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Plato's and Aristotles Views of the Soul - Coggle Diagram
Plato's and Aristotles Views of the Soul
Aristotle'sView of the Soul
body and soul are inseparable
so in contrast to P's dualist position, A does not hold that the soul is separable from the body 0 that when the body dies, you cannot meaningfullyspeak of a form or soul of the body because decomposition
analogy
eye
A says that the soul of the eye is the sight, if the eye is not functioning, there is no soul
wax and seal
when heated wax is imprinted with somenes seal or stamp it is impossible to separate the imprint of the seal from the wax.
so the form of the body, the soul, is imprinted on it but is also inseparable from the working of the body itself
relationship of form and cause
the form of something is found in its functioning
the form of something is related to the cause, specifically the formal cause, which is the 'blueprint' or map of something
example:
BMW - you cannot ay you have a BMW if all you have is a pile of BMW parts - they have to be connected together and functioning in the manner intended
human - even if you have human parts, you cannot say that there is a soul or form of human things there unless they all function together
materialism - Ryle's Philosophical Behaviourism
modern materialism
partly made possible by the effect of the Cartesian (D's) dualism on western thought
id matter is just extension and min id non-spatial, then it is simple to bracket off the mind and focus surely on the physical substance
R' P B
Gilbert Ryle calles D's theory 'the ghost in the machine' (ghost=mind, machine=body)
according to R, there is no mind which exists as a separate entity to the body and to search for one is to make a category mistake
by this he means that the brain and mind belong to different logical categories but have mistakenly been associated together
R's Cambridge/Oxford analogy
a foreigner visiting Oxford Uni for †he first time, is shown all the different colleges and bulding but then asks 'where is the university?'
the mistake is that he is looking for something separate from all the buildings he has been shown without realising that he has already seen the university
in just the same way, R argues that dualists are mistakenly searching for something over and above the brain, or behaviour, called the mind
'mental' events = specific patterns
so mental terminology actually means something physical (eg behaviour)
R was a philosphocila behaviourist who saw 'mental' events as just referring to a specific pattern of behaviour. 'mind' is no longer internal; it is what we do with our bodies
eg when someone is depressed/angry/joyful, we look at the pattern of behaviour they exhibit in each different case. we cannot see beyond this behaviour
limiitations of R's P B
R's explanation for wishing
partly anticipates problematic states such as wishing , which seems to have no particular pattern of behaviour attached to it, by talking about 'dispositions to behave'
appropriate behaviour is regarded as potential and can be anticipated given certain circumstances. so a person wishing to go on holiday may spend a lot of time on travel websites for instance
Ward's criticism of Ryle
feels R's account is inadequate
1) what about pretending? someone who pretends to be angry and someone who is angry may exhibit the exact same behaviour, but one of them is not experiencing the same internal state
2) we do know our experience from the inside. when we feel pain we know that such a feeling cannot be completely captured by a description of the way we behave when we feel it
3) what about self awareness? it is impossible to say how being aware of yourself as a thinking being is capable of being describes in terms of behaviour or a 'deposition to behave' in a certain way
counter-intuitive to humans
this approach is counter-intuitive to humans as subjects who have what they percieve as internal states of mind
some of these internal states may not manifest as outward patterns of behaviour at all - so do they not exist?
metaphysics of consciousness
Descartes substance dualism
cogito ergo sum
D frames this as
'I think therefore I am'
so we can have certainty that there is a mental substance or 'thinking' and we can be sure that that is not the same as matter - how can we be sure of this? - by application of Lebniz' law
Leibniz' law
ig two things are the same thing, they must share the same properties
the argument:
I can be sure that my mind exists (evil demon experiment)
I cannot be sure that my body exists (cogito ergo sum)
by application of L law, mind and body must be two separate substances (because if they were the same thing, we would be able to be certain the body existed as well)
thought experiment conclusion
while you can be deceived about the content of thoughts (eg that there is a world which is presented to your senses) you cannot be deceived that you are a thinking subject that seems to perceive things
in other words, there needs to be a subject - you - who is the subject of deception
body and soul are not the same
D arrived at the conlusion of this - he says that the key difference is that matter (body) is extended in space and mind is unextended
this echoes Plato's earlier dualism in which the soul (mind) is essentially non-material and indivisible
D's thought experiment
the point is that you cannot be entirely certain that this is not true
but even if you assume that there is a decievr, it follows from you being deceived that there is a 'you' - that much is certain
an evil demon decieves you into believing that the evidence of your senses is real. but in fact, it entirely illusory. how do you know for sure that is not the case?
evaluation of D's theory
substance dualism does account for some features of consciousness that materialism finds difficult to explain
D's theory fails to give a coherent account of how min and body interact when one is physical/spatial and the other non-physical/spatial - claimed that the two interact via the pineal gland in the brain, but this is speculative
D applying L law
L law is not necessarily applicable to the difference between mind and body as it may be that the supposed difference in properties is the result go viewing our consciousness 'from within'
Plato's View of the Soul
his beliefs about the soul
was a dualist and believe that the soul is deformed through its association with the body
the soul is separable from the body and as it is non-material, it is, in a sense, indestructible
arguments for the soul
the cyclical nature of existence
as sleep follows waking, waking follows sleep
as dead follows life, life follows death
the argument from knowledge
claims we have an innate knowledge that helps us make comparisons, which can only come from the world of the Forms. so our souls pre-existed our physical bodies
as the soul (not the body) grasps the Forms, then the soul must belong to that world too. so it is unchangeable and indivisibe, just as the Forms are
charioteer analogy
helps to understand the tripartite (threefold) nature of the soul:
2 courses (will and appetite) are controlled by charioteer (reason)
Plato believed that unless the charioteer kept control on the reins, will (the weaker horse) would be dragged in the direction that appetite (the stronger horse) wanted to go
discussion points
mind and body must be sepreate substances
disagree
what makes a person? is it only their mind or is it a combination of factors that include body sand mind? eg would you recognise your classmates in 30 years time because of their mind alone? you may recognise them by their physical characteristics such ads their eye colour, how they speak or their mannerisms
medical research has now found the function of the pineal gland - it secretes hormones that help regulate sleep patters and thus has a physical function and is unlikely to be the point of contact between mind and body
Descartes' view can be criticised. if someone loses a limb, it may alter their outlook on life, their personality or mind as well as their physical appearance, seen in those who survived a traumatic event such as a serious car accident or war. may suggest that mind and body are more closely connected than D allows
how can an immaterial mind communicate with a material body? Gilbert Ryle uses the idea to criticise D, saying that it is like a 'ghost in the machine' - how can a ghostly phenomenon pull the levers and handles to make a machine work? for Ryle, this does not make sense
agree
as a thinking being, I consider myself to be a whole person. the mind, or consciousnessm, is the part go me that holds the essence of personhood. eg someone given a face or body transplant is the same person because their mind is the same
Descartes gives an explanation of how th mind and body interact through the singular pineal gland. this solves the problem of how an immaterial mind could communicate with a material body
because they can be treated differently , mind is immaterial and thinking whereas the body is physical. body can divided into parts which can be removed but mind is a singular whole
it is a category error to talk about body and mind as separate substances
it isn't
it is
this use of language us inaccurate; it is a category error because the body and mind cannot be desxcribe iinb the same way
or someone asking, 'where is th team sprrit?" in a game of cricket- it Iis not another type of physical object or person. using the phrase in the sway is a category mistake, an error in use of language
it would be like the foreign visitor asking where the university is when they have just seen all of its building, professors and students. 'university' is not another building or person; it is the combination of all the parts
body and mind are not distinct (seperate) because both are describing what it means to be a person. Ryle argue sit would be like saying I ahem a left glove and a right glove but hot a pair of gloves - but both of these phrases are describing the same thing
personhood involves every aspect of physical and mental;. the thinking part of 'me' is not something that can be categorised and separated. it would be like a ghost (non-physical) trying to work a machine (physical) - it could not work
Aristotle's view of soul is successful
disagree
P would argue that the soul can be separated from body which imprisons it during life. after death, soul is released to return to WoF and gains knowledge of the Forms before it is incarnated into another body
materialists would argue we are made of physical matter only. no need to assume there is something extra or immaterial inside that is a soul eg physical body ceasing to function explains the difference between a living and dead chicken because there is nothing else, no soul
agree
both are essential to living being. eg wax and seal analogy, imprint cannot be separated from wax thus same principle applied
because body and soul cannot be seperated, when body dies so does soul. explains differences that we observe when something dies because the soul dies as well as the body
soul is essential because it is the formal cause of th body - its characteristics eg blade and handle of an axe are like the body; the from of should is its ability to chop. the axe would not be an axe with only the matter, it needs the form (or soul) to be what it is
British philospher, Anscombe, supports this idea of intention. although action of pointing at an object is physical, doesn't explain reason why we have pointed or intention behind the action. intention could be linked to soul because it shows there is more to me than just physical actions
Plato is right there is a soul
disagree
Geach, criticises argument. he asks how a disembodied soul can 'see' the Forms when 'seeing' is a physical process
in Plato's eg of the slave boy, Socrates' questions seem to lead to the boy to answer step by step. even without an education, he could arrive at the answer by learning, not recalling
argument from opposite seems to be an assumption. eg not everything has an opposite, what's opposite of the colour blue?
there is no need to assume that the should exists or is the opposite of the body
this inner conflict could be simply explained as emotion, personality type or lack of maturity. it could be due to upbringing or DNA so that we are more easily swayed by desires or emotions rather than an immaterial soul
there is no verifiable evidence of an immaterial should as something extra and beyond our physical body
agree
souls, using reason, can access the WoF because it remembers this world prior to being incarnated in the body. this 'remebering' is called anamnesis.
we know what is fair or unfair before we have learned this because our should recalls the Form of Justice from WoF
plato's argument from opposites
we recognise opposites, eg small and large, light and dark, life and death. the body and soul are also opposites. since life is something dead must also be something - moving of soul to WoF
Plato does seem to describe human experience of inner conflict eg I may know that I should go to the gym to keep healthy, but I feel too tired or lazy, or I choose to go to the coffee shop instead. this means that reason is not in control of my soul
when reason is in control, soul is in harmony eg if the three parts of soul are harmonious, the spirit shows courage, the rational part of the soul shows wisdom and together they control the appetites, showing moderation and order. as we become mature and make more rational decisions based on reason, we feel more unified as a person thus is a soul that is more important than and controls the wants and desires of material body