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Issues for Dualist Theories - Coggle Diagram
Issues for Dualist Theories
Problem of other minds
Substance dualism holds there are two substances: mental and physical. mental substances cannot be reduced and explained by physical properties therefore, cannot be observed empirically. therefore the only way to observe mental properties is through introspection. We cannot observe other peoples mental experiences this way so there is no way to know other people have mental experiences is substance dualism is true.
Responses
Mills argument from analogy: I behave according to my mental states eg. saying 'ouch' in response to pain. I can observe these behaviours in others. So others probably also experience the same mental states.
One case resonse: N. Malcom = Mill is only using one case (his own mind) so he cannot generalise this to all other people.
Ayer improvement - Use many expamples of mental states determining your behaviour correlating with many examples of other people depicting similar behaviour
This doesn't solve the issue - still using the one case of your own mind
(Evaluation) - what else are they supposed to do? Dualism claims you cannot empirically observe mental states
We could also inductively conclude that all behaviours are involuntary because there is many involuntary behaviours like sneezing, hiccuping and reflexes that we can observe in other people
Ryle: substance dualism makes a category mistake (fundamental mistake in foundations of the theory)
Substance dualism states mental substances are not physical as they are non-extendable and non divisible In nature making them non-identical). However, it does not follow mental substances are non-physical, they may not be a 'thing' at all.
Descartes assumes that our mind must be a 'thing' or substance because of the words we use. 'Process' or 'state' are words that can be ascribed to physical things, like mental 'state' but our mind is not a thing. such as asking 'what is the taste of blue' would be nonsense as they are assuming blue fits in the category of things that have taste. similar Descartes is assuming the mind fits into the category for 'things' that can be located, 'and if its not physical it must be another kind of substance'
Instead our mind consists of sets of behavioural dispositions (eg. is someone is described as being scared what is being described is their disposition to sweat and hide' - Ryle is a behaviourist
Uses example of the 'brittlesness' of glass - brittleness is not something within the glass, you would not ask if it can be spatially dived - this would be nonsense. the 'brittlesness' is just a way of describing the glass's disposition to shatter if dropped.
The interaction problem
If mental substances are non-physical and physical substances are - how would they interact if they're not remotely similar things?
conceptual interaction problem) Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia only physical things can interact like a ball pushing another - non physical things like colour cannot do this
Descartes response: Gravity is non-physical and interacts with physical things without by pushing or pulling
Modern physics discovered gravity does push and pull - the electrostatic forces sending atoms of interacting objects push and pull
Descrates: The interact at the pineal gland
There is no evidence for this gland existing - he also never explains
how
the substances interact
Empirical interaction problem
Physicalists say the universe is 'casually closed' meaning energy cannot be created or destroyed. So energy cannot come from outside physical substances so the mental affected the physical cannot be true.
But the physical affects the mental - if we are hurt we become sad (quail) so what if the amount of energy leaving the physical universe to affect the mental is equal to the energy coming from the mental to affect the physical - so the total amount of energy doesn't change.
This mis understands the argument - even if total energy doesn't change the claim mental creates energy to affect the physical is absurd
Epiphenomenalism
Physical causes changes in the mental but not vice vera - one way interaction
The challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge
We can gain knowledge through introspection - We can gain knowledge that we are in pain by noticing our mental state of hurting - how could this be if the mental cannot cause anything?
May also lead to skepticism because you can have two distinct beleifs 'I'm in pain' and 'I believe I'm in pain' these mental states can have two different physical causes, thus you may have a physical change that produces the belief you are in pain without a physical change that actually causes you to be in pain. This leads to skepticism to whether our beleifs match what is actually happening in our body.
Epiphenomalist repsonds - this doesn't prove the theory false
The challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life
Surely the mental does cause changes in the physical - our desire to touch a bottle leads to our arm reaching out. Also the placebo affect is entirely mental.
Response - psychological experiments show there is much more occurring in our brains than what we are introspectively aware of - our conscious thoughts may be cuased by unconscious changes in our brain that present themselves as conscious thought
The challenge posed by natural selection/evolution
If the mind doesn't not cause any changes then why would we have it? if the mind is not evolutionary advantageous as it does nothing to help us survive then it shouldn't exist.
Consciousness is a by-product of the brain evolving, our intelligence lead to consciousness through a physical process yet to be discovered