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judicial precedent (1) - Coggle Diagram
judicial precedent (1)
ratio decidendi
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these principles are the important part of the judgment and are known as the 'ratio decidendi', which means 'the reason for deciding'
this is what creates a precedent for judges to follow in future cases
if the ratio is given by a judge in a higher court, particularly an appeal court, it will carry great authority and must be followed by all lower level judges in later cases
in appeal cases where there is a particularly important or complicated point of law, more than one judge may want to explain the legal reasoning that led to a decision
this can cause problems in later cases a each judge may have had a different reason for their decision, so there will be more than one ratio decidendi
it will be for lawyers and judges in later cases to choose which ratio they prefer and which to use in the court
stare decisis
let the previous decision stand - rulings in past cases bind courts faced with similar situation (this maxim is at the heart of all rules of precedent)
judges are able to make decisions in court, either to interpret Parliamentary law, or to decide a rule where there is no Parliamentary law
these decisions, when reported, can be looked at by other judges in later cases
if the later cases uses similar rules then a judge in the later case can follow the earlier decision
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obiter dicta
things said by the way - supporting arguments and commentary (this part of a judgment is only persuasive)
a major problem when looking at a past judgment is to divide the ratio decidendi from the orbiter, as the judgment is usually in a continuous form, without any headings specifying what is meant to be part of the ratio decidendi and what is not
sometimes a judge will speculate on what the decision would have been if the facts of the case had been different
this hypothetical situation is part of the orbiter dicta and the legal reasoning put forward may be considered in future cases, although, as with all orbiter statements
lawyers and judges dealing with later similar cases have to make their own decisions as what the ratio of a decision is and what forms the orbiter
R v Howe: HoL decided that the defence is duress was not available to a charge of murder - duress is not a defence to a charge of attempted murder and it was directly relevant to the facts of the case
HoL in R v Gotts followed the orbiter statement in R v Howe and, in their ratio decidendi, rules that duress cannot be a defence to a charge of attempted murder
EXAMPLE OF PRECEDENT:
Daniels v White (1938)
A man drank a bottle of lemonade and had a burning reaction in his throat - there was a corrosive chemical in the lemonade.
He sued the manufacturer and won by using the precedent of Donoghue and Stevenson because the case was almost exactly the same situation.
Donoghue v Stevenson (1932)
A lady drank a bottle of ginger beer in a cafe and when she poured out the dregs, she saw that there was a decomposing snail in there.
She felt ill, sued the manufacturer and won.