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Meta-ethics, Meta-ethics - Coggle Diagram

- - - - WHAT? IF YOU PRESCRIBE SOMEONE SOMETHING YOU ARE EXPRESSING YOUR ATTITUDE ON WHAT THEY SHOULD DO. IT IS TRYING TO PERSUADE YOU AND YOU ARE TRYING TO INFLUENCE THEM??? I DON'T GET THIS IT'S STUPID??
      - Hare's view of 'good'
        
        It is used to command, to provide guidance for choosing what to do
        
        It assumes a set of standards, features in virtue of which something counts as 'good' or not
        
        Two identical things must both be good or not. To think otherwise is logically contradictory
        
        WHAT THE HELL DOES THAT SECOND POINT MEAN????
      - Hare's view of 'ought'
        
        The same three features that apply to 'good', Hare argues, also apply to 'ought' and 'right'
        
        We can ask for reasons behind prescriptions
        
        We must be consistent (if I say don't steal, I should not steal)
        
        We can infer prescriptions from other prescriptions (If i say that taking innocent life is wrong, then if a foetus is innocent life, abortion is wrong). If I disagree, I must dispute one of these claims.
        
        I DON'T UNDERSTAND 1 AND 2???
    - - 1. Imperative
        e.g. 'shut the door' - not moral; 'don't eat meat' - moral
      - 2. Value judgements
        e.g. 'good' used to command something
        
        I DON'T GET THIS EXAMPLE
        
        Value judgements are more than descriptions
        
        'That's a good strawberry because it's sweet'
        
        This agrees with Hume's Is-Ought gap and Moore's naturalistic fallacy --> our commendation is not the same thing as the description. (since someone might think sweet strawberries are bad)
        
        I DON'T UNDERSTAND THIS AT ALL???
    - - HOW IS IT ANTI REALISM BUT THEN SAYING THERE ARE OBJECTIVE MORAL REALITY ??? WHAT????
  - - - Metaphysical queer
        
        moral properties are supposed to motivate us to act
        
        we are used to subjective personal desires, wants and needs motivating us to act
        
        facts like 'that tomato is red' do not have any intrinsic motivation, they just are the case
        
        if morals are truly objective, then that suggests they are queer as moral facts alone would be enough to motivate us to act. No other objective fact about the universe does this
        
        just to know something true about the way the world is does not entail being motivated to do anything about it. It just seems odd
      - Epistemologically queer
        
        Realists (particularly intuitionists) claim that there are special moral values, and that we know them through a special faculty unlike the rest of our senses
        
        This is an odd thing to claim
        
        What or where are they? And how exactly do we perceive them if not through our senses
        
        There do not seem to be any adequate answers.
        
        It is therefore better to say that there are no objective moral properties , and we do not know categorically that things are right or wrong
        
        I DON'T UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE HERE, WHY IS ONE METAPHYSICAL AND ONE EPISTEMOLOGICAL
    - - HOW CAN THIS BE A COGNITIVIST THEORY IF IT CLAIMS MORAL JUDGEMENTS CANNOT BE TRUE OR FALSE
  - - - I DON'T REALLY GET EMOTIVISM HERE.
    - - I DON'T GET IT? IS THIS IN FAVOUR OF EMOTIVISM OR NOT? IT SOUNDS LIKE IT'S TRYING TO TEAR DOWN THE THEORY AND I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHAT AYER IS TRYING TO SAY HERE. IF MORAL DEBATE IS JUST INFLUENCING OTHERS HOW CAN IT BE ABOUT FACTS
    - - OBJECTION 1:
        
        If Ayer concedes that there is disagreement between moral positions, this suggests cognitivism is true. because surely disagreements only occur when people have truth claims?
        
        WHAT??? THIS IS BS??? PEOPLE CAN DEBATE OVER IF THEY THINK A MOVE IS GOOD/BAD BUT THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE CONCLUSION TO MAKE HERE, THEY ARE EXPRESSION THEIR OPINIONS IT DOES NOT MEAN ONE IS TRUE AND ONE IS FALSE???
      - OBJECTION 2:
        
        People deliberate over moral propositions and change their minds - surely this suggests that there is more to morality than just an emotional reaction
        
        WHAT?? THIS DOESN'T MAKE SENSE, PEOPLE CHANGE OPINIONS ALL THE TIME E.G. YOU MIGHT LIKE A PERSON AT FIRST AND THEN BEGIN TO DISLIKE THEM. I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY SHOULD EVEN CONSIDER THESE GOOD OBJECTIONS
      - OBJECTION 3:
        
        The verification principle says a statement is only meaningful if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable
        
        The VP is neither analytic not empirically verifiable
        
        So the VP fails its own test and is meaningless
        
        REPLY:
        
        Ayer could say that the VP is intended as a definition, not a hypothesis. But we do no have to accept this definition
        
        DEFINITION OF WHAT??? WHAT IS IT DEFINING
    - - Charles Stevenson developed the theory further
        
        He distinguishes between beliefs and attitudes. A belief is something we think is true about the world. An attitude is what we want (the way we feel about the world)
        
        He distinguishes between the descriptive and emotive meanings of words. Some words can have both. (e.g. 'she is honest' = 'she tells me the truth', she is morally good)
        
        The purpose of moral judgements is not to state facts but to influence behaviour (this explains motivation)
        
        HOW IS THIS A DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY??? HE'S JUST KIND OF SAYING THINGS I DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW IT LINKS BACK TO THE THEORY??
      - OBJECTIONS TO STEVENSON
        
        First, non-moral language influences others too e.g. advertising. So what IS unique about moral language?
        
        Second, we aren't always influencing others when using moral language - e.g. they may already agree with you e.g. 'homophobia is terrible, isn't it!'
        
        Third, moral language isn't always emotive - sometimes we can and should have dispassionate discussions about ethics . BUT maybe it IS essentially emotive
        
        WHAT? I JUST DON'T GET THIS THEORY OR THE OBJECTIONS? HOW IS IT DIFFERENT FROM AYER AND WHAT IS IT EVEN TRYING TO ACHIEVE
  - - - WHAT DOES THAT THIRD POINT MEAN???
      - Defending emotivism
        
        Moral language might be essentially emotive even if it isn't always emotive (just like factual language isn't always expressing facts - e.g. 'You have a big nose' is intended to insult someone)
    - - DEFENCE
        
        Hare could say the same thing as emotivists. It is essentially prescriptive but not always
        
        COUNTER
        
        Ethical language may express our desires, not just our prescriptions
        
        COUNTER
        
        language about desires also prescribes how we should behave
    - - I don't see the problem with this? we can do whatevr we want without being right or wrong, but others will just claim our actions are right or wrong??
      - Emotivists
        
        will disapprove of someone with no moral code. The feelings are real even if the moral values are not
        
        COUNTER:
        
        But how can we justify interfering with others' behaviour based on our feelings or choices? Realism can claim that racists are objectively wrong, but anti-realists can only claim it subjectively
        
        REPLY
        
        but maybe the reason to be moral is practical e.g. someone who steals from everyone won't have many friends
        
        REPLY
        
        maybe the reason is because we care for others and wish for them what we think is good
        
        or maybe the reason is selfish, and we want the world to accord with our point of view
      - Prescriptivists
        
        The fact that we must create a standard of goodness ourselves doesn't mean we shouldn't bother
      - Error theory
        
        Disliking moral anti-realism is not a reason that it is wrong. Also we can have subjective moral values
    - - Emotivist response
        
        Emotivism - moral statements are expressions of approval or disapproval
        
        Ayer says that our expression of approval or disapproval can be based on facts
        
        So, if our knowledge of facts about issues changes, then our expressions could change too
        
        How have our knowledge of facts about moral issues changed over time? e.g. some people claimed different races were smarter/dumber than others - we now know that this isn't true
        
        KEY POINT: moral 'progress' means basing one's morality on the facts, not false beliefs
        
        WHY IS MORAL PROGRESS BASED ON FACTS??? CAN IT NOT BE CHANGING OPINIONS??
      - Prescriptivist response
        
        Prescriptivism - moral statements command and commend behaviour
        
        Hare might say that people have become more consistent, more willing to universalise their principles than they used to be.
        
        People who would say they are opposed to animal suffering, have concluded that eating meat and using animal products causes animal suffering, so have turned vegan. Before, they were inconsistent, now they are consistent
        
        some people are more likely to understand that saying 'I'm not racist but...' is probably followed by a racist view. Before they were inconsistent, now they are consistent
        -KEY POINT: Moral progress is an increase in the consistency of our perceptions
        
        WHAT THE HELL DOES THIS MEAN???? WHAT THE FUCK IS CONSISTENCY AND INCONSISTENCY???? HOW DOES THIS SOLVE THE PROBLEM???? IF ANYTHING RACIST PEOPLE ARE CONSISTENT COS THEY'RE CONSISTENTLY RACIST LIKE WHAT???? AND WHAT THE HELL DOES THE KEY POINT MEAN??? HOW DO YOU MEASURE AN INCREASE IN CONSISTENCY
- - - - Reductive - Moral properties are identical with natural properties (good=happiness)
        
        we have reduced moral properties to natural, psychological properties
        
        Utilitarianism as naturalism
        
        Bentham
        
        the only good is happiness, happiness is natural (psychological), so good=natural
        
        utilitarianism says an act is right if it maximises happiness
        
        we can discover what creates happiness empirically
        
        morality can be explained as what objectively contributes to happiness
        
        'nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do'
        
        Bentham argues that pain and pleasure are our natural masters ( we are only ever motivated by pleasure and pain)
        
        NOTE: we cannot do a scientific experiment to prove that reductive moral naturalism is correct (how do you prove that good=happiness empirically?)
        
        Mill
        
        Mill: the best evidence that something is desirable is that it is desired. So for Mill, being desired=goodness
        
        But Mill is taking the natural property of what people desire as evidence for what is desirable
        
        he DOES NOT equate them (but Bentham does)
        
        why naturalism?: Mill thinks goodness is the natural property of being desired
        
        LOOK AT POWERPOINT SLIDE: Is Mill reductive or not????? questions 4 and 5 on slide 10 contradict each other
      - Virtue ethics as naturalism
        
        HELP
        
        not necessarily reductive but it is naturalist because our faculty of reason is a natural faculty wihtin us
      - OBJ: GE Moore's naturalistic fallacy
        
        GE Moore criticised ethical naturalism
        
        the naturalistic fallacy is "Confusing 'good' with a natural or metaphysical property (e.g. happiness, pleasure, health) or holding to be identical with such a property"
        
        he argued that moral properties may correlate with natural properties, but they are not identical
        
        e.g. 'every animal that has a heart has kidneys'. Hearts and kidneys correlate but they are not the same thing
        
        goodness and happiness may correlate but they are not the same thing
        Moore says 'there are no oughts in nature'. Breastfeeding is natural but that does not mean that it is good. Diseases are natural, but his does not mean that they are good
      - OBJ: GE Moore's open question argument
        
        Moore attempted to show that moral properties cannot be reduced to any non-moral properties, that they are unique
        
        An open question is a question where the answer could be more than one thing (e.g. yes or no)
        
        A closed question has only one answer, these are redundant (e.g. is money, money?)
        
        If goodness is pleasure, then it wouldn't make sense to ask 'Is pleasure good?'. This would be like asking 'Is pleasure, pleasure?'
        
        If two things are the same, you can only ask a closed question
        
        The fact that we can ask an open question about whether good is pleasure shows that reductive naturalism is wrong
        
        RESPONSE: Is water water? VS Is water H2O?
        
        Moore has confused concepts with properties
        
        Asking 'Is water, water?' is clearly pointless
        
        But asking 'Is water H2O?' is meaningful because these are both different concepts
        
        If a medieval person was asked 'Is water H2O?' they would answer no. It is an open question, but they are both concepts describing the same property
        
        Maybe 'good' and 'happiness' are describing the same property but are different concepts. This is why you can ask an open question
        
        SO DOES THIS JUST END HERE AND MORAL REDUCTIVE NATURALISM IS SUPERIOR??
        
        No, all that shows is that they could be descriving the same thing, that doesn't mean that they are the same thing
        
        THE WORD PROPERTIES ESSENTIALLY MEANS THE TWO CONCEPTS ARE DIFFERENT CONCEPT SDESCRIBING THE SAME THING
    - - -non-reductive - morality is an expression of the natural capacities of humans. it is not supernatural but it cannot be reduced to a natural property
      - example, virtue ethics
  - - - SLIDE 9 OF LESSON 3 I DON'T UNDERSTAND IT ????
      - DO I NEED TO KNOW OTHER INTUITIONISTS LIKE PRITCHARD AND ROSS -- no you don't, only GE Moore
      - Assessing intuitionism
        
        Strengths
        
        there are mind independent moral values so moral debates are meaningful
        
        it prevents the challenge of connecting good to a single natural property, but instead connects it to our intuitions
        
        goodness is similar to colour - it's impossible to describe or define it, but we know it intuitively
        
        Criticisms
        
        it answers no questions on the origin or nature of morality
        
        if intuitionism is correct, then why do people have different intuitions about morality if moral truths are objective
        
        the difference between moral properties and natural properties is exaggerated. It cannot be the case that moral judgements are entirely unrelated to ordinary features of the world or of human beings
        
        how can disputes be resolved? If there are moral facts, how can these be established
        
        I DON'T GET THE CRITCISMS ON THE SLIDES
        
        bullet point 2: we can have wrong and right intuitions. RESPONSE: what is the objective moral reality
        
        because he says there is a moral reality but does not describe where this come froms, his argument doesn't really help i dsicussing the mind
        
        he would reply but it could be true
        -yes but he cannot provide solid reason for why it IS true, we cannot know
  - - - Hume criticised cognitivism and therefore moral realism
        
        he argued that knowledge can only be either a matter of fact (synthetic, a posteriori, contingent) or a relation of ideas (analytic, a priori, necessary)
        
        moral truths are not analytic because it is not a contradiction to deny them
        
        moral truths are not synthetic because we cannot empirically verify moral truths
        
        therefore, moral judgements cannot be known and cognitivism collapses
        
        In standard form:
        
        Hume understand the faculty of knowledge as reason. So because there are just two types of knowledge, reason makes just two types of judgement:
        P1: There are only two types of judgements of reason: relations of ideas and matters of fact
        P2: Moral judgements are not relations of ideas
        P3: Moral judgements are not matters of fact
        C1: Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason
        
        therefore, cognitivism is incorrect as we cannot have ant knowledge of moral judgements
        
        WHAT DOES THIS FIRST BULLET POINT UNDER 'STANDARD FORM' MEAN???
        
        fo rhim knowldge is a faculty of reason, so he talks of knowledge of moral language in terms of reason
        
        REPLY: moral non-naturalists
        
        Moral non-naturalists will deny Hume's fork.
        
        Moral intuitions are not relations of ideas as they are not analytic truths
        
        Instead they are self-evident synthetic propositions
        
        They are not known empirically
        
        REPLY: reductive naturalists
        
        Reductive naturalists will argue that moral judgements are matters of fact
        
        Bentham argues that nature has made pleasure and pain our sovereign masters
        
        Happiness is good in his view and this is clear from our choices
    - - Verification principle - a statement is only meaningful if it is either analytic or synthetic (tautologies or empirical). Statements are only meaningful if they can be verified
        
        moral statements are neither analytic not synthetic so according to the verification principle, they are meaningless
        
        for naturalism, we cannot demonstrate that something is good or bad empirically (we cannot test which intuitions are correct empirically
        
        we can see that killing causes suffering, but we cannot demonstrate that it is wrong
        
        it also rejects non-naturalism because intuitions sometimes conflict, and there is no empirical test to show which intuition is correct
        
        REPLY: verification principle fails its own test
        
        the verification principle is neither analytic nor synthetic
        
        therefore, the verification principle itself is meaningless
        
        COUNTER:
        
        Ayer could say that the VP is intended as a definition, not as a hypothesis. It is only intended to be used to verify hypothesis
        
        however, we do not have to accept this definition
        
        WHAT IS IT A DEFINITION FOR???defintion for meaningful language
    - - what is the connection between what is and what ought to be? How, for instance, do we get from the fact that some action will cause pain to the claim that we ought not to do it?
        
        'you cannot derive an ought from an is'
        
        suppose 'eating meat causes animal suffering. Therefore, you shouldn't eat meat'. According to cognitivsim the conclusion is inferred from the premise, but Hume would ask how is this a rational inference
        
        the premise tells me how the world is and the conclusion tells me how the world ought to be - but you cannot infer one from the other
        
        there is a gap between what 'is' and what 'ought', so we cannot reason from to the other
        
        it is logically flawed to make this jump
        
        e.g. claiming that 'she is old and lonely' could lead to two different ought statements; you ought to help her, or you ought to euthanise her
    - - Hume argues against moral realism as below:
        P1: Moral judgements can motivate actions (e.g. don't kill)
        P2: Beliefs (judgements of reason) alone cannot motivate action (e.g. there is food in the kitchen)
        C1: Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason
        
        Hume concludes that they are founded on feelings, emotions and desires
        
        BUT maybe moral judgements don't motivate actions, a separate desire does
        
        morality is like marmite; violence causes suffering, but our moral judgement that it is wrong is an emotional reaction
        
        *WHAT HAS FOOD IN THE KITHEN GOT TO DO WITH ANYTHING??? I DON'T GET THIS ARGUMENT???
        
        when he talks of beliefs in P2 he talks of them in terms of knowledge, like i beleif theres food in the ktichn. that belief is not something that motivates us, it is our emotions/desires that do, e.g. hunger motivates you to eat the food, no ttha fact that you know the foos is there
        
        hume would say we justify our feelings with reason. We explain why we think murder is wrong, becuase we need to explain our feeling towards killing
    - - Mackie aims to show that moral realism is wrong
        
        Mackie begins with the common observation that there is a relativity of morality to societies (descriptive relativism)
        
        for a moral realist, moral values do exist objectively, so all societies must at least be seeking this truth, although they may not have found it yet
        
        it is far more plausible to say that different wats of life have given rise to different moral beliefs than to argue that societies' different moral beliefs result from very inadequate or badly distorted perceptions of the one moral reality
        
        Mackie goes on to note that the realist can respond that there are general ethical principles that different societies share, suggesting there is objective moral truth
        
        different ethical practices reflect the different particular conditions in which different societies are situated, but not different ethical principles
        
        Mackie argues that, at best, this shows only that the fundamental principles of morality are objective
        
        Furthermore, people hold their moral judgements not on the basis of general principles, but because they have an intuition that it is wrong.
        
        which acts arouse people's disapproval differs from that society to another, so we cannot argue that these moral judgements are objective
        
        I DON'T GET THE FIRST BULLET POINT, ISN'T THAT AGREEING WITH REALISM???
        
        he;s saying that maybe thos efundamental principles that are consistent are fundamental principles. There is a general consistency in moral beliefs but the way in which that's acted upon is different across different cultures. e.g. japan won't tell someone if they're dying cos it will only make them sad, even though that is dishonest
        
        the fact that we have these core beliefs but we don't act on them in every single case because our intuition tells us that we shouldn't in some cases
        
        if morality was objective, it would be like physical properties like extension. Everyone experiences the size of a table in the same way. The table occupies the same space no matter who is looking at it.
        
        if realism wants to claim that there is an objective morality, it would then entail that we would all experience it in the same way -- obejctively as a fact of the universe
        
        we should then be able to know the objective reality when observing moral/amoral act just like we know physical properties/reality just by observing a physical object
        
        we don't
        
        the very fact that we don't is evidence/proof that an objective moral reality does not exist
    - - just because people act based on intuitions, this does not mean that there is NO moral reality
        
        Moore argues that people's intuitions stem from fundamental moral principles
        
        WHAT DOES THIS SECOND BULLEY POINT MEAN? WHAT IS IT TRYING TO SAY??? WHAT'S THE POINT
        
        Moore thinks our intuitions are the manifestations of these fundamental moral principles
      - ‘Chilli plants will grow well’ is relative, but objectively true or false depending on the whether the country has hot weather. ‘Stealing is wrong’ is similar. ‘Stealing is wrong in conditions C’ is like the statement ‘Chilli plants grow well in hot weather’ - both are universally true.
        
        WHAT DOES THIS MEAN I DON'T GET IT???? (it's on powerpoint 4)
        
        this is trying to respond to the argument from relativism
        
        stealing is wrong is realtive to the situations, but this does not mean morality is relative, it shows that the circumstances are different
        
        with certain situations stealing is objectively true or false, i.e. you cannto steal just because you want to cause chaos
        
        stealing os ojectively false in that situation, but that does not mean stealing is objectively wrong overall, it is true or false
    - - IF moral properties did exist they would be incredibly queer. They would be queer in two ways
        
        metaphyical queerness
        
        epistemological queerness
        
        there is nothing else in the universe that have intrinsic motivation. for example, the way that chocolate exists (colour, size, shape) is not what motviates me to eat it. My desire is what motivates me to eat it
        
        therefore, if moral propeorties did exist they would have to be incredibly strange and unique. The 'moralness' of an action would have to exist within the action. But this seems incredibly strange -- it is queer
        
        secondly, if morality does exist it is also epistemolgoivally queer. Realists claim that there are special moral values and that we know them thourgh special faculties like our sense