Ideal is consensus/ reasonable disagreement. Compromise is constitutional democracy. This institutional structure is supposed to achieve deliberation, and how it is supposed to do so, can be understood in one of two ways:
- "forces" actual deliberation on political representatives; the majority meets deliberative critieria
- we do not need to assume that deliberation will be achieved, in the ideal sense, but that the liberal constitution will ensure for outcomes that could be justified by deliberative democrats. the content of the political discussion and ensuing output is not pre-political, but must be formed through political discourse, it unlikely that appeals to particular interests will be considered legitimate and therefore unlikely that majorities will form on the basis of these particular interests. The claims that are relevant to parliament are ones from the general interest (if this criteria is not met, then i do not think DD would consider that given liberal democracy legitimate.
those who form majorities are the ones who had the best arguments, most persuasive, according to deliberative practices; an important aspect is that the decisions they make, i.e. the political outcome, are in theory justifiable to all. // given that it is a majority, and not consensus, not all agree with their articulation.
Lafont: minorities need to learn to better articulate their position so as to explain, in order to convince the majority.
input: regular elections, reflecting changes in public opinion; no majority or majority decisions are permanent.
What : each account has in common: dynamic, continual process of determining common interest.
on only one assumption does the majority reflect the entire 'people' (although, those who are subject to their decisions do not agree with it). on the other assumptions - the majority reflects a majority idea (deliberatively); in both cases there is a minority that supposedly considers the political output legitimate, in virtue of the process or procedure.
what distinguishes this from the previous, is that it is not necessary the case that representatives will attempt to justify their majority coalition to all; rather they will advocate one particular understanding of the general will to the best of their ability. The requirement that the majority be, in theory, justifiable to all is relaxed; the majority needs to be considered justifiable to the majority.
The procedure ensures for temporary majorities: Lafont (and others) ask, why would a minority think it legitimate that they are subjects of legislation that they do not write themselves - in which they do not see themselves and cannot find justification? punctuated majorities; Habermas (temporary)// systematic minorities is a problem
the deliberative ideal is distinct from liberal aggregative models and republican. it does not assume a pre-political identity; and it is just doesn't want to maximize the interests of the most people in a given polity. rather it wants to establish the general interest through a process that best detects that which is general and common. it does this with complete and diverse representation of particular interests; through an ideal deliberative process, it transforms all the parts into whole. however, by relaxing the consensus requirement, and favouring liberal constitutionalism,
There are three potential dynamics, that can create problems for either account. Decisions makers are: ❎ systematic majorities; decisions makers never compromise certain groups ❎ systematic minorities; in cases where the first two do not hold, ❎political output does not reflect the normative arguments of majority
Why are each of these dynamics problematic? an obvious problem would be tyranny of the majority. but that is 'easily' addressed by simply lamenting the fact that representatives are not sincere. Also, liberal constitutional constraints limit how far individual freedoms can be violated
another assumption is that there is continuity with particular identities in a polity. if the majority got the general interest right, would it be safe to assume, on their account, that that would be reflected in elections? some of the minority groups would 'disappear' or weaken?
By relaxing consensus and advocating liberal constitutionalism, what mechanism is deliberative democracy relying on to ensure to prevent of minimize these dynamics?
should the forum in which deliberative takes place be equal and unrestricted, then we can expect that the deliberative and outcome to be reflective of that.
arguably, this dynamic can be saved, if the first two hold, but political outcome does reflect the 'whole.'
this dynamic can emerge without a 'tyranny.' the same majorities could be thinking in general terms, just unable to convince the minority of their position.
it seems to be reasonable to make the following assertion: the perpetual existence of the same minorities, would suggest that they are not be adequately represented in political output. (issues of one issue party.)
being the 'active' author seems to matter as well. even if the majority are 'getting it right' or approximating the general will, you are reliant on them to get it right. more importantly, in virtue of not taking part in the majority, you are not convinced that they are getting right.
an interesting dynamic is that in virtue of political party - you flesh out interest articulation. which is desirable. then, you get majorities and 'clear' political decisions where you see who made them (inclusion). it becomes clearer who is included and excluded.
this is corrected for, with consensus, or as I will argue, taking turns.
the procedure itself is subject to its own demands, namely that it is justifiable to all.