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Do institutions matter in Asian IR? Explain. - Coggle Diagram
Do institutions matter in Asian IR? Explain.
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
any country is eligible to join bank (despite its title); having 109 approved members worldwide;
improve economic and social outcomes in Asia
seen as an institutional challenge to US; because it is Chinese led, can seem as a way to challenge US' presence in region;
now
relying on China for economic and security alleviations in region...
to challenge existing system → bank allows China to legitimizate its rising role and status;
this is why China will most likely choose an inclusive institutional balancing strategy to draw as many supporters as possible, including the United States, to join the institution it has initiated
challenging existing system matters in Asian IR → Asian IR can heavily be influenced by regional hegemon or big power present in Asia, therefore if it tilts now to China,
changes* within Asian IR will ensue
whether changes are amongst Asian countries or with external powers,
shift in Asian IR's direction and narrative
will be present
If a state perceives specific benefits from this new institution it is most likely to ‘bandwagon for profit’ by joining the new institution that the challenger has initiated, so gaining benefits that the old governance institution cannot provide
MAIN ARGUMENT: AIIB represents a case of potential ‘leadership transition’ in Asian sphere
;
*All states must calculate costs and benefits when engaging in such an institutional transition in global governance.
Leader
: US (would take exclusive institutional balancing pov)
Challenger
: China (need to prove to others that the new institution it initiates can provide benefits which the existing system cannot) (inclusive institutional balancing pov)
Follower
: Other states
The failed outcome of exclusive institutional balancing towards the AIIB, therefore, is not due to the United States choosing the wrong strategy, but rather because it picked the wrong adversary
China has designed an inclusive multilateral institution to attract support from both developing and developed countries
The participation of a multiplicity of countries, especially from the West, will boost both the influence and relevance of the AIIB, as well as China, in a new setting of global governance
China has competed with the United States to a certain extent in offering public goods through the AIIB and other multilateral institutions
DEFINITION
: infrastructure development in developing Asia; China, moreover, has not limited AIIB membership solely to Asian countries, instead proactively inviting European countries and rich Arab states to join the bank, based on two considerations
Institutional balancing theory
suggests that states can use different institutional strategies to pursue their realist interests, such as power and influence, in the international system
Three types
Inclusive institutional balancing
strategy to include a target state in an institution whose rules and norms constrain it
e.g. ARF, and how ASEA used ARF norms and rules to constrain China's behavior in 1990s
Exclusive institutional balancing
excluding the target state from an institution, and exerting pressure on that state by virtue of the cohesion and cooperation of states within the institution
e.g. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); high entry standards actually precluded China from joining in first place...
Inter-institutional balancing
extension of exclusive institutional balancing; state that is excluded by a particular institution can support another, or initiate a similar institution to counter-balance pressure from the one that has excluded it
e.g. China counter TPP supported RCEP
provides a new perspective for explaining the dynamics of state behaviour in the AIIB
Role theory
on the other hand, examines how the role identity of an individual state shapes its policy choices regarding different institutional balancing strategies
US
not necessarily hating Asia-led institutions, just Chinese ones...
joined the ADB in 1960s for example
Essay Format
Yes
able to challenge existing system within Asia
→ influencing Asian IR's trajectory
AIIB
China's way of challenging existing system, by designing an inclusive multilateral institution focused on development in developing Asia, attracting support from both developing and developed countries
seeing membership isn't solely to Asian states, Asian IR is heavily represented including external powers relationships with Asian states on development, the only difference being it is done so through a Chinese-led institution
*it being Chinese, therefore Asian-led, also adds to how institutions matter in Asian IR, because geographically, when it comes to intra-regional relations, China having a more proactive and strategic approach then would US or Western power per se...
*IMPORTANT; able to sway states from choosing new institution, therefore throwing away previous existing order is a HUGE FEAT in how Asian IR will play out!!!!
highlight Asian IR key themes, economic, security and political aspects
ASEAN
deals with economic + security issues and everything in between;
ASEAN Way: navigating international anarchy as a collective of minor powers (prof)
ASEAN strategy:
effect Southeast Asian states' goal of "omni-enmeshing" great powers to tame their power towards the positive end of promoting regional stability
economic
: RCEP, ASEAN Plus Three, AEC, ASEAN's FTA
security
: ARF
political
: influenced by economic + security means
ASEAN
being umbrella of
sub-institutions
, able to efficiently
target Asian IR key themes
= better engaging with them,
necessitating its engagement in Asian IR for Asian IR to thrive
*even negative aspects of ASEAN can affect Asian IR
, therefore pros and cons of institutions STILL affect Asian IR
e.g.
Myanmar crisis;
ASEAN calls itself advocate of regional stability, yet
won't interfere in domestic issues of regional concern
, understood as
'internal' affairs
...
e.g.
South China Sea
; having
China potentially driving a wedge among ASEAN members
, territorial disputes not having proper joint communique...
No
Asian IR revolving mostly around bilateralism, not so much institutions
US-Japan, US-ROK alliances and US-Taiwan = defense/security strategies + economic means
Sino-US = economic means, balance of power regarding regional hegemon, keeping security stable in region
when it comes to territorial disputes like South China Sea, or domestic crises like Myanmar crisis, institutions are sort of rendered useless, for example with ASEAN, for the former can't have a joint communique, and for the latter not interfering with domestic issues...
Asian IR is heavily mixed with cultural, historical and current concepts all meshed into an international relations system, and that enmeshment is just too much for institutions to handle, therefore they don't matter
Power dynamics, not so much
can be represented as THE MAIN THEME of Asian IR
, looking at the rise of China and US' take of it
power dynamics does not rely on persistent and connected rules dictating whether the dynamic in question is acceptable or unacceptable
; it doesn't wait for anyone, as it is constantly on edge
how would institutions matter in Asian IR's most prevalent theme when it can't even embody power dynamics in its definition?...
can institutions matter looking at South China Sea, both powers reinforcing their will of wanting to be a regional hegemon, both power's respective bilateral relations? right...