Deliberative democracy: input vs. output

What is deliberative democracy

Habermas: law is an extension of reasoning about morality in non-traditional societies, where one cannot appeal to an external source of authority to have legitimacy. Liberal and democratic elements embody that type of thinking: each need to be convinced (non-external requirement of acceptance). Norms that govern groups typically happen implicitly; the move to law is when this is not working out and the process needs to be made explicit as well as coercive: enforced. It is not enough to have an implicit norm - it has to some governing power.

Cohen

Agree with Bohman - it must emerge from the procedure - i.e. the reasons that are in fact accepted

institutionalization of deliberation - the ideal method of generating legitimate norms on the basis of believing that all are equal

Liberties: political: equal voting power, freedom of political thought, equality before the law
Liberties: 'modern': necessary feature of public discourse, need for civil society (Habermas). Naturally consequence of premise of equality (Cohen)

Ideally consensus/ majority is necessary due to time constraints etc. // identity/will emerges // ideas and reasons compete from those that have found articulation in civil society// certain types of reasons 'work' ideal = impartiality, non-ideal - need to win majority therefore reasons of general appeal // continuous process

Discussions in deliberative democracy

Different types of reasons: Forst - justification, Bohman = accepted in fact// Cohman - raesonable to all (Rawlsian public reason// Habermas - impartiality // Lafont - reasonably accept

The symbolism of majority: Waldron - symbolism of equal power + recognition of dissent; Lafont, Habermas, Cohen - discussion is ongoing - emergence of identity 'subjectless' identity, temporary close, to be resumed again (i.e. have to face the 'minority' that did not agree again).

The link to outpu t= how to deal with

Which liberties are necessary (see above)

The role of judiciary - ensuring that power takes a legitimating form. Habermas goes further - it ensures that people can function in society.

Focus on input

Much of deliberative democracy focuses on what I call 'input': how to ensure that the voices of 'the people' are 'heard.'

Common thread: continual emergence from a body where each has equal standing; the only legitimate laws are ones where the people (understood in this way) are both subject and author

Party representation in parliament

rights and institutional arrangements necessary for that representation: equal voting power; effective political influence (Rawls/Cohen);

Freedoms - ability or capacity to form 'intelligent political opinion'

The forum - where the opinions that forms in a free and equal society are presented, argued for and again. The only institutional arrangements that 'restrict' the people's deliberation are ones that ensure that deliberation takes its necessary form.

similar understandings of 'who' the people are and why this institutional arrangements is necessary.

Little focus on output

Recognition that power is when, by saying, 'we will do X' results in X being brought about (barring meta-physical barriers). The content of X is what ends up being coercively implemented and therefore power being made manifest. This requires some argument.

Recognition that the content of political deliberation are policies, legislation, and institutions. The things that are being discussed are in fact policies.

What it means for deliberation to translate into policies is not spelled out fully.

What is implied is that the process of reasoning: of presenting proposals, argumentation etc if that process is inclusive then the output will be legitimate in virtue of having a procedure that is inclusive

Habermas - presumption of reasonability

The discussion is subject to contributions and criticisms of all who are represented (in a PR system of pretty much all interests)

This presumption has resulted in a focus on input - how to make it inclusive, equal rights and freedoms, the role associations and civil society etc.

Actual concrete policies are rarely discussed and shown how the the output is the manifestation of the input. What is shown is how deliberation met the criteria of inclusive input. What is often also shown, is that there is a degree of acceptance and belief in the legitimacy of the output. But a concrete relationship between agent X said x and Y said y, reasoned to C and generated c as a result of C is rarely discussed - and maybe with good reason.

Although I still want to finish reading Dyzek and Young.

Quite a good argument is that given that the proposals are the topic under discussion, it is kind of obvious or at least unnecessary to spell out what it means for input to translate into output. This is something I will take up in the following section.

Why it is problematic to assume that there is no need for an 'extra step'.

The argument is not there there is no attention given to this, just not very much or sufficient attention. A few things are taken for granted, but upon closer inspection, it is not as self-evident that things will 'work out this way.' This can be shown by examining how things can go wrong or differently.

There are two ways in which output figures into the deliberative democratic ideals: 1) starting with tangible/concrete proposals and then moving to reasons; 2) starting with reasons and moving to proposals

1) proposals are presented; argued for and against. Disagreement has to be about specific content. In an ideal setting, they should agree for the same reasons and the right type of reasons. But if we are in a situation where concrete proposals are being presented, I believe we are a few steps removed from the ideal - where we need to make sure that we agree for the same and right reasons.

assumption of reasonable pluralism

a potential way to get 'around' this is, is to look at how majorities are formed (Dewey/Habermas) i.e. to look at the more informal processes whereby political parties increase in size by absorbing minority or marginal interests. That means that there is sufficient deliberation going on in the process of policy proposals prior to parliamentary debate

Disagreement about proposal: then reasons comes in. There are many reasons to think why reasoning would have to come. The most obvious reason is that one needs to explain why they disagree. Recourse to reason is necessary

Given the deliberative nature - reasons need to be given to convince others of their proposals or adaptation of their proposal.

2) we can also start with general ethical-political or moral questions. In Habermas's terms - the first is 'what kind of 'people' do we want to be? What identity are endorsing and developing? Or whether our identity/policy proposals accord with moral reasoning.

These types of questions tend to be abstract and general - by nature.

What these two have in common is that unless there is immediate agreement on the content of X - for the same or different reasons- deliberation will ensue.

There are two different types of disagreement with any given proposal: you claim that a certain norm X is behind your policy, we disagree with have X be the driving force. Alternatively, we can disagree with how X is being cashed out in the policy.

My argument about types of demands the procedure places on agreement

Agreement or disagreement can happen at the abstract reason level saying 'no' to the concrete policy proposal

Each is significant in its own way - but in terms of political power, only the latter really matter.

This is because disagreement about abstract norms and values does not amount to anything that can be coerced.

This is not to undermine the importance of abstract reasoning, but to shed light on the importance of the concrete policies that 'conclude' debate; the things that is ultimately coercive

If we look at the types of reasoning and discussion that can happen, essentially backwards (proposal first, reasons later) or forwards (reasons first, proposal later); agreement on the proposal is a necessary feature constitutional democracy; agreement for the same reasons is desirable, but not necessary

This feature enables 'agreement' versus consensus and makes the system 'feasible.' But it also means that having an identity emerge from a set of reasons can have different meanings: emergence - as in creating something together - or emergence as in we do not have to have our reasons 'reach each other' they just have to be compatible with the same output

Here as well there are two different types of disagreement: we disagree with the general norms and reasons you are presenting; or we disagree with how they are manifesting in policy.

A potential objection are certain performative actions, like taking responsibility for the sins of the past.

My argument about how reasons should figure into political output

Reasoning giving should not stay at the abstract and hypothetical: if a norm is deemed worthy, it should be 'felt' in society. Although deliberative democrats do a lot of work at the abstract/ideal level, it is ultimately a theory about real political power. Whatever is discussed in parliament matters. If there is sufficient agreement about a need for a solution for x, a solution for x should be produced.

If we take an 'ideal' case where we start reasoning forwards and find general norms, values, goals that we agree we want to pursue and agree that it is insufficient that the deliberation stays at the abstract level, an additional move needs to be made, namely: deliberation about how to translate norms into policies and legislation needs to occur.

This probably seems trivial, but the thing is, it is not actually explicitly stated (although Habermas could be interpreted as stating as much).

Why is this not said? I can speculate that it has to do with the effort to juxtapose DD against aggregate conceptions of the common good. The idea being that we want something more substantive that simply bargaining. We also want something that is more inclusive, that we need to explain ourselves to all

This needs to happen for two reasons: using the same general reasons can be interpreted differently. One and the same result can be explained with different reasons.

The agreement (Habermas) that public reason feeds into the process suggests that there is a possibility of tracing a line of reasoning from beginning to end. Reasons are supposed to be powerful

example of meritocracy

what is implied in the literature is something like this will happen. However, there is a contradiction because reasons generating different results and one and the same reason being interpreted differently.

Looking at the example of civil disobedience from Habermas - what we see is that a distinction needs to be made - there is civil disobedience when one cannot back-up the law because the reasons supporting it are illegitimate. I believe he states they disagree with the law: the law is illegitimate.

It is possible, although I believe there are far fewer examples of civil disobedience simply for the reasons given (often those reasons are manifested in the law themselves - or not) if you can find different reasons for supporting the law - that is you take no issue with the output and its effects, you would just defend it differently. Although this is possible, it does not make the fact that it is the actual legislation and policy that one takes issue with. Even if it is just the supporting reasons - what is desired is a change in the wording, a statement that

A counter-argument is that if two reasons supporting X, that's good. Public reason is functioning as it should. But we need to recognize the cost in this, in that we are 'reaching' each other with our reasons, but with their compatibility for generating X.

Habermas quotes: - Different from liberal democrats and ‘rechtstaat’ the rights of citizens does not make it legitimate, but is a necessary precondition that makes the making/generation of laws legitimate : input. P. 135 /// Types of reason” the only law that counts as legitimate is one that could be rationally accepted by all citizens in a discursive process of opinion- and will-formation.” ///

His argument that popular sovereignty is ‘subjectless’ and is not visibly identifiable – it is circulating and fluid in the form of communication, takes effect in ‘the circulation of reasonably structured deliberations and decisions, one can attribute a harmless meaning to the proposition that there cannot be a sovereign in the constitutional state.’ P. 136

Then we move to a place where law legitimizes political power, but that power can use law to organize political ruling. These distinctions between political power and power are important. It is at this state, that we can speak of administrative power – where political power can effect ruling through organized administration/executive.
Intrinsic functions power and law serve each other: patterns and goals. P. 143.

Habermas

Political power can use law to exercise political rule; but law in turn regulates how political power does this and in doing so ensures political power’s function. It helps coordinate collective goals by making sure the law is coherent and applied equally (people can count of the law ‘behaving’ in a certain way). In turn, power ensures the execution of laws. Given that political power is being executed in this way, we see that power and law legitimize each other (not Habermas’ words): power allows itself to be shaped and in doing so, lends itself to justifying and upholding the norms and values of the law (legitimization). But kind of Habermas “law remain present as a recourse of justice.” p. 145.

politically enacted law and instrumentally employed power (was supposed to be made legitimate through reason): Discourse theory on political autonomy provides a different explanation. “jurisgenerative communicative power must underlie the administrative power of the government.” (4.1.3)

Habermas:

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“now, the agreement between words and deeds may be the yardstick for a regime’s legitimacy. But this does not explain the change in aggregate condition that communicative power must undergo before it can assume, in the form of administrative power, those sanctioning, organizing, and executive functions that the system of rights depends on and presupposes…”

This comes after Arendt’s explanation of the ‘fluidity’ of communicative power, which cannot be stored or reserved; which emerges in unfiltered, distorted, uncoerced communication. This types of communication sanction and unable what it considered ‘true’ and ‘just’ but just ‘is.’

Communicative power has the properties of Arendt and true political autonomy implies the discursive formation of a common will, not the implementation of the laws issuing therefrom. P. 150 – does this mean that political autonomy is distinct from the laws? Or that autonomy is not about implementation as such?

Law translates communicative power into administration power: administrative power is guided by communicative power. The idea of the constitutional state is that lawmaking communicative power and kept free of illegitimate interventions of social power. Maybe return?

Output – that the difference between normative regulation of behavioral expectations and collective goal settings become intertwined p. 151.

Habermas

4.2.1 “only if a law expresses a reasonable consensus in view of all these aspects and problem types does it qualify as substantively general in the sense of material equality of treatment.” – aspects: collectives goals and goods, concrete form of life, shared identity, clarify what is equally good, who they are as members of a political community, how they want to live, as well as strategy, and balancing interests and fair compromises. The goal being substantively general.

“legal validity has the illocutionary meaning of a declaration: the state authority declares that an enacted norms has been sufficiently justified and is typically actually obeyed as well.” 4.2.1

Habermas on output:

For morality, U provides argumentation structure that makes it possible to discern which norms can be accepted rationality. In legality, because we infuse ethical-political, identity, collective goals, and fair compromises – the context figures into the validity of reasoning.
“even if one assumes that in the course of rational collective will formation attitudes and motives change in line with the arguments, the facticity of the existing context cannot be eliminated; otherwise ethical and pragmatic discourses, as well, as compromises would lack an object.” P. 156

Moral norms = rationally motivated consensus; legal norms – rationally motivated agreement. The latter which obligations we ought to take on. “self-legislation, which implies moral autonomy at the level of the individual will, takes on the meaning of political autonomy at the level of collective will-formation.” We come to agreement on universal moral norms; we generate through rational discourse legal norms. “this explains why the common ground of shared beliefs, …, also generates communicative power.” 4.2.1

“in the case of goal attainment, the collectivity understands itself as a quasi subject capable of purposive-action; in the case of conflict resolution, as a community whose members reach an understanding about what behaviour they can legitimately expect of one another.” P. 158-159 (Habermas)

Lawmaking is interwoven with the formation of communicative power…..highly abstract process model that starts with pragmatic issues, advances along the branches of compromise formation and ethical discourse to the clarification of moral questions, and ends with a judicial review of norms.” P. 162
With pragmatic reasoning – there is no internal relationship between reason and will, with whether the proposed recommendation is adopted and executed. This is different than with ethical-political discourse where reason and will meet: argumentation (reason) is mixed up with self-understanding and authorship (will). What is means to actualize the will depends on reason; and reason depends on self-understanding of the ‘will.’

“[Pragmatic discourses] do not include the formation of the reasonable will that adopts the program only in a further step, by making its own the goals and values hypothetically presupposed by the program.” P. 165

On Habermas: I would venture to say that the efficacy question is internalized to the pragmatic – that is, if X is an appropriate program to begin. I get the impression that only appropriate programs will be thought of, and then together with experts, we decide on which is more efficacious. It is presupposed but not make explicit?
But what is made explicit is that there is a separation of discourse (at least ideally). We not do create the will in this program, but we best facilitate it…

“social power cannot be neutralized in the way rational discourses presuppose…. But discourse principle does bear at least indirectly on bargaining processes.” P. 166 Agree for different reasons.

Habermas but discourse principles still matter in bargaining – they regulate bargaining from a standpoint of fairness “disciplined by its equal distribution among the parties, …equal opportunity for pressure, so that all affected interests can come into play and have equal changes of prevailing.” P. 167

“political will-formation terminates in resolutions about policies and legal programs that must be formulated in the language of law.” P. 167 (and then judicial review).

“Thus the law is not only constitutive for the power code that steers administrative processes. It represents at the same time the medium for transforming communicative power into administrative power.” P. 169

Political communication is general but “they ultimately issue in the decisions of legislative bodies.” Political will formation aims at legislation: horizontally agreed rights only manifest interpreted and developed in law; administration is programmed through laws. 4.3.1.

“The priority of laws legitimated in democratic procedures has the cognitive meaning that the administration does not have its own access to the normative premises underlying its decision… cannot substitute legislation and adjudication.”
“the utilization of administrative power on the part of the legislature and judiciary is unobjectionable only insofar as this resource is necessary for the institutionalization of the corresponding discourses.”

“On the one hand, they must enable the communicative power of a rationally formed will to emerge and find binding expression in political and legal programs. On the other hand, they must allow this communicative power to circulate throughout society via the reasonable application and administrative implementation of legal programs, so that it can foster social integration through the stabilization of expectations and the realization of collective goals.” P. 176

Law “forces” argumentation to take a certain shape, a shape that reflects the things that legitimize power (communicative power). “..procedural norms regular participation and the distribution of roles in discursive processes of opinion0 and will -formation; they limit the spectrum of admissible topics, questions, an arguments; and they link argumentation to decision making. In this way the instrument of law is reflexively deployed so that discourses for making and applying law can be socially expected in specific places at specific times.” P. 178

Habermas: only acceptance is the criteria for evaluation section 4.3.2

p. 179 – what makes majority rule legitimate? It is a proviso decision: one that can be reversed with different majorities. It ‘represents an ongoing discussion; the decision records, so to be speak, the interim result of a discursive opinion-forming process….. Doubt about the legitimacy of majority decisions on matters with irreversible consequences are revealing in this regards. Such doubts are based on the view that the outnumbered minority give their consent to the empowerment of the majority only with the proviso that they themselves retain the opportunity in the future of winning over the majority with better arguments and thus of revising the previous decision.”

Democratic procedure: fair balancing of interests; clarification of ethical self-understanding and moral justification of regulations.

Democratic procedure: fair balancing of interests; clarification of ethical self-understanding and moral justification of regulations.
Fair balancing of interests: with the negotiation among representation (p. 181) I believe his point is that there is a process of ‘creation’ or ‘emergence’ of a political will in virtue of negotiated compromises. Politics is not just balancing interests, in a type of aggregate will, but one where there is ‘full’ representation of interests, and the process of bargaining/discourse generated an negotiation or interpretation of how these interests can be reconciled (bargaining) or how to generalize them (discourse.). an aggregated will p. 180

Habermas

The administration implements and designs strategies for implementation. Efficiency and efficacy, accuracy. From the first few pages, I assume this means that there is already a policy program (since policy programs – pragmatic discourses are part of the legislative processes.) Administration goes further with more concrete and practical implementation problems.
“The competent fulfillment of this function plays an important role in legitimating the administration in a constitutional democracy.” P. 187

“politically autonomous citizens can understand themselves as authors of the law to which they submit as private subjects only if legitimately generated law also determines the direction in which political power circulates.”

“if the legal statue is understood as a general norm that acquires validity from the approval of the people’s representatives in a procedure characterized by discussion and publicity, then it unifies two moments: the power of an intersubjectively formed will and the reason inherent in the legitimating procedure” (taking away an quasi-natural notion of political will/domination). P. 189

What we see is that actual acceptance of written proposals for policies and legislation is the only tangible device deliberative democrats have in their toolkit. This makes the liberal requirements of the system even more important. Although reasons are essential for deliberation - and while still in deliberation it is possible to provide 'yes and no' positions to reasons; reasons on their own never amount to political power. What we have seen is that within the deliberative system the less stringent requirement is that we agree on the proposal. And that it is possible to agree on a proposal for different reasons while it is possible to agree on abstract reasons and still not agree on the proposal.

There should also be a requirement that in cases where an abstract reasoning process took place, that a connection is made between the reasons that are given and the strategies: that we say we want equality; and we believe that meritocracy is a manifestation of equality: we do not just agree on the reasons - the reasons are acceptable to all- but also what a manifestation of those reasons looks like (implemented)

Conclusion:

Objection: this is implied by deliberative democrats and is 'obvious' to most readers. That may be the case, but then we have to acknowledge that the procedure available is insufficient. It either leads to inconsistencies or holes.

  • the normative content, and not the pragmatic content necessarily. “Democratic procedure, which establishes a network of pragmatic considerations, compromises, and discourses of self-understanding and of justice, grounds the presumption that reasonable or fair results are obtained insofar as the flow of relevant information and its proper handling have not been obstructed. According to this view, practical reason {} resides in the rules of discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative content from the validity basis of action oriented to reach understanding. In the final analysis, this normative content arises from the structure of linguistic communication and the communication mode of sociation.” P. 296-7

therefore he wanted a type of restriction on political debate to ‘neutral’ topics of justice. However, the nature of political debate – along discourse theoretical lines – is about context-dependent conceptions of the good life. Therefore, it is unavoidable to include these topics (it is in essence part and parcel of what politics is about). The neutrality is found in discourse principle.

“….procedures… function as the most important sluices for the discursive rationalization of the decisions of an administration bound by law an state…..The public opinion that is worked up via democratic procedures into communicative power cannot “rule” of itself but can only point the use of administrative power in specific directions.” 7.1.2

Citing John Dewey about importance of the procedure through which majorities become majorities: “Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it never is merely majority rule/… The means by which a majority comes to be a majority is the more important thing: antecedent debates modification of views to meet the opinions of minorities. The Essential need, in other words, is the improvement of the methods an conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion.” 7.2

Referring to Ackerman – neutrality: only discussions of justice, not the ‘good’ life, or ethical-political discussion.

Ultimately, (quoting Fraser) it is a free public that determines what is of collective concern – through argumentation.

see disussion of Dahl - and bottllenecking of technical knowledge 7.3: p. 320 – the importance/role of functional coordination in complex societies and the difference between lay and experts is not enough. “Dahl has recognized the danger that these ‘cognitive’ problems of functional coordination displace other, namely moral and ethical, problems and overburden the problem=solving capacity of democratic procedures. Various symptoms of such a cognitive overburdening of deliberative politics lend support to the assumption, by now widely accepted, that discursive opinion- and will-formation governed by democratic procedures lacks the complexity to take in and digest the operatively necessary knowledge.”

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8.2.2 Borrowing from Peters – he speaks of the a core – inner and outer periphery of communication. The idea being that legitimate power is generated at the periphery and the democratic structure is doing its work properly, when what happens at the core (lawmaking and “in needed administration”) is being steered by the periphery.

His argument is that this occurs when there is conflict, experienced in the lifeworld, and there is 1) sufficient capacity of the public to articulate problems and present solutions and 2) there is sufficient opportunity to make this known/felt. The former is more difficult to realize because the administration is specialized.

Note here a few things: what is ‘felt’ by the public is the workings of the administration, not the norms. At least I think this is the only proper reading of this.

“…multifunctional ordinary language can achieve precisely in virtue of its lack of specialization.” P. 352

“The parliamentary complex is the most open for perceiving and thematizing social problems, but it pays for this sensitivity with a lesser capacity to deal with problems in comparison to the administrative complex.” P. 355(administration = inner periphery)

“For the most part, operations in the core area of the political system proceed according to routines. Courts deliver judgments, bureaucracies prepare laws and process applications….. all these processes follow established patterns. From a normative standpoint, the only decisive question concerns which power constellations these patterns reflect and how the atter can be changed….In cases of conflict, that is, processing matters according to the usual conventions is eclipsed by another mode of operation.” P. 357

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“Problematization. Incases in which perceptions of problems and problem situations have taken a conflictual turn, the attention span of citizenry enlarges, indeed in such a way that controversies in the broader public sphere primarily ignite around the normative aspects of the problems most at issue.”

I would argue that there is a conflation here: in order to explain why policy X is problematic, one needs to explain this with norms, reasons, and argumentation. But the immediately felt issue is the effects of policy X. Rosa Parks, indigenous folks etc.

[remember illocutionary effect of political outcomes] + agree to the same outcomes but for different reasons. That it is fair or legitimate to have different reasons for X, demonstrates, in a way, that when conflict arises it is, at least in part because of X. If one had their own reasons for supporting X, they would not feel the need for conflict and change because agreeing to X for the same reasons is no longer a necessary requirement. If that was the case, that would undermine the concept of bargaining.

“political influence supported by public opinion is converted into political power- into a potential for rendering binding decisions – only when it affects the beliefs and decisions of authorized members of the political system and determines the behaviour of voters, legislators…. Just like social power, political influence based on public opinion can be transformed into political power only through institutionalized procedures.” P. 363

“Public opinion can be manipulated but neither publicly bought nor publicly black-mailed. This is due to the fact that a public sphere cannot be ‘manufactured’ as one please.” (in dictatorships there is no public sphere…) p. 364

“interplay of a public sphere based in civil society with the opinion- and will-formation institutionalized in parliamentary bodies and courts the limited scope for action that civil society and the public sphere afford to noninstitutionalized political movements and forms of political expression.’

Public opinion is relieved of decision-making – it can be undifferentiated. However, the quality of public opinion is contingent on the ability for it to be translated in such a way that it can be put into practice – into the political system

“the political public sphere can fulfill its functions of perceiving and thematizing encompassing social problems only insofar as it develops out of the communication taking place among those who are potentially affected.”
“Systematic deficiencies are experiences in the context of individual life histories…. That might be failing in their delivery of services…. Such experiences are first assimilated privately.” p. 365

Political parties and organization interact and are intermeshed with civil society and public sphere. They draw resources from the latter; but also present forms of articulation that the latter adopt. majority
“But public influence is transformed into communicative power only after it passes through the filter of the institutionalized procedures of democratic opinion- and will -formation and enters through parliamentary debates into legitimate lawmaking.” P. 371.

p. 372 the instruments available in politics are limited: they cannot self-organize, especially in functionally differentiated societies. “Political steering can often take only an indirect approach and must, as we have seen, leave intact the modes of operation internal to functional systems and highly organized sphere of actions… give up holistic aspiration of self-organization….. civil society can have at most an indirect effect on the self-transformation of the political system; generally, it has an influence only on the personnel and programming of this system.

…”Should not be understood as incapacitation.” It is not a question of knowledge expert that is self-generated: administration draws knowledge from the ‘system’ and becomes an expert in it. This development is also available to civil society. They need to provide appropriate definitions of the problem and concomitant solutions – this is available to them and not something the administration has a hold on.
This is something that is felt in the following section – in civil disobedience and ‘conflict’

“the power of media should thus be neutralized and the tacit conversion of administrative or social power into political influence blocked.” Steering: by administration or social power – this can be ‘blocked’ through public sphere if reflected upon thematized and therefore, ‘reprogrammed.’ P. 378-9

Popular sovereignty as a procedure

“Consensus and majority rules are compatible only if the latter has an internal relation to the search for truth: public discourse must mediate between reason and will, between the opinion formation of all and the majoritarian will-formation of the representatives.

A majority decision may come about only in such a way that its content is regarded as the rationally motivated but fallible result of an attempt to determine what is right through a discussion that has been brought to a provisional close under the pressure to decide: ‘The… practical specification of law results from the development and recognition of the theoretical legal consciousness already present in the society, but it can…succeed in one way only, namely that of voting and deciding according of the majority’(Frobel)..conditional consensus….’Certainly one does not require that the minority by resigning their will, declare their opinion to be incorrect; indeed, one does not even require that they abandon their aims, but rather… that they forego the practical application of their convictions, until they succeed in better establishing their reasons and procuring the necessary number of affirmation votes.’”

The public sphere thereby continually thematizes itself – self-referentially – and in doing so “reveals the place to which the expectation of a sovereign self-organization of society has withdrawn.”
“will-formation in such a way that their fallible outcomes have the presumption of practical reason on their side” p. 486
procedure

The public can only think in terms of generalized norms “it is because normally they can choose only between the highly generalized policies and vague profiles of popular parties, and they can perceive their interests only in the light of pregeneralized interest positions.” p.487-8

Internal relation p. 14“..the binding quality of legal norms does not stem solely from processes of opinion-and will -formation, but arises also from the collectively binding decisions of authorities who make and apply the law. This circumstance makes it conceptually necessary to distinguish the role of authors who make (and adjudicate) law from that of addressees who are subject to established law.”
This text shows recognition that both the procedure and content of law is relevant.

“democratic procedure – which alone provides legitimating force to the law-making process in the context of social and ideological pluralism – from a discourse-theoretical standpoint. Here I assume a principle that I cannot discuss in detail, namely, that a regulation [content/output] may claim legitimacy only if all those possibly affected by it could consent to it after participating in rational discourses.”

p. 17 “when citizens judge… whether the law they make it legitimate, they do so under communicative presuppositions that must themselves be legally institutionalized in the form of civil rights..”- procedure and content.

interal relation: p. 18-20 – argument against currencies of liberty: shows that simply thinking about content is insufficient. Determining which liberties we should enjoy (including potentially social ones) can only be determined through discourse.
The examples of feminist critique – specific policies, their formal content (what they are supposed to achieve) and their actual effect (the content of laws is the concrete subject of debate). And Habermas’s assessment that the norms that guided legislation which insufficiently narrow… “need for a change of the legal paradigm”

Cohen

“instead it is that they compromise elements of an independent and expressly political ideal that is focused in the first instance, on the appropriate conduct of public affairs – on, that is, the appropriate ways of arriving at collective decisions.” p. 20

Cohen - substance

Cohen

“intuitive ideal … I which the justification of terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens.” P. 21

Formal conception of deliberative democracy has five main features: 1) ongoing, members expect to continue indefinitely 2) the members believe in the legitimating qualities of the decision-making institution – commitment to coordinating activities within institutions that make deliberation possible according to norms that they arrive at through deliberation. 3) pluralistic, “no one set of ideal is mandatory 4) “… it is important to them that the terms of their association not merely be the results of their deliberation, but also be manifest to them as such. They prefer institutions in which the connections between deliberation and outcomes are evident to ones in which the connections are less clear.; 5) recognize each other as participants in deliberation.

Cohen

“The substantial features: need to decide on an agenda, propose alternative solutions to problems on the agenda, support these solution with reasons, and to conclude by settling on an alternative…. Requirements it sets on such a procedure… outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement equals” p. 22

I2 - reasoned state reasons for proposal; those reasons will settle fate of their proposal. [given the presupposition that the participants are committed to deliberation] the reasons offered are ones that each consider to appeal to all in light of pluralism and equality. It’s not just a fitness with desires, but the right reasons.

I3 – formal and substantive equality: formal – “everyone with the deliberative capacities has equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process” and equal voice (vote?); material and other inequalities to do influence their position in deliberation [i.e. social power etc. does not contribute to the deliberative process or outcome]. System is potential subject of deliberation.

I4 – ideal is to find consensus… “to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals.” P. 23. And then by majority vote (assumes that there will be a different result here than with bargaining…”

Although people reason in the first place form their perspective, they take on the deliberative point of use. These commitments require a ‘willingness to revise one’s understanding of one’s own preferences and convictions.” P. 23

Cohen

On whether the deliberative requirements will motivate deliberators to present reasons as opposed to ‘preferences’: preferences on their own do not compel people to do x or y. “practice of presenting reasons will contribute to the formation of a commitment to deliberative resolution (and encourage concomitant values). Shape content of preferences and convictions as well. If I cannot offer convincing reasons, that gives me a reason to change my position. P. 24 This pushes people to focus on questions of the common good.

“the interests, aims, ad ideals that compromise the common good are those that survive deliberation.” P. 25

Another counter is that through reflexive equilibrium you will get 'one' appropriate proposal. That is, if there is agreement on a set of reasons that there should be one outcome (Peter). However, that is not the premise that one is working with in deliberative democracy: reasonable pluralism; context-dependence/change; the focus on creation vs. discovery all underscore the fact that we do not have an external omniscient reasoning that we can turn to. The whole theory is based on a premise that there are differences/ Cohen - 1997

“For that reason, the test for democratic legitimacy will be, in part, substantive—dependent on the content of outcomes, not simply on the processes through which they are reached.” p. 407

His example is freedom of religion – that it is reasonable to have transcendent moral or religious beliefs and that any collective agreement that requires someone to violate those beliefs is unreasonable. This leaves a lot of things unsaid – like squaring these types of freedoms with other reasonable obligations like mandatory childhood education. But that seems to be evading the real kind of difficult questions…
“We have failed to provide a justification for the exercise of power by reference to considerations that all who are subject to that power, and prepared to cooperate on reasonable terms, can accept.” P. 418

However - this has to do with whether deliberative democracy is too radical - that oppressive policies and legislation will emerge from the 'legitimate' discussions. His point is that there are inherent restrictions on the content.

Cohen (1997)- importance of 'reasonable to all' as opposed in the general interest. The latter, through something like a utilitarian calculation could end up violating certain rights we consider very important.

This comes from an ‘aggregative conception’ of democracy. “… institutionalizes a principle requiring equal consideration for the interests of each member, or more precisely, equal consideration along with a presumption of personal autonomy…. Establish a scheme of collective choice – majority , plurality, bargaining… - that gives equal weight to the interest of citizens in part by enabling them to present and advance their interests…. And when we face outcomes that disadvantage people who are the likely targets of such views, we have strong evidence of a failure of the process to give equal consideration to the interests of each.” P. 411
However, on an aggregate view, there is no reason why a procedure should end up protecting ‘substantive’ liberties – the aggregative just looks at ‘how intense’ and not the stringency or nature of the convictions one may have with religion.

Cohen (1997)

‘favorable conditions for participation, association, and expression – ad ties the authorization to exercise public power (and the exercise itself to such discussion – by establishing a framework ensuring the responsiveness and accountability of political power to it through regular competitive elections, conditions of publicity, legislative oversight, and so no.’ p. 413
Public reasons i.p.v. public discussion. Not just pooling resources, or changing preferences, or figuring out what people’s beliefs are: equal participants who provide reasons that others can accept. “when participants confine their arguments to such reasons, majority support itself will commonly count as reason for accepting the decision as legitimate.” P. 414

It is important to notice a few things about Cohen's argument here: 1) the type of output he is talking about it minimal: whether certain negative freedoms will be violated. 2) he is doing the 'reasoning': although he is trying to show that the underlying norms of deliberative democracy limit the type of reasons that will be considered reasonable, he does not address a concern about whether they can be reasonable disagreement about this exact topic.

It is not about how deliberation can generate legitimate output - one that is emergent from 'the people.' : “liberties of the moderns.” Denying general freedom of expression (unrelated to political input) is not something that can be defended from the principles of inclusion/democracy. (Habermas has a more comprehensive understanding however). “…one element of that strategy: the need to protect inputs to a process of discussion. But as with religious liberty, so too, with expressive liberty: the deliberative view also ties protections to acceptable outcomes of a deliberative process, outcomes, that is, that can be justified given the requirement on finding reasons acceptable to others under conditions of reasonable pluralism.” P. 420

1997: Citizens have good reasons to reject a system of policy that fails to advance their interest at all. Connecting the equality of citizens limits the types of reasons that can be given: reasons that some are worth less, for example, is not reasonable

but this assumes that people would claim that some are considered less-worthy. The point is, is that from context-dependent view, reasonable disagreement necessarily allows for a disagreement on what it means to treat people equally.

1997: "3. Rights of the ancients – rights to participation. (in reverse order)
The personal moral reasons that shape an individual’s perspective give her reasons to want to shape her society. If she does not have the right to bring forth those reasons, then you are denying her equal standing – the background conditions of citizens as equals. 2) the reasons one gives for discriminating against one or other group in terms of political rights will likely depend on reasons that are not going to be considered acceptable nor acceptable from the perspective of the person

There seems to be a lack of recognition of the point I have been trying to make about this article: the fact that the reasonable disagreement will emerge not at the very abstract 'equality' but how it is cashed out. the deliberative procedure needs to be able to show how it can deal with this in a legitimate manner. To say that all output will be justified with reasons that are reasonable to all from their own perspective bypasses the disagreement aspect.

Stanford, Peter, F.
“The idea is that while democratic deliberation helps sorting through reasons for and against particular candidates or policy proposals, and perhaps even generates new alternatives, the legitimacy of the outcomes of such a process only depends on the fairness of the decision-making process, not on the quality of the outcomes it produces.“ (referring to Cristiano)

Waldron: DD are consensus minded: “A good theory may make idealistic assumptions about people’s motivation, but even if it does, it should hold on to a sense that in the real world, even after deliberation, people will continue to disagree in good faith about the common good, and about the issues of policy, justice, and right that we expect a legislature to deliberate upon.” P. 2189

waldron

“an entitlement to respect is something a norm must earn; it is not part of what is said when we identify it as legally valid.” P. 2191
Raz’s authority argument: figuring out the content of the law itself is not part of determining whether one can do better by treating it authoritatively. There must be something about the origin or procedure that generates this.

Not just a 'technicality' or the loudest poice: we have to a good reason to listen majority decisions. "“Positive law – treated as a source of law by virtue of some fact or action that has no intrinsic connection to the content, substance, or quality of the proposition itself.” P. 2189

“explore the possibility that majority decision commands our respect precisely because it is the one decision-procedure that does not, by some philosophical subterfuge, try to wish the facts of plurality and disagreement away…. It is a demand for a certain sort of recognition and, as I said, respect – that this, for the time being, is what the community has come up with and that it should not be ignored or disparaged simply because some of us propose, when we can, to repeal it.” P. 2195-6
Not just enactment of the majority, but something that stand for the time being in the name of the whole community. P. 2197

Waldron: Disagreement would not matter if we did not want concerted action; need for common course would not give rise to politics if there was not disagreement about what the concerted action should be. Respect for legislation is tribute to achievement of concerted, cooperative, coordination or collective action in circumstances of modern life. VII

Waldron: Disagreement would not matter if we did not want concerted action; need for common course would not give rise to politics if there was not disagreement about what the concerted action should be. Respect for legislation is tribute to achievement of concerted, cooperative, coordination or collective action in circumstances of modern life. VII

The need for justice: common basis for action in matters of justice has to be forced in the heat of our disagreements, not predicated on the assumption of a cool consensus that exists only as an ideal. (referring to Rawls) and the permanence of disagreement, combined with a need for justice.
We tend to respect the law, even begrudgingly.. ”legislative achievements claims authority and respect as law in the circumstances of politics, including the circumstance of disagreement as to whether it is even a step in the right direction. Such legislation does not claim authority and respect simply as an intimation of what an ideal society would be like; if it did, those with a different vision or social ideal would simply turn away.” P.2202/ similar to assent of minority to majority rule.

If you respect differences, then you necessarily must recognize that it is a procedural issue. Different from Rawls who wants to use an evaluative criteria (justice) to evaluate the outcome.

Majority decision – gives recognition to equal standing, each vote is equal such that it matters where the halfway point is. Anyone’s reason is not conclusive, but it still counts in favour of X.

“Society needs a mechanical procedure precisely because resource to a substantive procedure would reproduce not resolve the decision-problem in front of us. P. 2213. The reasons supporting majority decision are reasonable in circumstances of politics.

click to edit

… “will not be convinced then that equal respect entails majority decision, for he will know that majority decision can lead to outcomes which do not appear to give individuals the substantive respect to which they are entitled.

Once again, however, we can see that this broad notion of respect is unusable in the circumstances of politics. It is because we disagree about what counts as substantively respectful outcome that we need a decision-procedure; in this context, folding substance back into procedure will necessarily privilege one controversial view about what respect entails and according fail to respect the others.” P. 2212

p. 2197 "once voted on in Parliament, it is entitled to whatever respect that communitarian status confers on it, without regard to - indeed bracketing away - the substantive merits of its content."

the respect it deserves is that it is an achievement - we have managed to come to a decision about how to live collectively - whilst in disagreement. "circumstances of politics" p.2198

It is essentially on liberal and communitarian grounds that it deserves respect: it respects the equality of all each vote is equal; it also respects that we want to live together. It acknowledges dissent and disagreement - a different form of respect. Waldron does not really go into how people should reason, just that the procedure safeguards equality essentially. You want to explain why, if you disagree, you should still respect the decision of the majority - it is because a truly equal majority decision-procedure respects each, including yours while recognizing disagreement.

Waldron 'Respect has to do with how we treat each other's beliefs about justice in circumstances where none of them is self-certifying, now how we treat the truth about justice itself.'

quoting Rawls: "Different conceptions of the world can reasonably be elaborated from different standpoints and diversity arises in part from our distinct perspectives. It is unrealistic... to suppose that all our differences are rooted solely in ignorance and perversity, or else in the rivalries for power, status, or economic gain."

Rawls: "it is not to be expected that conscientious persons will full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion." p.58 (1993 Political LIberalism)

an inherent result of respect equality and disagreement is that you have a purely procedure account - that counts equally. Nothing more substantial than that. no substance criteria - but also not some common reason. "however once a set of options is established, the principle of majority decision goes further and says that in the case of each individual, the fact that that individual favors option X is a reason for the group to pursue option X." so how proposals are generated is not the focus here.

Voorheen, zegt Annick Pijnenburg, stelde Europa bij overeenkomsten met derde landen voorwaarden over democratie en mensenrechten. „Maar inmiddels vindt men het zó belangrijk om migranten tegen te houden dat er deals met autocraten komen. Meestal staat er in de tekst wel iets over respect voor mensenrechten, maar er zijn geen mechanismen afgesproken om dat ook te waarborgen. Europa draagt zelfs bij aan mensenrechtenschendingen. Dat speelt in Soedan, in Libië, in Niger.”
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/09/03/in-zekere-zin-maakt-de-tunesie-deal-h et-probleem-alleen-maar-erger-a4173428?t=1693815309

Importance of concrete political output

“democratic discussion, deliberation, and decisionmaking under certain conditions are what make the outcomes legitimate for each person. … [W]hatever the results of discussions, deliberation, and decisionmaking …, they are legitimate. The results are made legitimate by being the results of the procedure” (Christiano 1996: 35).

"Public explanations and justifications of laws and policies are to be cast in terms of conceptions of the common good (conceptions that, on Rawls's view, must be consistent with the two principles of justice), and public deliberation should aim to work out the details of such conceptions and to apply them to particular issues of public policy (p.362 - citing Rawls)"p.18