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Kant, Unlike the consequentialist nature of utilitarianism, Kant's…

- - - - Likewise, it cannot be a contradiction in will because you can rationally will to live in this world.
- - - - (2) This part of the 'clashing virtues' objection is somewhat resolvable. While we are obligated to follow perfect duties at all times, imperfect duties are more lenient.
        
        (3) The apparent requirement to lie here seems counter-intuitive. HIs fundamental point seems to be that telling the truth will have bad consequences. The moral value seems to reside in the consequences, and not in whether the maxim is universalisable.
        
        (1) Consider the mad axeman case. Kant would say that it is wrong to lie in this instance, Lying cannot be universalised, as truth as an institution is undermined if 'It is acceptable to lie' holds true. Therefore we have a perfect duty to tell the truth. However, we also have an imperfect duty to care for others.
        
        Kant's deontological ethics are often criticised due to his tendancy to contradict consequentialism, which many view as common sense. In the axeman example, it is the consequences of having x as a law (in his second formulation) which make it immoral. However, Kant claims that his ethics are purely motive-based.
  - - - Consider the maxim, every Wednesday, punch a red-haired student on the nose. Universalised, this becomes 'everyone ought to punch a red-haired student on a Wednesday'. This world is not contradictory in terms, like how a lying promise is. You may not like this maxim but it passes the test. It may not be a nice world, but it is one that you could will to live in.
    - - X Has a personal maxim “Buy, but never sell”. → This maxim seems eccentric but it is harmless. When universalised, X's maxim becomes 'Everyone ought to buy and never sell.' This becomes a contradiction in conception. A world in which everyone buys and nobody sells is impossible- something has to be sold in order for it to be bought. Therefore this seemingly good maxim fails the universalisability test. This seems counter-intuitive.
    - - You are in hospital. A friend who visits you (friend A) only does so out of duty. Another friend, friend B, visits you because they are a good friend, they genuinely care about you. According to Kant, only friend A is moral, as they are the only person acting in accordance with duty. He is clear that that acting only from desire has no worth.
      - Parent A enjoys reading with their daughter and spending time with her. Parent B does not enjoy these things but does so out of duty to do the right thing.
        
        A common intuition is that Parent A is the better parent, who helps their daughter because they want to.
        
        However, Kant says that Parent B is the better parent. They act purely out of duty, not desire.
      - We cannot adopt an impersonal perspective.
        Some object to Kant's approach as it is cold and calculative. Demands that we put aside our feelings for the suffering of others. Williams argues that the impartial position that Kant wishes us to adopt may be possible for facual reasons, but not practical.
    - - Phillipa Foot completely accepts, endorses and defends the Humean Theory of Motivation. We cannot ignore desires. Moral law cannot motivate you by itself.
        
        This means Kant is completely misguided when he claims the belief that this is your duty. The belief that this is the right thing to do without any reference to your own desires cannot by itself motivate you. Acting from duty alone would mean that you have no motivation (according to Hume and Foot). Therefore, Phillipa Foot claims against Kant. She claims that morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives. Foot claims that morality does not rest on our desires or passions, because these are what get us to do things.
      - Foot rejects possible 'reasons to act on categorical imperatives'
        
        Out of respect for moral law
        
        We are 'bound by moral law
        
        'To be rationally consistent'
        
        We are not obliged to behave out of respect for the moral law, any more than we have to follow etiquette for the sake of convention.
        
        We are not literally, or metaphorically, bound by anything. Foot suggests that the metaphors of binding are illusory- an attempt to give the moral ;ought' a magical force.
        
        Foot suggests that,' The fact is that the man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency.'.
        
        In other words, there is nothing irrational about disobeying the categorical imperative if you never accepted it in the first place. The categorical imperative does not itself provide any rational reason to follow it. We might feel that there is some moral force that compels us not to steal or tell lies but this feeling is just that: a feeling.
- - - - Step one: Work out the maxim (When in need, make promises with no intention of keeping them to gain help), and universalise it (When in need, everyone ought to make promises with no intention of keeping them to gain help).
        
        Step two: Can you conceive of a world with this maxim as a law?
        
        Therefore, making false promises cannot be moral because it is a contradiction in conception; we have a perfect duty to keep promises. Breaking a perfect duty is always wrong and your action would always be blameworthy.
        
        No, as the concept of making a false promise is contradictory. Here, promising as an institution is being undermined. If this maxim held true, nobody would trust promises any more.