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Patrick Todd - Coggle Diagram

- - - - Vanlig invändning är att om framtiden är öppen så borde dåtiden vara öppen också.
        
        Presentism är symmetrisk, varken framtid eller dåtid existerar.
        
        Det går att använda sig av Growing Block Theory för att undvika denna symmetri, men det vill Todd inte göra i första hand.
        
        Anledningen till att det inte stämmer är att det inte finns en bestämd framtid utveckling, det finns ingen "priviligerad framtid".
        
        Todd antar att dåtidens faktum saknar djupare förklaring dem är brute och att framtiden inte är det.
  - - - Vidare menar argumentet att eftersom presentism gäller så måste all sanning bero på verkligheten i nutid (TSB-P)
        
        Exempel: Om ett påstående om en framtida händelse antas som sann måste det finnas något i nutid som gör det sant.
        
        Indeterminism säger att nuet är förenligt med flera möjliga framtider. Det finns alltså ingenting i nutid som gör det sant.
        
        Framtida kontingenter skulle alltså bryta mot TSB-P enligt indeterminism.
        
        Det finns inte sanna framtida kontingenser.
        
        Framtiden är öppen
  - - - Clark menar att om framtiden är öppen för nutiden så bör dåtiden också vara öppen för nutiden.
        
        nutiden tillåter flera möjliga framtider men nutiden tillåter också flera möjliga dåtider.
        
        Hartsthorne menar att Gud har perfekta minnen av det förflutna, vilket gör att det bara finns en möjlig historia. Framtiden är dock öppen eftersom framtida händelser inte kan påverka Gud på samma sätt.
        
        Om Gud kunde radera minnen skulle det innebära att sanningar om det förflutna upphör att existera. Det verkar orimligt.
        
        Sanningar om det förflutna existerar oberoende av nuvarande verklighet, dem är brute.
        
        Den bryter mot TSB-P eftersom om dåtiden är oberoende av nutiden så kan inte framtiden vara beroende av nutiden enligt TSB-P
  - - - Symmetriskt med detta är att faktum om fiktiva berättelser bara kan bestämmas av det som faktiskt har skrivits.
        
        Framtiden kan inte vara oberoende av nuet, det verkar godtyckligt och oförklarligt.
        
        Vi har en stark intution om att framtiden är beroende av nuet. Vi har inte en stark intution om att Dåtiden är beroende av nuet.
        
        Om allt i nuet försvann skulle framtida kontingenter vara meningslösa.
        
        Dåtiden är fast och oberoende av nuet medan framtiden är öppen, eftersom den ännu inte är bestämd av nuvarande fakta.
  - - - Utifrån presentism kan inte TSB tydligt stödja öppen framtid.
        
        Vi ska alltså undvika presentism och indeterminism med sanningsprinciper överlag eller TSB.
        
        Det går att argumentera för en öppen framtid med presentism men utan TSB
- - - - There are three models
        
        Todd's model is model 3
        
        Ockhamism is model 1
        
        Supervaluationism is model 2
      - Each model tells there are multiple future histories.
      - Each model is consistent witht the past
      - Each model is conistent with natural laws
      - Model 1
        
        Exact one of those histories is the actual future history.
        
        It is determined which history is the actual future history
        
        Refers to one actual future history.
        
        Is the same with model 2 in that there is an actual future history
        
        Is different from model 2 and 3 in that there is a privileged future
        
        There are primitve future directed facts
        
        Future-directed facts are determined, this means there is a single, definite future.
        
        Model 1 have only one "available" future, but this does not mean it is deterministic.
        
        Model 1 allows there being different future outcomes if they are consistent with past and natural laws
        
        Furthermore it allows there being only one future outcome if it is the only one consistent with past and natural laws,
        
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      - Model 2
        
        Exact one of those histories is the actual future history.
        
        It is indeterminate for each given history wheter it is the actual future history.
        
        Refers to one actual future history
        
        Is different from model 1 in that there is a privileged future
        
        Is the same as model 1 in that there is an actual future history
        
        Is different from model 3 in that there is an actual future history
        
        Is the same as model 3 in that there is no determined actual future history
        
        There are primitive future directed facts
        
        Future-directed facts are indeterminate, this means that the future remains open and uncertain.
        
        Model 2 have only one "available" future, but this does not mean it is deterministic.
        
        Model 2 allows there being different future outcomes if they are consistent with past and natural laws
        
        Furthermore it allows there being only one future outcome if it is the only one consistent with past and natural laws, still we dont know which and will never know which.
        
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      - Model 3
        
        No given history is such that it is the actual future history
        
        There is no actual future history.
        
        Does not refer to a actual future history
        
        Is different from model 1, there is no actual future history
        
        is different from model 1 in that there is no determined actual future history
        
        is different from model 2 in that there is an actual future history.
        
        is the same as model 2 in that the actual future history is indetermined
        
        There are no primitive future directed facts
        
        Histories consistent with the past and the laws and the future directed facts are true simpliciter
        
        All reality has to narrow down the class of possible worlds to the "actual world" is what has happened up to now and the laws of nature.
        
        If what has happened up to now and the laws do not by themselves “narrow down” the class of possible worlds to one single world, then, on model 3, there simply is no “actual world” at all.
        
        On models 1 and 2, however, there is indeed a unique “actual world.” Thus, reality does have something further at its disposal, in addition to the past and the laws, to narrow down the class of possible worlds to a unique “actual world.”
        
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        The available futures are just the causually possible futures
        
        Futures consistent with the past and the laws and the future directed facts (future directed facts are non-existent)
        
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      - The amount of possible futured is determined by natural laws and the past in all models.
      - The debate revolves around if future directed facts exist or not, this is model 1 and 2 vs 3.
    - - The main differences of these models is about the privileged branch
        
        A present branch does not include a privileged branch
        
        The privileged branch includes a present branch
      - Introducing and motivating a new semantics for the word "Will"
        
        Builds on the previous metaphyscial footing
        
        There are no primitive future-directed facts.
        
        "Will" is considered to be a universal quantifier over all available branches
        
        Truth-values on future contingents becomes a broad metaphysical question with "Will"
        
        Namely, how many branches are genuinly avaliable?
        
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  - - - it will be in n units of time that p
        
        It will be in n units of time that p, iff in all of the available futures in n units of time p
        
        Will is treated as a universal quantifier over all available branches
      - Model 1 only consideres (quantifes) over the unique actual future.
        
        Model 1 conjoined with neutral semantics results in: (UAF): It will be in n units of time that p, iff in the unique actual future in n units of time p
        
        Model 2 conjoined with neutral semantics results in: UAF but does not know which P or not-P is the actual unique future.
        
        The problem of model 1 and 2 is that they assume there being only one cow in a barn, and then consider (quantify) if this cow is either black or not.
        
        But there could be a lot more cows in the barn, therefore either way a cow is black or it is not, is false, because the quantification states simultaneously that it is all the cows in the barn that we are quantifying over, but really we are not, we do not know how many cows there are in this barn.
        
        In a thought experiment we could know how many cows there are in the barn, but not in reality.
        
        If we assume on metaphysical ground that there only is one available future, then model 1 and 2 is correct.
        
        There is a scope distinction between telling that not all (in a strict sense) cows are black or not black call this the negation of a prediction.
        The prediction of a negation is that all (according to us available) cows are either black or not black.
        
        Patrick Todd does not seem to understand that the use of PFDF seems different between model 1 and 2. 1 means PFDF are such that indicate the exact actual future. 2 means that PFDFare such that only goes as far as determining between the negation or the acceptance of the actual unique future.