Rylands v Fletcher

Ground breaking case that changed tort law in ELS - introduced principle that would be used to protect individuals from damage caused by things that escaped from the defendants land
even though it is a tort in its own right its origins are in the tort of nuisance - in recent years it has not been popular because of the development of more appropriate torts
although, it is still seen as a tort that protects against environmental damage

Nature of strict liability:
rule in rylands v fletcher was established at a time when increased industrialisation caused damage such as fires, floods or escapes of fumes
initially RvF was a strict liability tort to ensure that social justice was achieved in order to protect people against the problems caused by industrialisation

Defences:

Consent:
if the claimant gives express or implied consent to the presence of the dangerous thing, this is a defence unless the defendant is negligent
consent can be implied where a thing has been bought onto the land for the common benefit of the claimant and defendant - it can also be implied where a person who enters a property as a tenant takes it as they find it, in so far as they know of the presence of the dangerous thing

Act of a stranger:
defendant will not be liable if the escape is the result of an unforeseeable act of a third party, over whom the defendant has no control or who is not acting under the defendants instructions
defence cant be used if the act is one that the defendant ought reasonably to have foreseen and guarded against
in relation to this defence a trespasser is regarded as a stranger by employees acing in the course of their employment are not

Statutory authority:
defendant may avoid liability if a relevant statute authorises the defendants actions. however, some acts that allow the carrying of dangerous activites do not specify whether the rule should apply so it is entirely up to the court to interpret the act - means that similar cases may have very different outcomes

Act of God:
this defence may be used when the escape is caused by natural forces, only in circumstances that the defendant could not have been expected to foresee or guard against it
the judgement in Tennant v Earl of Glasgow said that his includes any events that:
no human foresight can provide against, and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility

Default of the claimant:
if the claimants own act or omission causes the damage, there will not be a successful claim
if the claimant is partly to blame, defence of contributory negligence will apply

Facts of the case:

defendant (mill owner) had paid independent contractors to make a resevoir on his land which was intended to supply water to the mill - while working on resevoir the contractors discovered shafts and passages of an old coal mine
some of the passages joined with a mine on the claimants neighbouring land - contractors should have blocked the shafts but didnt - when resevoir was filled the water burst through shafts and flooded claimants mine causing £937 damage
defendant had not been negligent as he did not kno about the shafts - and he couldnt be vicariously liable as the contractors were not employees - could be no claim in trespass to land because the damage was not direct and immediate - also at the time nusiance didnt apply to a one off incident

decision: defendant was still liable in tort - the HofL claimed that the foundation for the rule had been set out in previous nuisance cases so the court took opportunity to create a new legal principle
blackburn J set out principle: we think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes brings onto land and collect and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it in at his peril, and if he doesnt do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape

HofL approved the principle, although Lord Cairns added the stipulation that the defendant must be carrying out a non natural use of land
to succeed in tort, the claimant must show the following:

  • defendant must control the land from which the mischief has come
  • defendant must have brought and accumulated something in course of some non-natural use of the land
  • the thing accumulated must be likely to do damage if it escapes
  • the dangerous thing must escape
  • there must be damage because of the escape

put simply a defendant who brings onto their land something that is likely to cause damage if it escapes - if liable for the damage it causes when it does escape

Who can sue?
traditionally, even though rylands does not indicate that the claimant needs to be a landowner it was thought that the claimant must have an interest in the land affected by the escape - position was unclear
cases of Weller v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute, and Read v Lyons - both seem to support this
in Weller the claimant didnt succeed in their claim as they didnt have interest in the land affected by the Foot and Mouth disease virus that escaped from research centre
in Read v Lyons, was said in obiter dicta that the claimant must be an occupier
doesnt mean that the claimant and the defendant have to own/occupy separate areas of land e.g. Hale v Jennings Bros there was liability although both parties occupied the same ground - in this case, the claimants claim was successful when hit by chair that had broken loose from defendants ride
case of Transco plc doesnt expressly deal with the issue of who can sue, but the court stated that RvF is an aspect of nuisance which suggests that an interest in land is needed to bring into line with Hunter v Canary Wharf

Who can be sued?
defendant must be someone who is in control of the dangerous thing - it isnt necessary for the defendant to have proprietary interest in the land from which the dangerous thing escapes
in Read v Lyons the court said that the defendant would be the person from whose land the thing escaped, even if that person were only a license (someone without interest in the land)
however the court in British Celanese v Hunt said that the person from whose control the thing escaped would be liable - issue is still unclear

Defintion & Conditions of liability

Escape:
in RvF jusgement, escape is taken to mean: an escape form a place where the defendant is in occupation or control over land to a place which is outside his occupation or control
as long as there has been a non-natural use, thing that escapes does not need to be the thing which has been accumulated
confirmed in Stannard v Gore - while agreeing it would be possible for Rylands liability to be based on fire, the court found this would need fire itself to be brought onto the land and then escape there could be no liability
traditionally the term escape meant that the release of the dangerous thing had to be accidental - has been some debate as to whether internationally releasing something from ones land is capable of being an escape and thus falling within rylands

Escape must have caused damage:
the damage is generally to land or other property. until transco 2004, it was unclear whether a claim for death or personal injury would succeed as such claims had succeeded before then.
However, in Read v Lyons doubts were raised about whether the turle could be used but later in Hunter v Canary Wharf it was held that personal injuries are not recoverable

Likely to do mischief:
word 'dangerous' is not interpreted literally and there is no requirement that the thing must be dangerous - it must be likely to do damage if it escapes

  • rule has been applied to a wide variety of things including:
  • gas (Batchelor v Tunbridge Wells Gas Co)
  • electricity
  • fire
  • vibrations
  • fumes
  • flagpoles (shiffman v order of st john)
  • swings (hale v jennings bros)
  • people

in Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council - Lord Bingham explained that the test for deciding if something was dangerous was a strict one. claimant had to show that the defendant had brought or accumulated on the land something that they recognized would lead to an exceptionally high risk of danger or mischief if the thing escaped - if the requirement was fulfilled it didn't matter that the risk of an escape occurring was low
court transformed the 'likely to do mischief' test into a foreseeability test in Transco - a defendant will not be liable if they could not have foreseen an exceptionally high risk of danger should the thing brought onto their land escape
but the rule in RvF should be so strict, so it shouldn't be a case of whether the defendant could/should have recognized that thing would give rise to an exceptionally high risk of danger if it escaped

Things brought onto land:
no liability for an escape of things naturally on the land, such as plants (Giles v Walker, thistles) rocks that fall because of weathering (pontardawe rural district) or water nautrally present on land

  • courts have interpreted natural to mean something ordinary and usual - so non natural use is regarded to be extraordinary use or activity
    Lord cairns in Hof in RvF interpreted non-natural as being something not nautrally there
  • what is regarded as non natural use has been subject to change. in the past domestic water supplies, fires electric wiring in shops and houses, ordinary working of mines and minerals and the keeping of trees and shrubs have been held to be natural use. in contrast, the bulk storage of water, gas or electricity and collection of sewage has been non-natural
  • when considering RvF claims the concept of non natural use was equated with abnormal risk - courts took account of the quantity of the accumulated material, way in which it was stored and character of the neighbourhood in Mason v Levy Auto Parts - also taken in LMS international v styrene packaging and insulation
  • non-natural is now taken to be non ordinary use - narrower defintiion than orginal one. what is ordinary will depend on the time, place and context of the use of land in question - begins to make test like negligence and has allowed courts to decide that various industrial acitivities are natural uses of land
    goes against concept of strict liability, and waters down any impact that the rule could have on environmental protection
  • British celanese v Hunt - area was an industrial one so the defendants escaped liability - use of land was ordinary in the context of industry as well as being for benefit of community
    contrast cambridge water v eastern counties, court said that storage of substantail quantities of chemicals on industrial premises was an almost classic case of non-nautral use even in an industrial estate
    fact that the chemical in question was commonly used in that industry and that the defendants factory benefittted the local community wasnt enough to make use of land nautrlal
  • courts have interpreted non naturally broadley giving them flexibility when deciding whether to apply the law to a new situation - can mean that a claimant is far less likely to succeed in a claim

Relationship with other torts relating to land:
this rule has its origings in nusiance but because the damage was not caused intentionally, the tort was not appropriate
in RvF the claimants relied almost exclusively on authorities regarding nusiance - been argued that RvF is used in a much more restrictive way becuase of the specific requirmeents of accumulation and of a thing likely to cause harm if it escaped - requirement of non-nautral use although similar to the unreasonable use of land in nuisance usually involves some degree of exceptional risk but unreasonable use doesnt
in many instances, claimants will succeed equally well under RvF on in nuisance - however, there are very few cases brought soley using the rule in RvF and those cases havent been successful
despite the apparent similarities between rule in rylands and nuisance, number of differences:

  • rylands is concerned with escapes from land rather than intereference with land
  • in an action in rylands - emphasis on ownership of or interest in the land, unlike in nusiance where emphasis is on the individuals use or enjoyment of hte land
  • initially rylands was seen as tort of strict liability - nuisance requires an element of fault but not necessarily the case in modern times, as there are fault based defences available

it is likely that the torts will remain separate for the foreseeable future, giving a claimant who has suffered property damages two avenues of compensation