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Philosophy of Mind - Coggle Diagram

- - - - They interact act the pineal gland - they can cause changes in one another - so your mind can give rise to physical movements - and physical changes like damage can give rise to pain in our mental state. (interactionalist dualism)
        
        Alternative - Epiphenomalism - Denise this trawl way interaction - brain states cause mental states but mental states CAN NOT cause changes in brain or behaviour. They are casually impotent. Eg. feeling of pain doesn't cause your hand to pull away - it is purely brain states that do this. Like a steam engine train.
  - - - But mind is not SPATIALlY divisible so properties are not the same
  - - - All physical things are logically divisible - we can still CONCEIVE of them being divided in half
  - - - People can conceive of angels and Gods though - people have always been able to make sense of beings with ohsycial bodies
        
        But the whole concept of angels and Gods is that they are inconceivable to humans so have to appear to us in forms similar to humans or animals so we can understand them
- - - - It is a weak inductive argument - only based on a single instance
        
        Correlating my behaviours with many of my mental Staes - on numerous occasions sad = cry
        
        Still only evidence from one person
    - - we dont make inferences in practice - we are hardwired to assume other humans have minds no reasoning process - so abductive argument fails to give account of how we actually come to believe other minds.
        
        Abductive arguments show how our 'hard wired' beleifs are justified - does not explain how we come to our belief that others have minds but it does justify it rationally.
        
        Abductive reasoning does not give us knowledge even if something is the best explanation - does not follow we know the explanation - eg. if there is a lot of evidence Sarah stole your pen but you did not see it - she's only the best exp. you still don't know they stole your pen.
  - - - Perhaps causations a constant conjunction - where's there's one thing there's another - where there's heat there is also expanding metal - and where there is physical there is mental - so there is no need for the mind/body interaction problem
    - - 2nd issue - We don't need to appeal to non-physical causes - every physical affect has a sufficient physical cause (The completeness of the physical) - So if I wave at someone = neural firing + muscle contraction
        
        Mental causes are fundemental to our explanatory practices - it is just as valid to explain why you waved with /it was my desire to interact with them'
        
        Mixing up the 'how' with the 'why'
      - The universe is not an isolated closed system - classical science doesn't claim the universe is causally closed - so we can say it is not
  - - - Epiphenomalnilism does account for introspective self knowledge - underlying physical states cause separate physical states lead to us having knowledge of pain. C-fibres = pains then c-fibres = knowledge of pain. So there's an direct causal relationship mental states don't have any causal power.
    - - We are not aware of causal power of mental states. Observing two things are connected doesn't mean they are causally connected. So behaviour of wincing and quail of pain are caused by some brain state - so quail isn't causing behaviour- both are being caused by some biological process.
    - - Mental states are an evolutionary by-product, some properties of evolution are by-products of advantageous traits eg. polar bears age thick coat that keeps them warm but it is also heavy which is not advantageous. it could be our qualia have no advantage to our survival - just by-product of a complex brain that does help us survive.
- - - - They are also introspectively accessible - only we can access our quail through introspection so no one can know what another's qualia is like - they are logically private
      - they are Irreducible - cannot be explained by physical theories - are not reducible to behaviour or physical brain state (yet)
- - - - They are not reducible to physical properties - they cannot be reduced to C-fibres firing for example
      - Qualia are not supervenient upon physical propeerties - there can be changes in quail without changes in physical brain - you can go from happy to sad without any new neural firings
  - - - A zombie world is not conceivable - we couldn't conceive of a fuctionally identical human brain that does not also have consciousness - a functional duplicate of our brains must come with consciousness - it has to be linked with brains as consciousness does not exist outside of brains
        
        Physicalist theories cannot explain qualms - physical theories cannot give us a full understanding of mental properties; quails are not reducible to the physical - they are phenomena so how can we say a purely functional brain has to also contain quailia
      - What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality - we might be able to conceive of a P-zombie like we can conceive of a horse with wings (they could exist if the laws of nature and physics were different) but this doesn't mean it could ever exist.
        
        What is metaphysically possible DOES tell us something about reality - it shows us that mental and physical properties are distinct - if they were not conceivable to be separated they would be identical.
      - What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible - P.Zombies are logically possible but it doesn't mean that mental and physical can be separated in any form of reality. Eg. I could conceive of heat being slow moving particles but it doesn't follow this is metaphysically possible. perhaps P.Zombies could not exist.
  - - - Ability knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge of colours -not a necessary condition that must be fulfilled - you can know what it is like to experience colour even though you lack the ability to picture redness
        
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    - - Acquaintance knowledge involves propositional knowledge - you are learning about a new mental property - raw feel of a certain mental state - learns a new and therefore non-physical fact when she becomes acquainted with red - so what it is like to experience red can't simply be a physical property of the brain