Lula’s international determination under the concept of achieving rising
power status through diplomatic diversification, advocating for
multipolarity along with the support of like-minded states to reshape the
future global governance and international institutions.
Denoted as the “main goal for the Brazilian presidency” by the Brazilian
Sherpa, Ambassador Mauricio Lyrio, Brazil has employed a taskforce to
launch its Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty initiative, drawing
similitudes from its domestic “Brazil Without Hunger” program. The
initiative proposes the implementation of public policies to eradicate
poverty at the national level, multilateral funding, and technical support for
developing states along with institutional UN support and trilateral
cooperation, consisting of “one [state] that has the financial resources, one
with experience in social programs and those [including beyond G20
members] that can be the beneficiaries of this cooperation between rich and
developing countries”. Here, inequality and poverty eradication are central
premises of Lula’s domestic political discourse since the 2000s, rendering
him favoritism during elections, and once again highlighted in his 2023
inaugural address. Likewise, desires to tackle hunger and inequality at the
international level find their historical precedents in Lula’s attitude on the
War on Terror in the early 2000s, stating that “the true path to peace is the
relentless war against hunger […], in a campaign of solidarity capable of
uniting the planet”.
Equally, the emphasis on environmental concerns reflects Lula’s domestic
agenda, which has recently encouraged specific legislation and preservation
plans for the protection of the Amazon region. More importantly,
environment and sustainable development have been key attributes of
Brazil’s historical diplomatic agenda since Rio-92, underlining the concept
of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. Since then, Brazil has
advocated for developing states’ reduced accountability during the
international forums (COPs, Rio+20), in order to promote economic
development and industrialization while not forsaking their environmental
role. Concurrently, he has called for increased contribution and funding of
global responses to climate change from developed states due to their “debt
to the planet”, such as the Green Climate Fund and the Amazon Fund. Here,
the specific taskforce for Global Mobilization against Climate Change, a
proposal that operates in tandem with the G20 Sherpas and Finance Tracks,
represents Brazil’s firmness in articulating political action to “reach the
Paris Agreement long-term goals and to restore the […] international
community’s capacity to answer climate urgencies”. On energetic transition
to low-carbon and lessening dependency on fossil fuels, Brazil has the
opportunity to expose its past and current experiences, from its National
Alcohol Program (Proálcool) since the 1970s to its recently launched new
industrialization program (bioeconomic focused), as avid efforts are made
to include an initiative centered at bioeconomy in the international agenda,
potentially the cornerstone subject of its soon to be hosted COP-30 (2025)
in the Amazon region.
Moreover, Lula’s domestic efforts and narrative of social inclusion are
analogous to desires to integrate peripheral states at the center of the
discussions at the international level. Here, Brazil’s vows to promote
multipolarity and reformation of the global governance institutions can be
rewind to successes in achieving greater representation of the developing
world’s interests in Western-centered institutions via South-South
cooperation in the early 2000s. Under Lula, the tackling the IMF voting and
quota reforms, not to mention the formulation of alternative mechanisms
such as the BRICS, are noteworthy examples of Brazil’s crusading to
consolidate its status as an emerging global power and representant of the
Global South. The sought political coordination with states of similar
footing and aligned demands are vital for the attainment of goals at the
international regimes, if not the only feasible modus operandi. Hence, the
strengthening and reform of the existing institutions, particularly the UN,
WTO, and IMF, considered goals towards the “democratization of
international relations”, are underscored at the G20 as imperative for Brazil.
Noteworthy, such desires have met international support. As stated by
African Union’s Sherpa, Albert Muchange, “The AU fully supports the
priorities because they have direct relevance to […] the African continent.
[…] We need to embark on the reform of global institutions, both political
and financial institutions […], and Africa is going to support that”.
Officially consolidated as a permanent bloc member of the G20 (same
status as the European Union) at the end of the Indian presidency in 2023,
the AU no longer stands as a passive abider but as an active protagonist
able to impact the decision-making structures. A milestone for the G20
while instrumental for Brazil to press for a Global South agenda along with
the African continent within the forum. Previously only represented by
South Africa, now the representation of the whole bloc at the negotiation
table is deemed crucial to advance effective resolutions, not only because of
its productive and economic potential, combined GDP ($3 trillion), and
populational growth (1.4 billion and expected to double by 2050) but also
because global financial decisions made excluding the continent’s
representation “have fallen short”, specifically the G20’s Common
Framework for Debt Treatment.
Brazil has long rendered its position as a political partner of the region,
from advocating in favor of its decolonization process throughout the 20th
century to forsaking 12 African states’ nearly USD 900 million debt (2013)
in the hope of inspiring the international community through example.
Consequently, there are positive prospects that the bloc and Brazil could
collaborate via a cohesive agenda toward alternative solutions that could
address several mutual interests. For instance, the viability of strategies to
promote the energetic transition towards low-carbon and reduce oil
dependency requires the assimilation of Africa within the global supply
chains due to its abundance of crucial resources, particularly minerals,
wherein the Democratic Republic of Congo alone produces over of the
world’s supply of cobalt. Counting on Brazilian support, UA has the
opportunity to leverage demands vis-à-vis global economic interests to
boost the continent’s market competitiveness and integration (facilitated by
the AfCTA since 2021), stimulate its sustainable development, and increase
its efforts in mitigating climate change, given that African states still stand
“among the countries who suffer the most issues”. In turn, the AU is
recognized as a pivotal partner for the achievement of Brazil’s objectives in
reforming financial institutions and international organizations, particularly
in its quest to revitalize the UN’s role and centrality, and to “engage the
G20 in Brazil’s struggle for a new global governance”.
As a forum, the G20 provides a more flexible stage for Brazil to press its
agenda through an alternative approach, one that reproduces Lula’s
domestic political stance while in consonance with Brazilian foreign policy
tradition. For instance, he seems eager to demonstrate that his pro
democracy and public participation is not merely symbolic nor limited to
domestic policymaking, calling for a mobilization of the civil society,
private business sector, academic institutions, and policymakers, among
others, to voice their insights through 13 engagement groups (B20, T20,
W20, etc.). Perhaps, more amenable issues such as fighting hunger and
poverty, sustainable development, and energetic transition are the needed
common denominator to help de-securitize the conflicting interests on the
international stage. As put by Ambassador Lyrio, “the G20 is an
opportunity to reinforce the Brazilian foreign policy”; if successful, Brazil
is expected to reconsolidate its strategic-political profile as a responsible
emerging power as a leading (not hegemony-seeking) voice of the
developing world.
