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AC 3.2 Describe the Contribution of Agencies to Achieving Social Control -…

- - - - Gradually became clear that they weren’t working e.g. between 2000 and 2013, they were issued to over 24,000 people but 58% breached them and over 10,000 orders were breached repeatedly.
      - Labelling theorists argue labelling a person as a criminal or deviant can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy, where the individual internalises the label as part of their identity and begins to live up to it, earning status and credibility from their peers. They suggest ASBOs became a ‘badge of honour’ for some young offenders, reinforcing rather than reducing their offending leading to recidivism.
    - - The Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014) replaced ASBOs with 2 new measures:
        
        Injunctions – Aim to deal with low-level nuisance and annoyance, breaching it can mean up to 2 years in prison for adults or a 3-month detention order for under-18s.
        
        Criminal Behaviour Orders – Deal with seriously anti-social individuals who cause harassment, alarm or distress. It lasts at least 2 years for adults and 1 to 2 for under 18s. Breaching can mean up to 5 years in prisons or 2 years detention for under 18s.
        
        Requirements
        
        Positive Requirements – Unlike ASBOs, CBOs can require a person to do something positive to improve their behaviour e.g. where someone’s committed a drug related offence, it can require them to join a drug treatment programme for their addiction.
        
        Negative Requirements – Like ASBOs, CBOs forbid a person from doing something e.g. going to certain places, seeing certain people or engaging in certain activities.
  - - - Interacting positively with staff and others
      - Staying drug free
      - Obeying the rules
      - Engaging in ‘purposeful activity’ e.g. attending vocational training or anger management programme
    - - Programmes may work because of the extra attention prisoners receive as a result, or even just that the rules are being spelled out more clearly to them and not because of the tokens.
      - Make prisoners more manageable while in prison, but there’s a risk that their behaviour is being modified to suit the institution, rather than meet the prisoners’ rehabilitation needs for when they’re released.
      - Other studies have found that when the offender leaves prison and the reinforcement stops, the desired behaviours disappear.
      - The offenders return to crime more slowly compared with those who’ve not undergone the programme.
      - Hobbs and Holt’s study of 125 boys aged 12-15 in a correctional institution in Alabama USE found that behaviour change lasted throughout the 14-month study
- - - - Some estates have high crime rates because of councils’ housing allocation policies rather than how they’re designed. Some councils place ‘problem families’ with a history of anti-social behaviour on ‘sink’ areas.
      - Cul-de-sacs might be defensible spaces – but they might not actually be defended e.g. if the residents are all at work all day, there’s no surveillance. Highlights how social factors can interact with environmental.
      - Can’t prevent offences that don’t involve physical intrusion into a neighbourhood e.g. cybercrime, fraud, and white collar and corporate crime
      - Focuses on defence from outsiders, but insiders commit crime too e.g. DV
      - An area’s reputation rather than its design may cause a high crime rate. If police regard it as crime-ridden, they’ll patrol it more = more arrests, higher recorded crime rate and a worse reputation
    - - Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) involves ‘target hardening’ by changing the physical environment to make it harder to commit crime e.g. barriers to prevent vehicles
      - Rational Choice Theory CPTED sees offenders acting rationally e.g. if intruders fear they’ll be challenged, they will be more likely to stay away
      - Felson’s Routine Activity Theory emphasises the importance of a ‘capable guardian’ protecting potential crime targets e.g. In CPTED mutual surveillance by neighbours acts as a guardian
    - - Limitations
        
        Gated lanes can restrict access for emergency services and refuse collectors
        
        May be difficulties installing them if the alley is a public right of way, or if it has several owners who need to agree and their needs to be full consultation with residents to win their commitment to the scheme
        
        If neighbours don’t know or trust each other, residents may be less likely to get together to install gates, or not take responsibility
        
        Whilst they may decrease criminals entering from outside, they don’t work against those who live within the gated area
      - Sidebottom et al - Review of 43 studies
        
        Cost may be an issue in some areas, however they found that the average benefit (£2.29 for every £1 spent) was over twice the cost of the average cost of a gate (£728)
        
        May reduce the rewards of crime e.g. difficult to steal large objects if the offender has to climb over tall gates
        
        May suffer from ‘broken windows’ problem of disorderly, uncared-for space that invites crime, gating indicates it’s a cared for space that doesn’t tolerate crime
        
        Offenders can no longer use the excuse that they thought it was a public space
        
        Increase residents’ sense of territoriality
        
        Residents taking responsibility for closing the gates increases guardianship and surveillance
        
        Provide a physical barrier, increasing the effort required to commit a crime
      - Lockable gates installed to prevent offenders gaining access to alleyways, they’re used mainly to prevent burglaries, but also stop fly-tipping, anti-social behaviour by youths congregating, dog fouling etc as well as creating safe play areas for children.
    - - Influential with planners and led to attempts to ‘design crime out’
        
        The ‘Secured by Design’ (SBD) kitemark scheme used by the building industry indicates that a new building meets crime prevention standards. Home Office research found a 30% lower burglary rate in SBD houses.
        
        Some police forces now employ architectural liaison officers to ‘build in’ crime prevention features at the design stage for new buildings.
        
        Lisson Green estate in West London, the removal overhead walkways led to a 50% reduction in crime.
      - Recommendations
        
        No more blocks of flats
        
        Overhead walkways should be removed because they obstruct surveillance
        
        Each existing block should have its own garden or private space, so residents would look after it
  - - - Indefensible Spaces
        
        Where crime is more likely to occur, in what he calls ‘confused’ areas of public space such as anonymous walkways and stairwells
        
        Found 55% of all crimes committed in high-rise blocks in New York occurred in public spaces such as hallways, lifts, stairwells and lobbies, because no one felt they ‘owned’ them
        
        Belong to no-one, cared for my no-one and observed by no-one.
      - Defensible Spaces
        
        Argues that these spaces have low crime rates because of 4 key features:
        
        1) Territoriality – where the environment encourages a sense of ownership and control among residents. Certain layouts tell outsiders that particular areas are for the private use of residents e.g. cul-de-sacs project a private image and encourage a sense of community
        
        2) Natural Surveillance – features of buildings e.g. easily-viewed entrance lobbies and street-level windows allow residents to identify and observe strangers. Cul-de-sacs allow residents to overlook each other’s homes. High-rise blocks often have concealed entrances that allow offenders to come and go unseen.
        
        4) A safe location – neighbourhoods located in the middle of a wider crime-free area are insulated from the outside world by a ‘moat’ of safety.
        
        3) A safe image – designs should give the impression of a safe neighbourhood where residents look after each other. Negative image means the area will be stigmatised and targeted by offenders.
        
        Areas where there are clear boundaries so it’s obvious who has the right to be there.
  - - - In the Panopticon, prisoners’ cells are visible to all the guards from a central viewing point e.g. a watchtower. Though the guards can see the prisoners, they can’t see them and so don’t know whether or not they’re being watched at any given moment.
        
        Therefore, the prisoners must constantly act as if they are. Surveillance turns into self-surveillance, the guards have no need to discipline them, they discipline themselves.
    - - Argues that in today’s society, self-surveillance has become an important way of achieving social control. We know we might be being watched e.g. CCTV, so we monitor and control our behaviour ourselves.
- - - - Offending, threatening or hurting someone
      - Preventing staff from performing their job
      - Escaping from prison
      - Using drugs or alcohol
      - Damaging the prison
      - Possession of forbidden items e.g. a knife
      - Being somewhere in the prison that you shouldn't
      - Not doing what staff tell you
    - - More serious offences can lead to having up to 42 extra days added to your sentence. Attempts to escape may also mean being moved to a higher security prison with more restrictions.
    - - Common way of attempting to achieve social control. A first offence is often dealt with more leniently e.g. loss of privileges for a few days in prison, a warning, a police caution or a conditional discharge. Repeat offending is likely to be met with stronger sanctions e.g. probation or prison in an attempt to deter future misbehaviour.
- - - - The police budget was cut by 19%, led to a fall of 20,000 in police
      - The CPS budget was cut by a 1/4 and lost 1/3 of staff
      - Prisons budget fell by 16% and staff by 15%
  - - - There’s been much debate over the responsibilities of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube for offensive and harmful material on them.
      - The right-wing terrorist who massacred 51 Muslims in mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019 was able to livestream his crimes on social media. If such material promoting hatred and terrorism was published in a traditional way e.g. a film, book or newspaper article, the publisher could be held criminally liable. Social media companies claim they’re not publishers and in the UK they can’t currently be prosecuted for the material on their sites.
      - In contrast, Germany enacted a law in 2017 requiring social media companies to quickly remove hate speech, fake news and illegal material or face fines of up to 50 million euros. In April 2019, Australia passed a new law requiring companies to notify police or promptly remove videos depicting terrorist acts, murder, attempted murder, torture, rape or kidnap. Executive companies who fail to comply may be liable of up to 3 years in jail