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GHA - Coggle Diagram
GHA
MODULE I : FROM HUNTER GATHERERS TO THE FIRST EMPIRES
Sessions 4-5 : the rise of states
Why did states emerge ?
Coercive theories
Population density and war
Food production intensity → Social complexity + population density → + War → States
The population is so dense in a given space, it will create a conflict for the use and control of the resources
When conquest occurs, Diamond observes three possible cases
Moderate density and war
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High density and war
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Low density and war
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Environmental circumscription (Carneiro)
States emerged where agricultural land was circumscribed
Where land was not scarce - too costly to fight for it (and the inverse is true)
Conquest might have further affected the political evolution
of the state by shaping the emergence of social classes
Intensification of farming → higher population density → warfare over land
Voluntaristic theory : social contract
Social contract (Rousseau) :
people voluntarily give up some of their power to someone else in exchange for security (stationary bandits)
States are voluntarily chosen
States are optimal
Problem :
The persistence of non-states is not accounted for
Voluntaristic theory : irrigation theory
Large Asiatic states (Egypt, Mesopotamia) : irrigation based farming required large and centralized investments in infrastructures (the need to create large scale irrigation systems)
Large scale irrigation → Centralised bureaucracy → Large states
Problem :
Large scale irrigation often came after state emergence
Voluntaristic theory : food surplus
Agriculture (max exploitation) → Food surplus → Storage/labor division → Political integration
Political integration refers to the process by which smaller groups coalesce into a more unified and centralized political entity
Once agriculture provides a reliable surplus, societies begin to develop formal leadership structures, ultimately evolving into chiefdoms or early states.
Problem :
Chiefdoms survived at maximum production and they did not necessarily aggregate into states
The emergence of the state in ancient Egypt
In Egypt : relatively abundant land but scarce labor
Fights over labor rather than land
Evsey Domar : land to labor ratio
Carneiro's theory : state formation depends on which resource is effectively “scarce” and can be controlled
Session 1 : Institutions
How do institutions help understanding historical change ?
Douglass North : Early human societies share similar traits
Some societies grew and advanced (convergence), while others fell behind or stayed poor (divergence).
because of
institutions
(rules, laws, and systems) that
either helped or blocked progress.
North emphasized
path dependence :
once institutions are established, they persist and shape future outcomes.
What's an institution ?
But also the equilibrium resulting from human interactions
Basic definition : rules, norms, organisations governing human interactions
Might refer to different spheres of human interaction
Politics - stable rules defining interactions within a community
Political order : conflict and cooperation
Institutionalism
: political institutions emerge from conflict and violence
Marxism :
Economic and political change as the result of technological innovation
Tech change → economic distribution → bargaining power → institutions
Functionalism
: political order as a more or less spontaneous solution to collective action problems
Economics - Norms and organisations reducing uncertainty agents in economic interaction (eg property rights...)
AJR : The rise of Europe after 1500 was mainly due to institutional change.
Technological
or
environmental
shocks
(like the discovery of new trade routes) were
necessary
but
not
sufficient
.
Economic opportunities (like trade) only create growth if institutions allow it.
Potential pitfalls of the institutionalist approach
Do good institutions always lead to success ?
Example of Poland and Polish constitution
Elites blocked good propositions
Good institutions :arrow_right: bad outcome
Not all “good” institutions work the same way in every context.
A strong constitution can still fail if political power is concentrated in the wrong hands.
Avner Greif : Institutions as an equilibria
Institutions are not just rules of the game, they are the equilibria society settles into
Very difficult to change once in place
Only elites, governments, and powerful groups can shape institutions often to benefit themselves.
Institutions are not neutral : they benefit some categories of people
They are also shaped by power struggles
Institutions appear endogenously, and evolve based on social and historical context and conditions
However for any single individual, institutions feel "external" and are not personally chosen (exogenous).
Key idea : Historical and social conditions shape institutions
Session 2 : From hunter-gatherers to sedentary societies
How were states different from chiefdoms ?
They governed over a larger population and territorial scale and they relied on
professional bureaucracy
Economic system
Redistribution - tax and tributes
Surplus labor appropriation - corvée and slavery
High specialisation
The state was viable through
Religious organisation and political power
Decline of kinship social structure : formalized stratification
Written laws
Human organizations before the rise of states - 4 anthropological categories
Tribes
Hundreds of people
Clanish organisation
Early forms of leadership (big man) and informal conflict resolution
Some stratification (social)
Chiefdoms
Social hierarchy, hereditary leadership
Surplus redistribution
Thousands of people
Early bureaucracy
Bands
Hunter gatherers
No formal leadership (informal conflict resolution)
5-80 people
Small families
States
Tens of thousands +
Formal institutions - written laws
Organized religion
Professional bureaucracy
This is not necessarily a positive evolution : we don’t want to attach a judgement, states might not be the final step of evolution
The neolithic revolution : from bands and tribes to chiefdoms
Shift from nomadic lifestyle to one based on agriculture
Chiefdoms introduced formalized, permanent leadership.
This centralization of authority came with social stratification
What made chiefdoms viable ?
Public order and diminution of violence
Disarming the population
Redistributing output
Formal institutions
Bureaucratic apparatus
Slave labour
Developing a common ideology/religion
Marxist theory : agriculture as an exogenous change
The possibility to produce food surplus helped support larger populations
MODULE II : THE EMERGENCE OF PRE-MODERN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Sessions 1-2 : The clan and the city
How to sustain cooperation ?
China :flag-cn:
The clan organisation induces stronger links between people
When did clans emerge ?
Either the ancestor (a male who established a totally new clan) or the founder (established a branch of an existing clan)
Until Song Dynasty, there were mostly new clans/clans formed by ancestors
In this period, the clanish society was forming
Societies organised around clans
Informal institutions to sustain cooperation
Moral obligation
Reputation
Kin based inter-households associations with origin in a common ancestor
Participation in a clan is
not voluntary
Europe :flag-eu:
Formalised institutions allow interactions between people from different kinship groups
After the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 BC
Political fragmentation : a lot of small populations clustered
Lack of central authority and mechanisms
The "Dark Ages"
Formation of city states
Charles the Great (Charlemagne) comes up with a system of land retribution for military services
Creation of a landed aristocracy
Feudalism and Manorialism
Societies organised around corporations (cities, guilds)
Voluntary associations among unrelated individuals pursuing common goal/same interest
Soon developing formal laws and institutions to sustain cooperation
Social organisation supports cooperation
9th - 14th century : institutional bifurcation between China and Europe
Sessions 4-5 : Fiscal capacity and political institutions
Western Europe
:flag-eu:
Middle East
:flag-sa:
Relied on slave armies as an alternative to the landed aristocracy. The region remained in the “Classical equilibrium”
Mamluk army
Well-paid and loyal
Isolated from the rest of society
Different language and separate social interactions
Recruited from peripheral territories
Limited constraints on the ruler’s powers and no development of parliamentary assemblies
The rise of Islam and its Golden Age
633-661 CE : first expansion towards Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Egypt
661-750 CE : second expansion towards Afghanistan, Maghreb, Iberian peninsula
622 - 632 CE : political unification of Arabic peninsula
8th-11th centuries CE : a long phase of political stability
Institutional, cultural and social homogeneity
Same language
Common legal system
The end of the Golden Age
Geographical factors and the decline of Islam
Cities in the Middle East were landlocked :lock:
Reduced potential for agriculture due to worsening climatic condition
Cultural factors and the decline
Ernest Renan : Islam VS rationality : Limiting the adoption of scientific development
Timur Kuran : Islam → Law → Institutional divergence
Avner Greif : Islam → Culture → Institutional divergence
Maghribi traders : relationships based on trust and intra group cooperation
Genoese traders : developed formal institutions and laws to enforce
They could trade with strangers (individualistic ideology)
11th century : political instability and internal crisis
External pressure from the rise of Western Europe
Recovery of Europe maritime trade threatened the Islamic dominion
Subsequent Atlantic trade and the lost of centrality of the Mediterranean
Crusades and beginning of the Reconquista : real threat for political stability
Internal pressure from the Persian province and unsettled groups (turks and berbers) at the borders
"Classical Equilibrium"
Influential monotheistic clergy
A ruler with the monopoly of the use of violence and coercion
Fiscal capacity :
the capability of a political entity to raise and spend public resources
Session 7-8 : The consequence of limited fiscal capacity