. This essay will argue that 'evil' can be informed through the narratiuves which locate legal institutions and give it meaning,
        
        Subjective culpability
        
        The theoretical work on the general part, at least in the Anglo- American literature, is plagued by a great confusion of terminol¬ ogy. Mens rea, actus reus, culpability, criminal intent, objectivity,
        
        subjectivity, state of mind, justification, excuse — these are among the many terms that are used with great abandon and ambiguity.
        
        As a preliminary to further work on the theory of the general part, we must devote this chapter to a clarification of terms and to the introduction of a number of distinctions that will assist us, both in
        
        understanding the extant literature and in moving toward our own theory of the general part. These preliminary sections, then, are designed as a guide to the perplexed; the reader is encouraged to
        
        refer back repeatedly to this chapter as a guide to later work in the book.
      - e really saying when we call a person, act, or event evil, our responses are frequently weak and diffuse. There is a disparity between the intense moral passion that we feel in condemning something as evil and our ability to give a conceptual account of what we mean by evil. If we turn to moral philosophy as it has been practiced in the twentieth century, we do not find much help. Moral philosophers are far more at ease talking about what is right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust, than in speaking about evil. “Evil” appears to have been dropped from the vocabulary of most moral philosophers, even though it is still very much in evidence in our everyday experience and discourse. ( Berstein)
        
        “ance to the jurisprudence of blaming. Midgley has argued that a consequence of this failure to engage with and critically evaluate models of wickedness has
      - Im not trying to say the this this correct model but that an understanding of how we frame evil is derived from understanding the narratives which locate our legal institutiuons and give them meaning.