Please enable JavaScript.

Coggle requires JavaScript to display documents.

Substance Dualism, Substance Dualism - Coggle Diagram

- - - - READ TEXTBOOK ON THIS AND UPDATE - PAGE 187-188
    - - what??? for something to be conceivable it literally means to have no logical contradiction???
      - Extentional contexts - the property that makes two things distinct genuinely belong to the object
        
        Intentional contexts - the property that apparently makes two things distinct is. not a property of the things at all, it is simply the awareness that I have directed at the object
      - Reply
        
        Descartes accepts that generally we cannot infer what is possible from how we think of it
        
        But in the case of clear and distinct ideas, the inference is justified
        
        If we can clearly and distinctly think of some object x having a certain property, then I it is both possible and true
        
        If I clearly and distinctly conceive of a triangle having three sides, it is inconceivable that it does not
        
        likewise because Descartes can clearly and distinctly conceive that mind and body are distinct substances then it is possible and they must be
        
        Counter-reply
        
        We can question whether he really has a clear and distinct idea of the mind and body. Can he really grasp their nature in the same way he can of triangles
        
        Thus if he doesn't actually have a clear and distinct idea then he has committed the masked man fallacy
    - - Even it is both metaphysically possible and logically possible that mind can exist as a distinct substance, this does entail that it actually does
        
        In the same way we can conceive of the mind and body being two distinct substances, we can conceive that one substance can have both the properties of thought and extension
        
        If, according to Descartes, whatever we can clearly and distinctly conceive is metaphysically possible.
        
        And I clearly and distinctly conceive of the mind and body being made of the same substance
        
        Whilst somebody else clearly and distinctly conceives of the mind and body being two separate substances
        
        Simply knowing what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the real world
        
        Reply
        
        However, knowing what is metaphysically impossible does tell us something about reality
        
        If Descartes could show that it is metaphysically impossible for the mind and body to be the same substance, then we could accept this
- - - - Reply
        
        The mind might be divisible but this is very different fro the way that the body is divisible
        
        The body is specially divisible
        
        The mind is functionally divisble
        
        So they are still distinct
    - - Reply
        
        is there a reply? this doesn't feel like a good objection, the idea that the mind is a property doesn't feel intuitive, it is too complex to simply be a property. Properties are things like red blue cold hot. The mind is a complex map of synapses with properties itself, such as willing, understanding an perceiving (it literally says in the textbook that the mind has these properties). So how could it be a property?
    - - bollocks!!!! waves are not physical things it is the movement of a partivle/vibration of a particle. it would be like trying to spaiclaly divide the action of walking. You can divide the particle in terms of protons neutrons and electrons like you can divide a leg into muscle, tendons and bones. But you cannot divide a wave like you cannot divide walking. They are actions not physical substance
- - - - Objection
        
        This argument is criticised because of its use of induction
        
        The conclusion I based off of one example
        
        it is like saying 'this dog has three legs so all dogs have three legs'
        
        You cannot generalise from one case because it could be a special case
        
        The Argument from Analogy - version 2
        
        P1: This behaviour has a mental cause
        -P2: That behaviour has a mental cause
        
        P3: That third behaviour has a mental cause
        
        P4: ect...
        
        C1: Therefore, many behaviours have a mental cause
        
        P5: Other people exhibit the same types of behaviour as cited before
        
        C2: Therefore, those behaviours also have mental causes
        -C3: Therefore, other people have minds
        
        Objection 1
        
        Although many behaviours have mental causes, not all of them do
        
        Sometimes I do something without being aware of a mental cause
        
        So while C1 is correct it isn't strong enough to support the whole argument
        
        Reply
        
        Using this logic, no argument is strong enough unless provided with certain, undeniable evidence
        
        Equally, those arguing against substance dualism would have to provide certain evidence that there is no mental substance, which they cannot do because they cannot explain quail and intentionality
        
        Can I use this reply??? it's not in the textbook but I think it's valid
        
        Objection 2
        
        The argument relies on a contentious claim that similar effects (behaviours) have similar causes (mental states)
        
        So at best this is an argument from inference, so SD is only inferring the existence of other minds - they cannot know
        
        Reply
        
        Aren't most arguments, arguments from inferences???? equally those arguing against SD can never know for certain if mental substance does or does not exist
        
        The correct answer should be the one that is most logical
    - - Is there an objection to this???
- - - - Descartes Reply
        
        This is not an accurate representation of how things are moved
        
        When something falls over, we would explain this in terms of it's weight. But it's weight doesn't 'push' it
        
        weight is the result of gravity which is a a non-contact force, meaning it does not require contact on the physical object in order to act upon it