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PS2027 - Travis - Coggle Diagram
PS2027 - Travis
Lecture 5
Brehm, 1956: Rating of non-chosen but desirable outcome lowers
Aronsan and Mills, 1956: persons who undergo an unpleasant initiation to become members of a group increase their liking for the group
Aronson and Mills, 1963: If a person is induced to cease performing a desired action through the threat of punishment, he will experience dissonance. Lower likeability of toy in mild threat than severe
Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959: The well-paid volunteers suffered no cognitive dissonance because they could justify lying for payment.
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Zanna and Cooper, 1974: Taken a pill 3 groups, relax, tense and control. Those in the high choice condition had a bigger attitude change (agree with the ban on speech) than the low-choice people.
Nel and Aronson, 1969: significant dissonance effect (more attitude change for low financial incentive) was found when the audience was not committed on the issue of medicinal marijuana
Evidence in animals, Egan et al: derogae favoured food they couldn't choos (Post-decision dissonance reduction))
Lieberman et al., 2001: both amnesiacs and normal exhibited post-choice attitude change in art ranking
Steele, 1988: Dissonance reduction is self affirmation
Balcetis and Dunning, 2007/10: High choice, low choice and control - push skateboard up hill and walk around campus in costume; high choice percevied environment to be less aversive
Lecture 4
Jones and Harris, 1967: Rated people in free to choose and instructed as having a more positive behaviour to Castro
Lau and Russell, 1980: Athletes most likely to account victory to internal attributions v defeat account as extrenal attributions
Potential link to Geoff; Kitty Genovive -> people blamed not helping on external, only one internal attributions
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Ross et al., 1977: contestants and observers consistently rated the general knowledge of the questioners in the experimental condition as superior. There was clear demonstration of FAE, as the contestants and observers attributed the questioners' ability to answer the questions to dispositional factors and failed to take into consideration the situational factors that gave the questioners an advantage.
Gilbert, 1989: cognitively busy persons often fail to use contextual information to correct the impressions they form of others. when perceivers were able to correct their original impressions retroactively, they were still unable to correct subsequent inferences that had been biased by those original impressions
Lecture 3
Milyavskaya and Inzlicht, 2017: Self-reuglation lies in removing the tempations available in out environment
Higgins, 1997: Theory of approach and avoidance, people approach pleasure and avoid pain
Hoffamn et al., 2012: 34.6% of desires were rated as somewhatimportant to highly conflicting with important goals
Temptations are automatic; potentially link in to Ulrichs lectures on discrimination and self-control?
Galinsky, Gruenfield, and Magee, 2003:
Experiment 1, participants who possessed structural power in a group task were more likely to take a card in a simulated game of blackjack than those who lacked power.
Experiment 2, participants primed with high power were more likely to act against an annoying stimulus (a fan) in the environment, suggesting that the experience of power leads to the performance of goal-directed behaviour
Experiment 3, priming high power led to action in a social dilemma regardless of whether that action had prosocial or antisocial consequences.
Lecture 6
Proulx and Heine, 2008: Participants witnessed the changing experimenter and then consumed a placebo. Those told side effect = missatribution of arousal, those not told = moral belief affirmation
Sleegers et al., 2015: Using pupil dilation as a proxy for immediate conflict arousal, we found that the same meaning violation (anomalous playing cards) evoked greater pupil dilation, and that this pupillary reaction was diminished in participants who earlier reported extreme beliefs.
Proulx et al., 2010: Those in unexpected biggles condition would pay higher bail compared to expected biggle and resolved absurdity
Randles et al., 2015: People with higher PDA support higher PD and people with low PDA support low PD.