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GD (US isolationism, Impact on LoN, Weakened+ Divided Western Powers, Rise…
GD
US isolationism
The Washington Conference opened on Nov 11, 1921. Secretary of State Hughes offered his formula for naval reduction. Ratio of 5-5-3 in naval strength for US, B+ J. Japan accepted it naval inferiority as it gained strategic advantages elsewhere. 5 Power Naval Limitation Treaty signed by the US, B, F, J+I.
Treaty also denied the Western powers the right to fortify those islands in the Western Pacific from which they might launch an effective campaign against the J homeland
In the 4-power treaty the secretary managed to replace the Anglo-Japanese alliance w/vague agreement among the US, B, F+ J to consult in any case of aggression should arise in the Orient
In 9 power treaty Hughes secured another formal J acceptance of the Open-Door principle od the commercial+ territorial integrity of China
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League Council reconvened in mid-Nov. Dawes sent to represent the US. Informed by Stimson that the US would not join any L embargo against J. Hoped to avoid driving J moderate from power amid worldwide depression which struck J in 1931.
Non-recognition applied to Manchuria crisis might have no bearing on J policy but would relieve Washington of any responsibility for confronting it realistically. US enforced the doctrine on non-recognition to both C+ J. B+F refused to endorse the US statement, declaring they had no interests in Manchuria that merited even a legal sanction against J.
Impact on LoN
LoN failed to address the world slump, J aggression in East Asia+ Mussolini’s invasion- no significance. F hopes of Italian support in the containment of G collapsed, leaving it demoralised+ temporarily leaderless at the very moment when Hitler felt able to take greater foreign risks
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October 17 the Council agreed to urge all signatories of the Kellogg–Briand Pact to remind C+J of their obligations to sustain the peace of the Far East
October 23 the League Council passed a resolution that called upon J to evacuate Chinese territory by November 16. Stimson refused to endorse as it might commit the US to some forceful intervention. J open contempt for the deadline measured the L ineffectiveness.
Feb 16 League Council supported the non-recognition doctrine+ called upon J to fulfil its obligations under the 9 Power Pact
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Rise of Extremism
Germany
stock market crash in October 1929, triggered a financial crisis as foreign loans were recalled
Historian Arthur Link argued that the Depression could not set the world on the road to war unless the conditions for conflict were already well established. Major powers believed themselves sufficiently victimized by the Versailles Treaty to tear it to shreds at the first opportunity.
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Economic disaster of world depression gave him an inroad to the masses who suffered from joblessness+ hyperinflation in the early 1920s. Promise of food, employment+ restoration of national pride constituted a powerful appeal
Japan
Although emerged triumphant, J did not find its post-war settlement satisfactory. Japan’s wartime on China (as embodied in the 15 demands on 1915) generally unfulfilled but also (as the self-appointed leader of Asian independence) J had failed to replace Western imperial structures in the Orient w/body of independent Asian states in J-led East Asian hegemony.
Military leaders were incensed at the outcome of the 1930 London Naval Conference whose results did not satisfy it. J needed mainland markets+ raw materials in areas in nominally controlled by China+ its economy, so dependent on international trade, was highly sensitive to world market fluctuations.
GD--> Gov had to implement a policy of severe retrenchment-1929-31 nonmilitary expenditure fell by 37% respect for liberal gov declined esp. young officers+ studentsextreme nationalist+ imperialist movements
Demand for silk- 90% of which had been purchased by the U.S.- plummeted, and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff further restricted Japanese exports, Japan faced rising industrial unemployment and rural debt, with prices for rice and silk dropping
Leading industrialists, bankers+ merchants persuaded the Hamaguchi gov to restore the yen to the gold standard in Jan 1930. But new US tariff which strongly affected luxury imports such as woven silk (J largest export commodity) aggravated problems. Employer-worker relations came under intense strain+ peasants faced exceptional hardship- agricultural prices declined by 1/3 before the slump decreased by1/3 again. Emigration to the US now closed. 2:5 peasant families relied upon silk production for money income but US market which absorbed r of exports vanished. Need for tighter monetary policy+ loss of exchequer revenue meant gov could not cushion impact of unemployment
Aggression
Japan
Economics
Manchuria was frequently mentioned as a necessary component of such a block- regularly described as Japan’s lifeline; its rich natural resources would liberate the country from its reliance on foreign imports, and because it was relatively lightly populated, poor J farmers could be encouraged to emigrate there. All of Japan’s economic problems might be solved if Manchuria could be pulled away from China’s orbit. By mid 1931 the commanders of the Kwantung Army were convinced that Manchuria had to come under direct J control. On September 18 they made their move, setting off a minor explosion near one of the South Manchuria Railway Company’s lines outside the city of Mukden+ blamed it on local bandits.
For J the occupation of Manchuria had become a vital necessity. J islands had limited arable land, no mineral resources+ population increasing at the rate of 1 million per year. Occupied Korea+ Formosa failed to satisfy J requirements for land+ resources. Manchuria w/abundant natural riches, supplied for food+ raw materials necessary for J economic expansion.
Depression exposed Japan’s vulnerability to fluctuations in the global market, as its lack of raw materials and domestic markets made it heavily dependent on international trade
Other factors
Rise of nationalism in China endangered a major outlet for its trade+ US immigration restriction heightened its view that the world was divided into exclusive blocs w/doors closing to J expansion
Historian John Garver argues that a key factor driving Japan’s aggression was its uncertainty about the future of China. By 1929 the rise of Chinese nationalism threatened Japan’s imperial privileges in East Asia
Japanese historians in the influential The Road to the Pacific War series highlight the desire to contain Soviet expansion. Japan faced a growing threat from the Soviet Union, which was strengthening its military presence in Siberia and seeking to extend its influence over northern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia
Italy
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1934 Mussolini decided to act- moment when national economic output, down nearly 30% from its 1927 peak, reached the low point of the slump. Wal Wal incident provided excuse+ forces built in 1935+ October 3 attack launched
Portrayed as the core of an imperial project that would solve Italy’s population problem+ yield up vast economic wealth
From 1929-31 exports sagged, per capita GDP dropped by 7%, production fell by more than 20%+ unemployment more than doubled--> greater state intervention in the economy and aggressive ton in foreign affairs
. Colonial ministry Emilio de Bono began discussions of an invasion as early as 1931+ present Mussolini with a plan for the operation in mid-Dec 1932 just when the economy had reached its low point