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Religious language: 20th century perspectives - Coggle Diagram
Religious language: 20th century perspectives
Cognitive and non-cognitive approaches to religious language
Strengths of cognitivism
Religious texts
Religious texts transcend time and place, they have a message that is relevant to everyone because they talk about God - an
objective reality
, therefore religious texts are cognitive and point to a universal truth - non-cognitivism undermines the importance of events such as the resurrection for Christians
Fundamentalists argue that religious texts should be interpreted in a cognitive, literal way - the message should not be diluted because it is a truth claim
Cognitive approaches to religious texts are in keeping with their intended interpretation - some have argued non-cognitive approaches have taken texts out of context, and are reductionist by removing the mythological elements from Christianity - religious texts are simply just reduced to general advice
Religious language
Aquinas
used religious language cognitively - the analogy of attribution and analogy of proportion show that words can accurately and positively describe God - these are truth claims that assert the reality of God
The
logical positivists
argue that the job of philosophy is not to decide whether a statement is true or false, only whether it is meaningful and worth scientists discussing - the
verification principle
treats religious language like failed scientific assertions because it treats all language cognitively
Flew
argues that believers make statements that sound like genuine scientific claims, so they should be judged by the same criteria and accept they could be falsified - this is treating religious language cognitively, although it fails the test because it doesn't meet the criteria of other cognitive statements
Aquinas'
cognitive approach better aligns with how Christians speak about God, as a factual reality - Christians are unlikely to be speaking symbolically or non-cognitively when they make claims such as 'God loves us'
Cognitive claims can be true or false, making them either meaningful or meaningless, many argue that non-cognitive claims are meaningless as they cannot be true or false
Non-cognitive approaches do not answer the 'big questions', such as whether God exists and if human life is purposeful, it places these questions outside the realm of what can be known - many believers argue revelation from God does give us facts that can be known, even if they lack evidence and require faith
Aquinas'
cognitive approach using analogy allows something positive to be said about God whilst avoiding agnosticism and anthropomorphism
Cognitive approaches' ability to be verified or falsified allows extremist beliefs to be discredited as meaningless -
Wittgenstein's language games
are arguably too subjective and can lead to dangerous, unchallenged beliefs based on faith alone (fideism)
Strengths of non-cognitivism
Religious texts
Religious texts need to be interpreted by those who understand them and have a use for them - this is much better done in the context of a faith community and there is less opportunity for misunderstanding
Wittgenstein's
focus on the use and context of language can also be applied to religious texts - they should be interpreted non-cognitively, within the form of life of the believing community - texts should not be interpreted as cognitive, universal truths
Non-cognitive approaches offer figurative, mythological and symbolic interpretations rather than literal, eg of Genesis
Non-cognitive approaches can address modern scientific challenges to religion, where scientific evidence has made it difficult for some to believe the Bible's claims as factual
Non-cognitive approaches allow religious texts to have different functions, for example serving a function within a community rather than making reference to historical fact - people are free to find meaning in religious texts in new ways
Religious language
Language games
show that the meaning of words depends on their context or use -
Cupitt
argues that since religious claims are not objectively true outside of the language game, they must be non-cognitive
Perhaps we should not treat all language in the same way as scientific claims. Religious language, just like poetry or music, cannot be said to be true or false, it is asking the wrong sort of question - religious language can be described as non-cognitive because it is beyond scientific criteria
Hare's bliks
support the non-cognitive use of religious language - a blik may be important to an individual and have a huge impact on their life, but is it not making a universal truth claim - bliks are a view of the world that cannot be true or false and are therefore non-cognitive
Non-cognitive approaches do not require evidence to support their claims, many argue that cognitive assertions and truth claims are meaningless as they lack evidence
Language games
reflect the subjective nature of reality
Using a non-cognitive approach, there can arguably be no criticisms of religious language, you can only play a different 'game' with other rules, eg the verificationism game
Cognitivism and non-cognitivism
Religious texts
Interpretation of religious texts can be both cognitive and non-cognitive - it may depend on the context of its use, or the type of writing (genre) found within the texts - this may be nearer to
Wittgenstein's
ideas of form of life - some will be cognitive, others non-cognitive, both are valuable, neither is a better or worse approach
Religious language
There is a view that
language games
take us beyond the cognitive/non-cognitive discussion - it is the rules of the game itself that determine whether the language used is cognitive or non-cognitive
The falsification symposium
Karl Popper
Popper
created the
falsification principle
to test what are scientific statements and what are non-scientific or pseudo-science
Unlike the logical positivists, who would need evidence from from all times and places to verify whether a statement is true or false (the
verification principle
), the falsification principle only needs evidence that would falsify it
The scientific method works by testing a hypothesis to see whether it fails
Flew's falsification symposium
Flew
applied
Popper's falsification principle
to religious language in the falsification symposium
Flew's problem with religious language is that it cannot be falsified - it is this consideration that means that religious statements are not statements at all
Flew adapts
John Wisdom's
parable of the two jungle explorers to demonstrate his view:
The two explorers find a clearing in the jungle, one believes there must be a gardener, the other does not
They decide to wait for the gardener but a week later there is no sign
The 'believer' continues to argue that the gardener exists, but he now must be an invisible, intangible, undetectable gardener - the other explorer asks what the difference between this and no gardener is
Flew argues this is how believers use religious language - they make a claim which appears scientific such as 'God created the world', but they refuse to accept evidence that would falsify it
When faced with suffering in the world, they may argue God has a plan or is beyond human understanding
By qualifying their statement, the original assertion has completely changed - "God dies a death by a thousand qualifications"
Since believers do not allow anything to count against their statement, it cannot be falsified or tested and is therefore not a genuine scientific claim
Strengths of Flew's falsification symposium
Flew clearly demonstrates that religious assertions are claiming cognitive, objective truths that appear as genuine scientific claims, so they should be judged by the same criteria
It is clear religious language is not used in the same way as scientific assertions, as believers will not allow any evidence to falsify their statements, instead they keep qualifying their original statement until nothing is left
Falsification helps to clarify which statements are scientific and which are non-scientific - since religious claims are not falsifiable, they are not genuine scientific assertions
Since religious statements are not scientific, it can be argued that they are not factual or cognitive
Flew argues there is little point in committing to a worldview that is not able to stand up to any scientific techniques or verification (such as
Hare's bliks
)
Weaknesses of Flew's falsification symposium
Because religious language is unlike scientific claims which can be tested and are falsifiable,
Hare
suggests that religious statements are
bliks
- unfalsifiable fundamental beliefs that are either sane or insane but are not affected by contrary evidence
Mitchell
argues that although religious claims are not falsifiable, believers do seriously consider evidence against them - however they do not allow that evidence to discount their belief because they have a reasoned faith in God
Religious claims are not like scientific claims, whether they are true or false is a different sort of question - many liberal Christians would agree that religious language should not be considered as scientific or cognitive, and therefore does not need to be falsifiable
The falsification symposium is not universally applicable, as not all religious assertions claim to be of scientific status or cognitive
Religious assertions can have validity or meaning within the context of a religious group or to an individual, they do not have to be objectively true or scientifically tested to be meaningful (
Wittgenstein's language games
)
John Hick
argued if religious belief is true, it can be verified eschatologically, but if it is false it cannot be shown to be false - therefore verification is a better test
Swinburne
argues that unverifiable and unfalsifiable statements are still meaningful as we can understand the claims they make - similar to
Hare's bliks
(however critics have accused Swinburne of oversimplifying the issue)
Responses to Flew's falsification symposium
Hare
Hare
uses the
parable of the lunatic
to demonstrate this view:
A deluded student or lunatic is convinced that all dons want to kill him
All kind interactions with the dons do not convince him, he believes this just shows how cunning they are
Hare defends religious belief and argues that Flew is wrong to apply scientific criteria to religious language
Hare argues religious assertions are
bliks
- they express a worldview or fundamental belief, bliks can be sane or insane (correct or incorrect), but they have a great effect on individuals and cannot be altered because any contrary evidence is ignored
Hare argues Flew has misunderstood how religious language works for believers - bliks cannot be falsified or empirically tested, but they have a huge impact on the lives of believers
Criticisms
Bliks may be an inadequate explanation of religious language as believers who claim that 'God loves us' are not just claiming a subjective truth, they believe themselves to be making a claim about reality as a whole
Bliks are open to the same exploitation as
Wittgenstein's language games
, extremist beliefs may be justified as insane bliks
Mitchell
Mitchell
uses the
parable of the stranger
to demonstrate his view:
During a war, a partisan (resistance fighter) meets a stranger who persuades him that he is the secret commander of the resistance despite working undercover
Afterwards the stranger sometimes helps the partisan, but is also seen helping the opposition
When challenged, the partisan trusts the stranger and claims he knows best
Mitchell partly accepts Flew's point, he suggests that there is evidence that counts for and against belief
He claims believers struggle with challenges to claims like 'God is loving', such as the problem of evil
Mitchell argues believers do not simply discount evidence against their statements (as
Flew
claims), or refuse to acknowledge evidence (like
Hare's bliks
), because they have an underlying reason for their faith
The believer does not allow the evidence to decisively count against their belief as they have a committed faith or trust in God
Unlike
Flew's
conclusion that believers' statements are empty and useless because they are unfalsifiable, Mitchell argues they are based on reason so are a significant type of explanation
Logical positivism
Logical positivism and the Vienna Circle
The logical positivists or Vienna Circle were a group of scientists and philosophers who met in Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s
They analysed statements to decide what was meaningful and what was not
They used a
verification principle
(later known as
strong verification
) to deduce whether statements were meaningful
The logical positivists believed a statement was meaningful if it could be verified by an actual experience (synthetic, empirical evidence), or if it is true by definition (an analytic statement or tautology)
Therefore any religious or ethical statements were meaningless because they were not true by definition and could not be verified by sense experience
However this form of the verification principle rules out many areas of discussions, such as historical statements, discussion of scientific laws and claims about art or beauty
Ayer's verification principle
A.J. Ayer
, not part of the Vienna Circle, developed the
weak verification principle
, which accepted statements that were verified in principle
Ayer argued the statement 'there are mountains on the far side of the moon' is meaningful because it could be verified in principle
Ayer argued for a statement to be meaningful it must either be a tautology or something that is verifiable in principle (a posteriori)
Under the weak verification principle, scientific, historical, and universal statements are not meaningless because they could be verified in principle, you don't need personal experience
Ayer argued that statements about God, ethics and the arts remain meaningless because they cannot be verified in principle and are therefore not worth discussing
However Ayer later rejected the weak verification principle because anything could be verified in principle, including the existence of God and heaven, and statements about the life of Jesus
Criticisms
Ayer is not right to rule out all religious statements -
Swinburne
has suggested that some religious claims such as the resurrection of Jesus, would be verifiable if true
The verification principle fails its own test and is self-refuting - the claim that 'statements are only meaningful if they are tautologies or verifiable in principle' is neither a tautology or verifiable in principle itself
Is religious language meaningless?
Religious language is meaningless
The strong verification principle argues that since religious language cannot be verified by sense experience now, it cannot be talked about as true or false - we cannot observe that God exists or that God is good - these are meaningless statements
The strong verification principle argues that 'God is good' is not true by definition, it is not a tautology or an analytic statement - therefore it is meaningless
Ayer's weak verification principle outlines which observations would make the statement verifiable and worth discussing - religious language cannot be verified in principle so is meaningless
Religious language is not meaningless
The underlying assumption of the verification principle is that only science can give meaning and knowledge about the world, but
Brummer
and
D.Z. Phillips
believe that sentences of faith, just like poetry or literature, should not be treated in the same way as scientific statements
Swinburne
suggests that statements are not meaningless just because they cannot be empirically verified
Hick
suggested that believers would be able to verify statements about God and heaven after death (eschatological verification) - religious statements can be verified in principle and are therefore not meaningless
Language games
Language games and religious language
Wittgenstein
argues that language use is like playing a game with rules - within our groups, we have agreed rules about how words are used
Wittgenstein observes that religious language and the language of different religious groups is in itself a language game
If we were to say that 'God allows suffering to develop our character and we will be rewarded in heaven', we cannot say the statement is true in a literal sense but it fits with a Christian interpretation of the world - it is not a statement that fits within the atheistic or Hindu language games for example
To suggest that the best explanation of evil is that God does not exist would not fit within the rules of the game
Those outside a language game cannot criticise it, they can only play a different game
Value and meaning are determined by the rules within the game - the meaning of our language is based on its context
In the logical positivism game, religious statements cannot be empirically verified and so become meaningless, whereas in the theist game, religious statements such as 'God is love' are meaningful
Cupitt
argued that all language, including religious language, is non-cognitive because 'true' or 'false' have no universal meaning, the meaning depends on the
form of life
in which they are used
Therefore since God exists only within some forms of life, God is not an objective reality outside of those faith communities - language games do not describe reality, each game makes its own reality
Criticisms
A believer may reject the idea that religious statements only have meaning to the individual, they may (like
Flew
and
Mitchell
) see them as truth claims and cognitive statements
Language games have been criticised of being circular - the language game gives words their meaning, yet the game itself is just a collection of words
Gellner
accuses Wittgenstein of over-analysing language
Do language games allow religious language to be meaningful?
Language games allow religious language to be meaningful
Talk about God and religion is meaningful to those who are in the same language game and understand the rules of the game - 'God is good' is meaningful to those in the Christian language game, and 'God does not exist' is meaningful in the atheist game
Meaning depends on the group in which the language is being used - no one from outside the group can criticise the language or claim it is false, therefore religious language is meaningful
Religious language, according to
Phillips
, is beyond the discussion of fact (cognitive) - it can be meaningful whether it is cognitive or non-cognitive because it depends on the form of life in which it is spoken
Language games do not give meaning to religious language
Anything could be meaningful as long as there is an agreed understanding - in the 'unicorns exist' game it would be meaningful to say unicorns exist - language is subjective and meaningful only within the game
Geach
argues that language game theory is a circular argument - the word takes its meaning from the game, but the game takes its meaning from the words within it, which take their meaning from the game and so on
According to
Cupitt
, language games show that religious language is non-cognitive and therefore does not have an objective meaning outside of a religious form of life
Comparing Aquinas and Wittgenstein
Similarities
Both Aquinas and Wittgenstein are interested in uses of language
For Aquinas, to avoid the problems of univocal and equivocal use of words, we can only talk about God through the analogies of proper proportion and attribution
Wittgenstein emphasised that the correct use of words depended on their context, or language game
Differences
Aquinas' use of the cataphatic way involves saying something positive about God in a cognitive sense, that God exists or is in some way loving - if you take a non-cognitive view of language games (as Cupitt did), Aquinas would simply be playing the analogy language game
However you could also argue that Aquinas and Cupitt are playing different language games so neither can be criticised because they are in parallel forms of life
Wittgenstein asked questions about how we use language whereas Aquinas asked how can we talk accurately about God?
Strengths of Aquinas
Hick
argues that the teachings and actions of Jesus give us some clearer ideas of how and what to say about God
Aquinas' analogies allow something positive to be said about God while avoiding either agnosticism or anthropomorphism
Weaknesses of Aquinas
Analogy is too vague because we don't know we are speaking accurately about God
Analogy makes an assumption that there is a similarity between finite humans and an infinite God
Strengths of Wittgenstein
Religious statements have meaning but it depends on the context of the language game
Language games do not reflect reality but make it - reality is subjective
There can be no criticisms of religious language, you can only play a different game with other rules, for example the verificationism game
Weaknesses of Wittgenstein
Believers use language to express truth and reality, so Wittgenstein's approach does not work for them
Since religious language cannot be criticised or challenged, it could lead to dangerous beliefs based on faith alone, without reason (fideism)
How far does Aquinas' analogical view of theological language remain valuable in philosophy of religion?
On a practical level, Aquinas' approach is still used within Christianity and offers some insight into the nature of God without reducing God to a human level
The discussion goes beyond language to some degree and perspectives on this question may be driven by beliefs about scripture and the relative importance of reason and revelation - eg to what extent does the world reveal truths about God?