How should a rising China deal with the US? Answer with reference to one or more IR theories

China

1930's


o War-lords (north) having military gov. and exercised control over northern china
o Manchuria ~ have the manchuko (puppet state established by Japanese to facilitate control over region)
o Chiang Kai-Shek's 'Guomindang' moving up North
1928 → Guomindang becomes 'de facto ruler'

Communists are in the shadows and Guomindang is calling shots in China*

Guomindang → modeled along Soviet lines; taking Soviet advice


o party state → did not distinguish party by the gov.; state, party + gov should come together as one; did not tolerate opposition parties


o system of 'tutelage' → did not want any liberal opposition, diversity or pluralism in political sphere

Key features of the 'party-state' (William Kerby) → seen also today especially with North Korea


o party state does not distinguish b/w political party and gov. → fused into one
tendency towards Leninist lines → emphasis of mass mobilization;
bringing masses together and mobilizing them to support party state objectives
o politicization of public life; making it difficult to tune out politics
o high degree of militarization → military first type of vibe (taking international context into consideration)
o Leadership cult/political idol worship → Chiang Kai Shek

Development State

Guomindang raising China up; party-state taking control of economy;


o "developmental state" → party state taking control of economy with objective to foster growth, modernize China

o Infrastructure building (highway network, national electrification)
o industrial planning and guidance (e.g., silk industry) ~ managing certain industries, getting their hands on on being the best at it
o Promotion of training in science and engineering to build a class of technical and functional experts to assist in achieving the developmental goals of the state → quick starting China's stereotype of having a focus of sciences
o Technocratic civil service selected on meritocratic competence carries over to Taiwan when Guomindang flees the mainland
o Outbreak of second-sins Japanese war (1937) further entrenches militarization of party state; authoritarian nature really looked at military precedence over all
o Mao focusing on political loyalty and infatuation with himself

By end of WWII → party state controls 70%-80% of China's industrial capacity

1946-49: civil war b/w Guomindang (Chiang Kai Shek) and Communists (Mao Zedong); communists grew their strength during second sino-japanese war; guomindang + communists forming alliance against Japan → empowerment of Communists and strengthening

Oct 1st, 1949: Communists proclaim PRC; **CCP → have to express outward support for Communists, more totalitarian views than GMD ever had

US-PRC Relations

US plays an indispensable role in the key regions of the world, including Europe and Asia: i.e. looking at key indsutrial countries


o Europe having Rhine Valley (France & Germany), Britain + Russia
o Asia has Japan


o George Kennan ~ ; strategic realist and thinker working with US state department; famous for articles how to deal with the USSR; thinks US doesn't need to worry about everything from the world → just need to protect five key industrial regions (Rhine Valley, Britain, US + Japan kept out of Soviet hand, balance of power not tilt to Communist powers)

China IS NOT a key strategic factor for US calculations

realist framework → China will not make a difference in balance of power


o Truman didn't want to alienate PRC; PRC not being as important in balance of power AND if PRC matters, better to keep it as US friend than enemy, to make PRC oppose USSR

Secretary of State Acheson and George Kennan were foreign policy realists → refer to offensive realism: regime type less important than balance of power considerations (MEANING not caring about whether country is communist good or bad, AS LONG AS balance of power remains US')

Offensive Realism

Structural Realism (Defensive)

o Preventing Western hegemony in Asia: China is looking out for itself (surviving in international anarchy, cannot be certain about other states’ intentions so take the offense first), and not falling under the clutches of US powers


  • modeling US' Monroe Doctrine in trying to drive out US out of Asia-Pacific region (seeing how US has been involved in the past, doesn't want it to be there any longer);



    -- i.e. maritime boundaries of South China Sea, pushing US beyond "first island chain," and "second island chain," giving China more power within Pacific and isolating countries like Japan, Philippines, Taiwan and Korea from US...


    -- i.e. military forces; PUSHING THEM OUT!


  • Want to tackle territorial disputes (e.g. Taiwan, India, etc.), naval (sovereignty over South China Sea) via coercion perhaps...;

  • will have strategic interests outside Asia → e.g. Africa

Limited cooperation, focusing on balancing of power


  • if cooperation and competition are to be enduring concepts, China might as well not have ties with US and do its thing to tilt balance of power on its side
  • isolating oneself is the best way to survive and stay strong; once cooperation becomes a thing, lose your edge;
  • FOCUS ON ITS ECONOMY TO TILT BALANCE OF POWER; is currently seen today with more and more nations having economic ties with China

Main focus looks at power-maximization, and fear of others having power therefore leading back to POWER-MAXIMIZATION

o Dealing with Chinese security + survival: not only secure its survival as a rising power (security wise), but also tilt balance of power in Asia so that it is predominantly Asian and not Western


  • having growing security interests around globe


  • grow its power to such an extent to minimize power gap in neighbors like India, Japan and Russia


  • grow its economy : and become so powerful that neighboring countries would have to abide by its rules (no more US ties ish) in order to not suffer