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Reasons to drop the bombs in Japan - Coggle Diagram
Reasons to drop the bombs in Japan
Effectiveness of air campaign
Air campaign had not destroyed Japan’s ability to make war
US General LeMay’s focus on civilian destruction meant much of infrastructure intact
Rail network, the Korura arsenal and the essential coal ferry between Hokkaido and Honshu were not disabled
The fact that Japan's ability to make war was not significantly crippled by the air campaign could have led to the belief that alternative measures were necessary to hasten the end of the war, such as the use of atomic bombs.
Failure of Bombing to Destroy Civilian Morale
Bombing to destroy civilian morale had not worked
There was no revolt against the regime.
Ignoring the Potsdam Declaration as a negotiating tactic
The lack of a civilian revolt despite heavy bombing may have suggested to decision-makers that traditional military strategies were not enough to break the will of the Japanese people. The atomic bombs were seen as a means to deliver a devastating blow that would force Japan's surrender.
Japanese Military Strength and Kamikaze Tactics
Millions of troops, civilian volunteers and ‘child soldiers’ 15 years and above
5000 effective aircraft – 4000 converted to kamikaze planes
Had enough fuel for a few thousand kamikaze missions.
The presence of millions of Japanese troops, including kamikaze planes and the willingness to engage in suicide attacks, indicated that Japan was prepared to fight fiercely and inflict heavy casualties on Allied forces. This reinforced the belief that a swift and decisive action, such as the use of atomic bombs, was necessary to avoid a prolonged and costly invasion of Japan.
Truman's Perspective and Ultimatum
US President Truman considered the bomb to be just another weapon, albeit one with potentially unparalleled destructive force.
Truman and Churchill at 7am on 26 July give Japan ultimatum - Potsdam Declaration
The issuance of the ultimatum, the Potsdam Declaration, was an attempt to provide Japan with an opportunity to surrender before resorting to the use of the atomic bomb
Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb
Japan chose to ignore declaration – ‘kill it with silence’ – mokusatsu – negotiating tactic to meet offense with silence.
Saving Allied lives and ending the war as motivations for the decision.
US interpreted response as rejection of Potsdam
The interpretation of Japan's response to the Potsdam Declaration as a rejection could have reinforced the belief that Japan was determined to continue fighting. The goal of saving Allied lives and ending the war quickly likely influenced the decision to use the atomic bomb as a means to achieve these objectives
Japanese Army's Resistance and Defensive Plans
Opposition to surrender by Japanese army leaders
Commitment to a bloody defensive war and better terms
Training of civilians for suicide missions
The Japanese army's resistance to surrender and their plans for a bloody defensive war demonstrated their determination to fight on. This likely further justified the use of the atomic bomb as a way to force a surrender and avoid a protracted and costly ground invasion.
6 June Big Three– 3 hardliners War Minister Korechika Anami, Army Chief of Staff General Yoshijirō Umezu and Navy Chief of Staff Soemu Toyoda – commit to battle for homeland.
Army high command wanted a bloody defensive war that would force better terms from US. Army leaders suggested still had 3 million troops for defense of the homeland.
Civilians were to form a shield against invaders. All fight to death. Training of civilians to operate as suicide bombers
Cost of Land and Sea Battles
The high casualties and damages suffered during the battles at Okinawa, along with the effectiveness of kamikaze attacks, illustrated the potential cost of a full-scale invasion of the Japanese mainland. The atomic bombs were seen as a way to avoid such losses and end the war more swiftly.
The land and sea battles at Okinawa killed 12,5000 US sailors, marines and wounded 44,000.
Most costly naval campaign of Pacific war. Kamikazes sank 27 ships and damaged 164.
Loss of 1465 aircraft and crews. US land invasion of Japan far worse.
Awareness of the Atomic Bomb and Casualty Estimates
Estimates on casualties based on Okinawa were around 270,000. All aware of test of S-1 on 16 July.
Nimitz Mc Arthur later warned dead count could be higher.
McArthur increased initial est. of 50,800 in first 30 days. Growing numbers of Japanese troops and civilians in defensive positions– able to field two million put pressure on US to abandon land invasion.
Knowledge of the atomic bomb's destructive power, as well as the projected casualties of a land invasion, likely contributed to the decision to use the atomic bombs. The desire to minimize casualties on both sides and bring a swift end to the war could have made the atomic bombs an attractive option.
Key debate
The orthodox view
the orthodox view was that the attacks on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were to bring a swift end to the war.
Winston Churchill (then British prime minister) supported Truman’s decision to use the bomb, as did Stimson, who stated that the Japanese army was large and powerful and that fghting would not end until late 1946.
The revisionist view
revisionist historians argue that there were several other key reasons why the bombs were used, not least the issue of US–Soviet relations and the USSR’s position in Asia.
Truman has been criticized on several grounds for his decision.
Military advisers told Truman that Japan was a defeated nation and that the US naval blockade of the home islands meant that its war effort would wane quickly.
Reportedly there were also three million Japanese soldiers stranded in China
who could not return to Japan to defend the homeland.
Senior commanders from all arms opposed its use - saw the use of the bomb as no different to using poisonous gas or bacteriological weapons.
Indeed, some of them saw that the USA was surrendering its moral high ground if it became the frst to use such a weapon.
Lack of viable alternatives
The alternatives presented, such as rescinding the demand for unconditional surrender, waiting for the Soviet declaration of war, intensifying the bombing campaign and naval blockade, or conducting a demonstration of the atom bomb on an uninhabited island, were either deemed impractical or unlikely to achieve the desired outcome of swiftly ending the war
Ending the war quickly
President Truman's top priority was to bring a rapid conclusion to the war. The atomic bomb was seen as a means to achieve this goal and avoid a protracted conflict with potentially millions of casualties on both sides
1 June, President Truman: ‘There can be no peace in the world until the military power of Japan is destroyed… If the Japanese insist on continuing resistance beyond the point of reason, their country will suffer the same destruction as Germany…’
From Truman’s memoirs: ‘Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used.’