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Chapter 5 Prussia and France: Franco-Prussia relations 1866-70 - Coggle…
Chapter 5 Prussia and France: Franco-Prussia relations 1866-70
International situation
Britain welcomed Prussia's dominant position
Russia pleased it had a reliable partner against Austria
Austria not in a position to mount war or revenge (problem of subject nationalities)
only real threat to Prussia was France -> Napoleon and many Frenchmen regarded the establishment of of powerful German state as a threat to French security
Napoleon III
Situation in 1866
Napoleon neutral Austro-Prussian war - hoped to mediate + persuade them to make peace on his terms where he could gain, but speed and scale of Prussian victory dashed these hopes
attempted to mediate following Sadowa, offer declined by Bismarck , who informed Napoleon that Prussian expansion limited to north Germany - division of Germany presented to Napoleon as a reward for neutrality
Bismarck still had some fears Napoleon might still march to Austria's assistance
Threat of German unity
post-1866, Napoleon concerned - Prussia controlled over 2/3 Germany + unlikely that remaining 1/3 would continue independent existence indefinitely
expansion of Zollparlament seemed to be step towards full German unity
Relations between Bismarck and Napoleon III pre-1866
first met in Paris 1855 - successful on personal level, parted on friendly terms
Biarritz meeting - no records, likely no commitments made, but probably protestations of goodwill and general support
The south German states
4 south German states (Bavaria, Wurttemburg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt) did not present united front - distrusted each other as much as they distrusted Bismarck
also distrusted Napoleon - believed (correctly) he wanted part of their territory
July 1866, French ambassador in Berlin presented plans to Bismarck to acquire part of the Rhineland belonging to Bavaria and Hesse
rejected by Bismarck - did not want to give any German territory to France
did not want to alienate Napoleon - suggested France should look for expansion in Belgium and Luxembourg
Napoleon III
seems to have wanted to restore France to a position of influence in Europe, peacefully if possible
policy of undoing decisions at Vienna, 1815 - sympathy for nationalist movements in Italy and Poland, but not Germany
difficulty making a decision and sticking to it - lacked ruthlessness and will to carry things through to logical conclusion
disadvantage against Bismarck
The Luxembourg Crisis
Napoleon vs Bismarck
March 1867, Bismarck released texts to secret military alliances made with south German states -> not as independent as many statesmen had thought
Napoleon began new negotiations with King of the Netherlands, playing on fears Prussia wanted Dutch territory, offering to protect the Netherlands in return for Luxembourg
Napoleon felt the king wrecked the scheme by agreeing to sell Luxembourg for 5 million guilders, subject to approval by the King of Prussia (not likely to be given)
Bismarck used patriotic German fervour (he had encouraged) as an excuse to threaten King of the Netherlands to not give up Luxembourg
Bismarck appealed to Great Powers to settle Luxembourg question
London conference agreed:
Prussian garrison would be withdrawn
Luxembourg's independence would be guaranteed by the Great Powers
no French territorial gain a heavy blow for Napoleon
Results of the Luxembourg crisis
damaged Franco-German relations
but, 1867-70 peaceful
Bismarck keen to avert war - fearful of French military strength + that France might find allies
Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph met Napoleon twice in 1867 to see if it was possible to reach agreement, but these came to nothing - no basis (most German Austrians opposed pro-French and anti-Prussian policy)
The Luxembourg crisis 1867
Bismarck began by helping persuade the King of the Netherlands (also Duke of Luxembourg) to relinquish the duchy, he readily agreed
but, Prussia had rights in Luxembourg, incl. to garrison the fortress
end of 1866, Bismarck no longer felt need to be friendly to Napoleon, who was stirring up demonstrations in Luxembourg against Prussia
in response, and to encourage nationalist sentiment, Bismarck started to refer to Luxembourg as German + that it should not be given to France
anti-French sentiment increased throughout Germany
Bismarck's intentions
Bismarck presented himself as a man of peace - ally British fears about Prussian warlike intentions + reduce chance of a British alliance with France
did upmost to present policies in a favourable light
difficult to judge true intentions from public utterances
likely Bismarck hoped to unify Germany at some stage, but does not seem to have been in a hurry or have a master plan to bring about unification
had to be cautious + not neglect public opinion - seize opportunities
aware war with France would likely speed up unification process (raised national consciousness) - but war would only be popular if France seemed to be aggressor