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Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals…
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The Argument from Marginal Cases ( mainly from Regan, Tom)
The Categorical Version
1) certain(some, not all) animals have certain rights (maximum moral significance) because these marginal humans have these rights.
( the strong argument for animal rights)
Maximum moral significance implies basic moral rights, or right to life, and a strong presumption against killing.
The Categorical Argument From Marginal Cases.
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1) Beings who are similar in all important morally relevant respects are equally morally significant.2) Nonhumans exist who are similar in all important morally relevant respects to marginal humans. 3) Marginal humans are maximally morally significant. 4) Therefore, the non-humans who are similar in all important morally relevant respects to marginal humans are also maximally morally significant.
The Full-Personhood view
As Kantian argument suggests, only rational and linguistic beings fall within the scope of moral concern, then is difficult for all humans that are mentally impaired or retarded to be considered legitimate objects of moral concern. They lack rationality and or language. Thus, the rationality of language does not represent a necessary condition for moral concern.
The followers of this view usually ignore, evade, and dismiss the argument from marginal cases.
Many believe that full personhood is the foundation of membership in the moral community.
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The argument is that if infants or other mentally impaired humans have direct moral stats, then animals also have it. Since there is no known morally relevant characteristic that those marginal-case humans have that animals lack. text
The Biconditional Version
2) if these marginal humans have certain rights, then animals have these rights also.
(the weak argument for animal rights because it is a conditional conclusion)
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The Biconditional Version of the Argument from Marginal Cases
1) Beings who are similar in all important morally relevant respects are equally morally significant.
2) Nonhumans exist who are similar in all important morally relevant respects to marginal humans.
3) Therefore, those nonhumans who are similar in all important morally relevant respects to marginal humans are maximally morally significant if and only if marginal humans are maximally morally significant.
Peter Singer argues that some nonhumans may have higher degrees of some morally relevant characteristics than some marginal humans do
Terminology
- enthymeme - an argument who one premiss is not clearly stated.
- moral agent, marginal humans , capacity for full personhood.
- homecentrism - a view of nature that only considers humans rather than animal or plant needs
- anthropocentrism - an ethical belief that humans alone possess intrinsic value, and other living creatures instrumentally bring value.
- ecocentrism - the entire environment as a whole carries an inherent value
- speciesist - anyone who believes that species membership can itself, independently of the capacities of the individual, be a morally relevant characteristic,
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Evelyn B. Phuhar, American philosopher specializing in moral philosophy and philosophy of mind, especially the moral status of animals.