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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE CHART - Coggle Diagram
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE CHART
the response of the League
several discussion meetings to discuss further actions
attended by Japan and the USA
Japanese government seemed to be cooperating → army actually continued expanding its influence in Manchuria
defied the request from the League that Japanese troops should withdraw to the railway zone
sent a fact-finding commission (led by Lord Lytton) to Manchuria
commission took several months to arrive + several months to complete the report in the situation
meanwhile, the Kwantung army continued to expand throughout Manchuria
March 1932 → Manchuria was declared the state of Manchukuo (a puppet state under the control of Japan)
1 year after the Mukden incident, the Lytton Commission Report was published and it stated that...
Japan did have special interests in Manchuria → the use of force by the army + its takeover of the whole of Manchuria was unacceptable and unjustified
Japan should give up the territory + withdraw its forces
Manchukuo was not an independent state → could not be recognized as such
Manchuria should become independent, but under Chinese sovereignity
the Commission stressed that the problem could only be solved by general improvement in Sino-Japanese relations
recommended that after Japan withdraws its troops back to the railway zone, a non-aggression pact and trade agreement should be signed between the 2 countries
this recommendation ignored the fact that Japan wanted Manchuria + was unwilling to compromise
no further action was taken against Japan after the fact-finding commission
France (one of the key members) had no real reason to fall out with Japan
colonial power in Indochina → could benefit from a weakened China
suffering from the economic effects of the Great Depression
Britain was cautious → unwilling to act when its own interests were not at stake
lacked the military means to resist Japan
fear of communism → Japan was viewed as an ally in containing communist Russia in the Far East
failure of the League to respond to the Manchurian incident → Japan was able to continue its expansion + may have contributed to Mussolini's decision to invade Abyssinia (1935)
Marco Polo Bridge Incident + bombing of Shanghai → the League condemned Japan for breaking the Nine-Power treaty of 1922
was now impotent to help China
Britain repeatedly asked USA for joint diplomatic pressure on Tokyo → to no avail
the response of China
After his release, Jiang changed his priority of attacking the Communists before the Japanese
a
Second United Front
was formed between the Nationalist Party and the Communist party
civil war suspended → now there was to be a "war of national resistance"
despite the Second United Front, the war went badly for the Chinese
by 1938 → Beijing, Shanghai, Ghangzhou, and Nanjing had all fallen
the GMD government had to withdraw their capital to Chongqing
nevertheless, Japan was drawn into a conflict that they did not want + for which they did not have resources
by 1940 → Japan had committed over 750,000 ground troops to the struggle
the Japanese could not quickly win the war
adopted a policy of living off the land with the help of puppet governments
one of the most important of these was led by Wang Jingwei (former GMD colleague + rival of Jiang)
1940 → agreed to become the head of "the New Government of China"
1 more item...
despite the United Front, tensions between Nationalists and Communists remained high → in 1941, Jiang attacked the Communists
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor + declaration of war by the USA against Japan → Jiang realized that Japan would ultimately be defeated
after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Jiang announced that "the limits of endurance had been reached"
national conference was held (included both the Communists and the Nationalists)
Mao declared a policy of "total resistance by the whole nation"
the response of the US
Manchurian Incident → US interests and security were not directly threatened → President Hoover took minimal action
the US also lacked a credible naval force in the Pacific
the focus of the US administration was on the economic crisis
the US also had their own self-interests!
USA had trade and investment interests in Japan that it did not want to jeopardize
the US had far more important trade ties with Japan than with the much larger Chinese Republic
Stimson non-recognition doctrine
(7 January, 1932)
the US declared that it would not recognize any agreement that violated China's territorial or administrative integrity or that went against the open door policy or the Kellogg-Briand Pact
the doctrine allowed Hoover to uphold international law but also to avoid committing to economic sanctions
Roosevelt was inaugurated as president in March 1933 → continued with the same limited response to Japan
USA continued to export strategic materials to Japan throughout the 1930s
the hesitant approach continued after 1937, even though Japan’s ambitious naval building programme (launched in 1936) upset the balance of power in the western Pacific
Roosevelt had some sympathy with China's position → gave financial aid → no political intervention
between July and November 1937, the USA rejected 10 British appeals for participation in a joint offer of mediation in the Sino-Japanese conflict and to make show of naval strength
his actions were limited by Neutrality Acts (enforced the USA's isolationist stance by preventing US involvement in conflicts that did not specifically involve the USA)
Panay Incident →a US gunboat, Panay, was escorting three small oil tankers on the Yangtze River → it was bombed and sunk by a Japanese aircraft on December 12 1937
Japan quickly apologized + offered compensation
1937 → USA sent representatives to the Brussels conference → was unwilling to go beyond verbal condemnation
USA did not only not impose economic sanctions, it continued trading with Japan until 1939 → this played a key role in supporting Japan's war effort
Roosevelt did not share the sentiments of the isolationists regarding the Neutrality Acts (which treated aggressor and victim alike)
1938, Roosevelt chose not to apply the Neutrality Acts to China + give more active support to the nationalists (starting with an oil loan of $25 million)
the announcement of Japan hat it wished to create "a new order in East Asia" was a turning point
another factor: USA does not give enough aid to Jiang → Soviets might increase their support for the Nationalists → would increase communist influence in China
US pressure on Japan
January 1939 → a "moral embargo" was placed on planes and aviation parts sales
February 1939 → credit to Japan was stopped
July 1939 → a long-standing trade agreement with Japan was suspended
1940 → a partial trade embargo on aviation and motor fuel and high-grade melting scrap was put in place
1940 and 1941 → Japan advanced → the USA gave millions of dollars of aid to China
by the summer of 1941 → 100 P-40 US fighter planes were sent to replenish the depleted Chinese air force
July 1941 → Japan moved south rather than moving north to attack the Soviets → the US froze all Japanese assets + imposed a trade embargo in November (which included oil)
Britain and the Netherlands also imposed a total trade embargo
Japan was totally dependent on the imported oil from the US → created a crisis for the Japanese government → japan now believed the Western powers were attempting to encircle Japan and destroy its "rightful place" in the world
if Japan's oil reserves ran out → Japan would be unable to continue the war in China
negotiations stalled → USA insisted that Japan withdraw from China → Japan may have agreed to a withdrawal from southern Indo-China, but could not agree to remove its forces from China
Japan decided a war of conquest was necessary
attack on Pearl Harbor → united the American people for a war against Japan
the Declaration of War on Japan was signed by Roosevelt on December 8