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Mind - Coggle Diagram
Mind
Dualism
Substance Dualism
Divisibility - I am divisible, my body is not divisible, therefore I am not my body.
Mental divisibility
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Response:
Mental and physical objects are divisible in different ways- mental objects are functionally, rather than spatially divisible. However, these different functions perfromed are not physically seperate locations.
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Physical divisibility
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can running be divided
wittgenstein counter that we are dividing a property of a divisible substance rather than the substance itself.
Conceivability. I can clearly and distinctly conceive of the nature of two things as seperate, and that is must be possible to seperate them. I can conceive of the nature of my mind as a thinking, non extended substance. I can conceive of the nature of my body as an extended, non thinking substance. I can conceive of these two things as distinctly seperate, thereofre it must be possible for them to seperate. Therefore they are two seperate substances.
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Masked man fallacy
I know who my father is, I don't know who the masked man is, the masked man and my father have different properties, therefore the masked man and my father are two distinct things.
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Property Dualism - the theory that mental properties emerge from physical substances, but are non-physical in nature and can't be reduced back down.
Philosophical Zombies (imagine a world with no conscious mental states IC this world would be metaphysically possible P2) We can conceive of a world that is physically identical to this one, but in which there is no conscious experience P3) What is conceivable is metaphysically possible IC) Therefore a zombie world must be metaphysically possible C) Therefore physicalism is false.
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What is conceivable is not metaphysically possible, and what is metaphysically possible is not always real.
Mary's room
P1) Mary knows Everything there is to know about colour. P2) Mary learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself P3) Therefore there is more to know about colour that what is given in the complete physical account of it. C) Physicalism is false
New knowledge, old fact
I know there is water in that glass- I know there is H20 in that glass. She gains the phenomenal concept of it, which is merely a different way of understanding it.
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Mary would already know
rejects main premise that mary would learn something new. If Mary really did know all the physical facts then this would include knowledge of what it's like to see red.
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Dualist problems
Problem of other minds (solipsism) If dualism is correct then how do we judge if other people have minds, because it states that just because you have a brain doesn't mean that you have a mind
Mills analogy
I have a mind. P2) I know from experience that my behaviour is caused by mental states. P3) Other people have bodies similar to mine and behave in similar ways to me when in similar situations. P4) Therefore, by anaology, their behaviour is caused by their mental states. C) other people have minds
Analogical problems
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Behaviour across humanity is not uniform- hard to infer that people have similar mental states to me if their behaviour is dramatically different in the same situation
Ascribing mental states
For us to make sense of our own mental states, for example, what is means to say that we’re feeling angry, we need to also learn what it means to say of someone else that they are angry
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Physicalism
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Eliminative Materialism - the claim that the language we use to describe mental states is inadequate because it is folk psychology. Instead, a proper analysis of mental states will look more like neuroscience, with specific descriptions of the mechanics of the brain.
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Behaviourism
Hard - the claim that all propositions about mental states can be analytically reduced to propositions which exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily state or behaviours,.
Soft - the claim that propositions about mental states are analytically reducible to behavioural dispositions, which are hypothetical if then statements.
Problems
Asymetry between self and others. It's clear there is a big different between how you experience your own mental states and other people's. If behaviourism were true, this shouldn't be the case. To be in pain for example is to have a certain behavioural disposition. It doesn't feel like this though. I don't know that i'm in pain because I've acted a certain way- but instead, I just feel the pain and know I'm in pain from the unpleasant feeling. Behavioursim disregards this unpleasant feeling.
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Functionalism - mental states are functional states within an organism. For example, the functional role of pain is an unpleasant sensation that causes the organism to get away from the thing that's causing it harm. That function is what mental states, such as pain, are.
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Chinese Brain
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They communicate according to the rules set out in the complete functional description of human mental states described earlier
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So, the input leads to exactly the same output, and everything in between is functionally identical
inverted qualia
If functionalism is true, then two functionally identical mental states are the same mental state
My mental state when I look at the sky is functionally identical to yours but phenomenally different
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