Meta-Ethical Theories

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Naturalism

Intuitionism

Emotivism

Key Debates

Naturalism is cognitivist (moral facts can be verified or falsified), realist (morality is out there in the real world) and empirical (experience can be used to tell us moral facts)

Naturalism takes a scientific approach to test and prove moral facts. Morality is objective and ethical statements are propositions (meaningful, declarative statements)

Naturalism says kindness is good as we see its positive effects, and that Stalin was bad due to his negative impact

Moral facts are universal and objective as it is verified by our experiences of the natural world

If morality is objective, we surely should aim to maximise happiness for everyone - supporting Mill's utilitarianism

Rule utilitarianism can make the proposition 'torture is wrong' based on real-world experience, saying something meaningful about torture

Hume says that truth lies in beliefs gained through experience - could easily be applied to naturalism

Hedonistic naturalist R.B. Perry says if something is 'good' then we want that thing, and if something is 'right' then it is 'conducive to harmonious happiness'

F.H. Bradley's 'New Naturalism' suggests empirical ethical facts are part of the 'concrete universal' (our worldly experience). He thinks hedonism is too individualistic and Kantian duty is not grounded enough in reality - for him our moral duty is acting in our role in society to function in the social organism, in accordance with the moral traditions of our community (cultural relativism?)

Hume's is/ought (or fact/value) problem argues that it is logically wrong to derive an 'ought' from an 'is' - e.g., just because it 'is' good to give to charity does not logically mean that I 'ought' to give to charity

Singer however argues that if Steve 'is' a vegetarian then we can claim he 'ought' not eat meat, and Searle suggests that if Jones 'is' in debt to Smith, then he 'ought' to pay back the debt

G.E. Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy criticises the idea that 'good' is like a natural property and argues it cannot be reduced - 'good' is just 'good' as yellow is just yellow. Good is not found in things, it describes things. Thus, 'good' cannot be defined with a natural property like pleasure or approval

Moore's Open Question Argument suggests that as 'good' is just 'good' and can't be defined, then something may be pleasurable but we can still ask the open question of whether that thing is good

Ethical naturalism does not allow for moral dispute if it claims moral facts are objectively true

Bradley's 'concrete universal' can be undermined as chaos theory (randomness in system of deterministic laws) is challenging mechanistic approaches

Good is always reduced to something, often based on assumptions. Charles R. Pigden writes how 'naturalists ... resort to all sorts of supposed facts'

Objective moral laws exist independently of human beings, knowable through universal innate (mature) intuition, allows for objective moral values

G.E. Moore argued that there are complex ideas that can be broken down (e.g., horse), and simple ideas that can't be broken down (e.g., yellow) - 'good' is a simple, indefinable concept

Intuitionism (ethical non-naturalism) says objective morality can't be deduced from empiricism. Moral principles are 'there' like numbers just 'exist' - recognition of good 'just is' (non-metaphysical moral realism)

The term 'good' is sui generis (without comparison / unique) and knowing good is a priori knowledge

Intuition is a conscious mental state that recognises the self-evident - good is the same self-evident truth for all (or is it subjective?)

Any fallible intuition is due to an error in practical reasoning not because we fail to recognise good

Moore said we ought to do actions that produce good but there are goods of less purity

W.D Ross argued we know prima facie duties by intuition (e.g., fidelity, reparation, justice, beneficence)

Duties may conflict but we use intuition to decide what to do in that situation

H.A. Pritchard says there is no definition of 'ought', agrees we all recognise 'good'

Reason looks at the facts of the situation and helps us answer worldly truths, while intuition shows us where our moral obligations lie and answer moral truths

Intuition involves deciding which obligation is more important - this is the 'ought' (very subjective?)

There is an is-ought gap - just because something 'is' good doesn't mean we 'ought' to do it without obligation

General thinking uses reason to make the moral decision relative to the situation; moral thinking rests on intuition and tells us the right thing to do

General thinking produces preliminaries but these hold no obligation - only moral thinking gives us the 'ought'

Intuitionism does not mean that all moral decisions are reached by relying on intuition but enables people to know basic moral truths so we can make ethical decisions

  • Non-naturalist, no reliance on material world, so no naturalistic fallacy
  • Universally innate intuition and self-evident truth of good explains why societies share moral values
  • Overcomes naturalism's problem that there is no agreement over ethical 'facts'
  • Realistic is admitting flawed moral intuition, explains why we have disagreements
  • Allows for moral duties and obligations, link to conscience as moral guide
  • There is no proof that moral intuition exists, relies on an assumption
  • Intuitive 'truths' wildly differ and are very subjective, with no way to resolve conflicts like pro-life v pro-choice for abortions
  • Mackie said that good's non-natural properties would be 'queer' and therefore implausible things to exist in the natural, empirical world
  • Hume argued that knowing something doesn't make you want to do it. Mackie agreed with Hume's Guillotine and asked what 'queer' element had been added to make you think you 'ought' to do something
  • Mackie calls intuitionism the argument from 'queerness' as our knowledge is limited to the phenomenal and intuition would be a different kind of knowing to what we know about knowing
  • Intuitions could be unconsciously influenced by social norms (e.g., slavery)
  • Fail to agree on moral good: Moore is teleological and promoted happiness; Ross emphasised duty

Emotivism is non-cognitive - there are no moral 'facts,' no objective truths or falsities

'Good, bad, right and wrong' have no actual existence - it is just personal feelings, just opinion

To say 'murder is wrong' is to just say we do not like the idea rather than being a moral fact

Linked to relativism in the sense that morality is subjective, without universal moral truths

Saying 'most people approve of racism' does not contradict 'racism is wrong' as the latter is non-cognitive

We cannot be infallible by always getting the answer right as there are no moral truths, meaning 'the right answer' does not exist except in opinion

Bertrand Russell said moral statements are rhetorical to rouse emotion as they are unverifiable and non-cognitive

A.J. Ayer said ethical language is meaningless as it cannot be verified (verification principle). It just expresses approval or disapproval - boo-hurrah theory

Ayer said ethical statements are 'pseudo concepts' and cannot be analysed, so should not be object of meta-ethical enquiry but left to psychology, sociology and anthropology

C.L. Stevenson said making moral judgements expresses an opinion but also tries to influence others

Stevenson's 'interest theory' focuses on how we use ethical language to use a desired effect which is the 'causal or dispositional property' of language

  • Ethical language is effective in changing the views of others (in rhetoric)
  • People make decisions based on emotions, emotivism reflects this
  • Explains relativism, the subjectivity of morality
  • To say morality is meaningless seems harsh
  • If all morality is just emotions, then are we just to act on our emotions all the time? Is this not selfish?
  • Undermines all ethical theories that say morality is based in reason and logic
  • No solution to resolve differences of opinion
  • What about degrees of disapproval? Mackie says there is a distinction between disliking curries and disliking genocide
  • James Rachels argues there ought to be a distinction between the reaction of 'ouch' to stubbing one's toe and 'that's wrong' when we witness a murder. Hare says it's too reductionist

Do 'good, bad, right and wrong' have an objective factual basis?

Our ideas of GBRW are based upon experience of the world and can be verified by such experiences (Hume)

Bradley's New Naturalism allows for cultural relativism

Universal intuition tells us what the objective moral laws are

Our experience tells us that GBRW cannot be objective since there are so many disagreements in society

Hume's is/ought problem means it is logically invalid to take an 'ought' from an 'is' statement about the world

Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy says good cannot be reduced to physical property, can't answer what it is (Open Question Argument). Pigden writes how 'naturalists ... resort to all sorts of supposed facts'

They are meaningless terms that cannot be verified according to Ayer

Do 'good, bad, right and wrong' only reflect what is in the mind of the person using those terms?

Intuition is a mental state which recognises self-evident terms like GBRW

GBRW only express an emotional reaction, approval or disapproval (boo-hurrah) and try to persuade others, no objective meaning

GBRW must reflect an individual state of mind as the 'right' decision is determined by the ego balancing between 'objective' societal views (superego) and 'subjective' personal desire (id) - link to Pritchard's moral and general thinking

Right intuition is universal and innate - there are objective moral laws which are self-evident

To claim that morality is merely emotional is reductionist - the good and bad effects of acts can be clearly seen in society and matter more than just a 'I don't like that'

If everyone has synderesis and uses the God-given gift of recta ratio in conscientia, then it ought not produce different conclusions else it would undermine the universality of God's moral law

Are 'good, bad, right and wrong' meaningful or meaningless?

GBRW relate to the real world as morality can be seen out there through experience - the consequences of decisions are evident and are verifiable

Language Games allows ethical language to be meaningful depending on the language game - it doesn't have to be verifiable/falsifiable (cognitive)

GBRW are intuitively meaningful, like 'yellow' (Moore)

GBRW can't be reduced down to a physical property which is 'out there in the world', thus cannot be verified

GBRW clearly are not subject to a universal intuitive interpretation - claiming that others intuit wrong is assumptive; cultural relativism better?

If we take language as having a communicative function, then meaningful language would have to mean something to more than one person and part of a multi-player language game. If we have different ideas of what is good, this suggests the meaning of good is different for each individual, in which case how could we establish a language game wherein the language is meaningful, since we would each be playing by different rules?