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Trespass in Land - Coggle Diagram

- - - - Minister of Health v Bellotti (1944):
        
        If a permission has been terminated, trespass will begin to happen
      - Robson v Hallet (1967):
        
        If a licence is withdrawn, person is not a trespasser during the reasonable time that is required of him to leave the premises
  - - - Southwark London Borough Council v Williams (1971):
        
        Facts: A homeless family stayed on an empty council's house and resisted the council's efforts to evict them. They attempted to argue their unlawful occupation of an empty house was justified by their need to find shelter for homeless persons. Council succeeded in their action.
        
        Per Lord Denning: Necessity should be denied as general because otherwise anarchy and disorder will follow
  - - - Cheah Kim Tong v Taro Kaur (1989):
- - - - Involuntary entry-intention:
        
        An involuntary trespass is not actionable
        
        Smith v Stone (1647):
        
        Facts: D was carried onto the land of C by force and violence of others; there was trespass by the people who carried D onto the land and not by D.
        
        Held: D not liable but the person who brought him was liable for trespass.
      - Negligent entry / placing things on land:
        
        It is trespass to throw/place anything onto land occupied by another. As long as there is some physical contact with C's property.
        
        League Against Cruel Sports v Scott (1985):
        
        Facts: C owned 23 unfenced areas of land. Staghounds used to enter the land in pursuit of deer. C's sued D for damages and sought an injunction against further trespasses.
        
        Held per Park J: "the master will be liable for trespass if he intended to cause the hounds to enter such land or by his failure to exercise proper control over them he causes them to enter such land. Injunction issued to D to not enter C's land anymore. Damages also awarded
  - - - Ownership refers to title in the land
        
        Exclusive possession to physical holding of the land
        
        Possession may be immediate or constructive
        
        The nature of possession depends on the material possessed
      - Street v Mountford (1985):
        
        Facts: C (Mr Street) by agreement that stated it was a license, granted D (Mrs Mountford) the right to occupy rooms of a property for a stipulated rent. The terms of the agreement: Mr Street enter the rooms at any time to inspect, read the meter, carry out maintenance and install/replace further for any reasonable purpose. Only D can occupy/sleep in the room without permission.
        
        Issue: whether the agreement, as expressed in the agreement, a license, or whether it was in fact a lease.
        
        Held per Lord Templeman: "if the agreement satisfied all the requirements of a tenancy, then the agreement produced a tenancy, and the parties cannot alter the effect of the agreement by insisting that they only created a license". The agreement = lease.
      - Drane v Evangelou (1978):
        
        Facts: C went to a rent officer and got a reduction in rent. But D (landlord) did not want to reduce the rent and throw him out of the house as it would be much cheaper for them to do that".
        
        Held: D liable to pay damages to C.
- - - - Star Energy v Bocardo (2010):
        
        D (energy company) carried out activities relating to extraction of oil beneath C's property without title owner's permission. D had statutory license to perform acts necessary for extraction of oil and the works underneath C's property were performed from adjoining land and didn't cause any damage to land.
        
        Issue: whether this constitutes trespass, and to what extent does the owner of the surface land owns the substrata that lies beneath
        Held: A landowner owns all substrata that lies beneath his property up to an undefined depth where the notion of ownership is absurd. Works involved in this case would not be so deep to render the notion of ownership absurd thus trespass has occurred.
    - - Anchor Brewhouse Developments v Berkley House (Docklands) Developments (1987):
        
        Facts: Arms of tower cranes situated on D's land occasionally crossed the airspace above C's land.
        
        Held: D held liable for trespass even though the cranes were at the height which meant that the normal use of the land was not affected.
      - Kelsey v Imperial Tobacco Co (1957):
        
        Facts: C (lessee of a tobacco shop) and D owned a building adjacent to C. For many years had a sign on the wall of their building that encroached 4 inches into airspace above C's shop and this sign was replaced with a new one that encroached 8 inches into his airspace. C gave a notice to D to remove the sign but D declined and C sought an injunction for the removal of the sign.
        Held: McNair J gave consideration to many issues including the question of whether the lease to C included a lease of the airspace above the shop. He concluded that it did and the intrusion of the sign board into the airspace is a trespass. Injunction granted.
    - - Malaysian Position:
        
        Trespass to land is therefore completed once a person wrongfully enters onto land in the possession of another even though no damage has been done
  - - - Failure to remove an object unlawfully placed on land when asked to do so or leave the property once permission has been withdrawn
        
        It will lead to a new cause of action each day for as long as it lasts
        
        Holmes v Wilson (1839):
        
        Facts: D built a brick wall (buttress) on C's land for purpose of supporting a road. D had already paid compensation to C for trespass
        
        Held: D was still found liable for not removing the buttress as it was considered continuing trespass
        
        Konskier v Goodman Ltd (1927):
        
        Facts: D was doing repairs on his roof, where he wished to go onto the neighbour's roof to work on his chimney. He was allowed to do this but he left rubbish on the roof, in the process blocked the gully and the basement flooded. C sued for trespass to land.
        
        Held: Court held that the rubbish left behind was trespass and it was ongoing trespass. This did not diminish C's ability to sue.
        
        Cheah Kim Tong v Taro Kaur (1989):
        
        D's house encroached onto C's house. D relied on estoppel and consent on the grounds that the previous owner before C had never complained. Further, D said that C did not suffer any damage.
        
        Held: This was a case of continuing trespass and therefore a fresh cause of action arose each day. C need not prove damage as the cause of action was not actionable per se.
    - - If D enter C's land under the authority of the law or a license is given to him and he subsequently abuses this right of entry, he will be treated as a trespasser ab initio as though he had (trespassed from the beginning) even though his (wrongful) act was done innocently
        
        Cinnamond v British Airports Authority (1980):
        
        Facts: D sued a group of 6 taxi drivers who had been hanging about in the airport and touting customers. D was catching passengers before they got to the rank then overcharging customers and also refusing to handle baggages unless they paid.
        
        Held per Lord Denning: it was lawful of them to enter into the airport to drop off passengers but they had to right to loiter and disturb passengers. Thus trespass ab initio applied, D became trespassers when they entered the airport
        
        The police:
        
        Unless authorised by law, police officers have no special right of entry into any premise without consent of C
        
        Elias v Pasmore (1934):
        
        Police officers wanted to arrest a man and had legally entered C's land to do so. While on the land they seized a number of items, some lawfully and some unlawfully.
        
        Held: Police committed trespass only with regard to documents unlawfully removed. Their wrongful act didn't disturb the main purpose of entry (which was to make a lawful arrest).
    - - As highways may only be used for passing and re-passing, blocking a highway/remaining stationary on it for longer than its reasonable will amount to trespass
        
        [Use of public highway for any reasonably purpose, including a peaceful assembly is not trespass]
        
        Randall v Tarrant (1955):
        
        Facts: C parked his car on a grass verge in a country lane, which was a public highway leading only to a farm. Lane was narrow where D, driving a tractor came by and tried to pass C's stationary car in the process damaged C's car.
        
        Issue: Is D liable for damage to C's car?
        
        Held: D did not take careful steps that a reasonable man in those circumstances should have taken. Per Evershed M.R: "due to circumstance of a stationary car on a highway and another car approaching with room to pass, the onus is on the driver of the moving vehicle, if an accident occurs, to show 'all possible care' was taken"
        
        Jones v DPP (1999):
        
        Facts: Jones with a number of people were gathered on a roadside adjacent to the perimeter fence of Stonehenge and were part of a peaceful and non-obstructive assembly. But before that the Salisbury District Council made an order where all trespassory assemblies under S.14(a) of the Public Order Act 1986 were prohibited for 4 days and covered a specified area.
        
        Held: Since the order was granted, police had power to remove and prevent any sort of trespassory. C (Jones & other) were on the grass verge between the perimeter fence of Stonehenge. They were arrested under Public Order Act 14(a)
- - - - Smith v Stone (1647)
      - Tan Wee Choon v Ong Peck Seng & Anor (1986):
  - - - Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco (1957)
      - Anchor Brewhouse v Berkely House
  - - - League Against Cruel Sports v Scott (1986)