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Russia & EU (norms) - Coggle Diagram
Russia & EU (norms)
Differences in norms and values
Divergent normative perspectives over principles such as non-interference, combined with Russia’s subsequent refusal to accept EU normative hegemony in Europe, resulted in shift from cooperation to competition dynamic that laid foundations for total breakdown in relations from 2014
In early days of EU-Russia relations, Brussels and Moscow willing to cooperate and rally around shared norms, values, and interests, as demonstrated through signing of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994
PCA provided basic framework for EU-Russia relations and reflected EU’s wider policy towards FSU countries which aimed at exporting European rules and norms
HAUKKALA - However, cooperative relations broke down with a "sea change in Russian FP", noticeably accompanied by notions of spheres of influence, respect for sovereignty and overall equality between Russia Western partners
As result of change in policy direction, EU-Russia relationship now characterised by diverging normative agendas, which contributed to breakdown in relations by giving rise to different visions of what constitutes a just and desirable international order
If EU had adjusted approach to ensure progress in relationship by focusing on practical, issue-oriented, and less ambitious forms of cooperation in specific sectors based on mutual interests rather than on ostentatious ideas of normative convergence, a more constructive EU-Russia partnership could have been fostered
Very nature of EU as institution seeking to promote gradual implementation of its norms and values in EE limited potential for Brussels to foster more pragmatic, interest-based cooperation with Russia
In the end, with the outbreak of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, CASIER points out Moscow conclusively renounced its “willingness to find its place in the unipolar EU-centric Europe”
Distinctive perceptions of European security
Conflicting perceptions of security saw two opposing visions of Europe collide as expressed through the polarising effect of the launch of EAEU vis-à-vis EU mechanisms that brought EU-Russia relations into contestation after early signs of partnership
SAKWA - 2 opposing visions of Europe - “Wider Europe’, with EU at heart but increasingly coterminous with the Euro-Atlantic security and political community” and “’Greater Europe’, a vision of a continental Europe, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, that has multiple centres, including Brussels, Moscow and Ankara, but with common purpose in overcoming divisions that plagued continent
RIEKER & GJERDE - two visions result in different perceptions on European security. EU’s perception of European security emphasising importance of security community-building process with econ integration viewed as essential for safeguarding peace on continent
In case of Russia’s perception, emphasis on multipolarity as condition for stability with existence of multiple centres over and against security environment dominated by the EU and NATO
Differing perceptions on E security came to head following onset of Ukraine crisis, which demonstrated the two visions were fundamentally incompatible
Russia viewed EU involvement in Ukraine through a geopolitical lens as an attempt from Brussels to undermine and weaken Moscow
Distinctive perceptions of European security explain Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, as well as the subsequent war in Donbas
Extent of Russia’s diverging perception of European security can be seen through Moscow’s decision to create EAEU (served as a precursor to achieving political and security aims vis-à-vis EU mechanisms)
Launch of EAEU vis-à-vis EU mechanisms such as EaP had polarising effect that reinforced division between Moscow and Brussels, thus contributing to shift in relations from partnership to rivalry and then crisis
A lack of vision about the relationship
Broad, programmatic schemes lacking substance failed to provide strong basis for strategic partnership. Without such a basis for strategic cooperation, events incl. colour revolutions and crisis in Ukraine fuelled deterioration in EU-Russia relations
EMERSON - vague and “fuzzy” discourse set out in four Common Spaces roadmap docs indicative of EU and Russia still remaining in state of profound mutual ambiguity
CASIER - perhaps as direct consequence of ambiguity surrounding cooperation, introduction of four Common Spaces heralded beginning of relations being increasingly defined in pragmatic terms
WEBBER and HAUKKALA highlight that EU attempts at inclusion always characterised by rather troubled coexistence with exclusion in sense that Russia never truly considered as serious candidate for full accession to European bodies
Russian officials making clear they had no intention of joining EU further exacerbated exclusionary dynamic and demonstrated sheer lack of vision on both sides concerning the relationship