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KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV AFTER CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS - Coggle Diagram
KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV AFTER CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
NUCLEAR LIMITS
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
BENEFITS
banned underwater and overground testing for all signatories
step towards disarmamament
DOWNFALLS
not compulsory to sign up
didn't prevent nuclear proliferation
USSR developed ABMs and US developed MIRVs despite the treaty
CRITICISM AND OPPOSITION
JFK
public and political pressure to be tough on Communism
JFK wanted conciliar approach to relations despite Berlin and Cuba crises
KHRUSHCHEV
Strong-anti US sentiment in USSR and PRC
Khrushchev still sought cooperation with US, partly due to poor Sino-Soviet relations
CONCLUSIONS
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, US and USSR realised the destructive nature of nuclear weapons and the undisputable negatives of nuclear war
although the Test Ban and Non Proliferation Treaties were relatively successful, there was a clear need to further the arms reductions. Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and LBJ's decision not to run for re-election delayed talks, but when Nixon came into office SALT talks resumed
ATTITUDES
JFK
wanted conciliation but had to present a strong anti-Communist stance to appease his opposition
wanted to maintain MAD, which relied on nuclear powers being rational actors - so needed to prevent nuclear proliferation with 1968 treaty
KHRUSHCHEV
wanted to focus more on domestic issues - economy and standard of living
had to demonstrate strong anti-Western position to maintain Soviet dominance in the Communist community
AFTER THE CRISIS, BOTH LEADERS (AND NATIONS) WERE MUCH MORE INCLINED TO NEGOTIATE THAN BEFORE
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
REASONS
ensure that MAD remained through the maintenance of 'rational' actors with nuclear power
US continued producing ICBMs and SLBMs despite Test Ban Treaty, and USSR developed ABMs in the late 60s that threatened MAD
AGREEMENTS
signed by almost all UN members between 1968 and 1970
agreed not to share nuclear weapons technology with non-nuclear nations, and for non-nuclear nations not to seek that technology