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Hillsborough Disaster : - Coggle Diagram
Hillsborough Disaster :
Design Lifecycle
Construction
Failure to meet design standards
Refurbishment
1960 - Cantilever roof added to North Stand and Lepping Lane (West Stand) was built
1981 Divided Pens added to the stadium due to crushing incident 1981
1977 Perimeter fence built around the pitch
1978 failed to meet minimum standards of sports ground safety
Safety of Sports grounds Act 1975 sets out criteria to comply with relating any premiership football ground which holds more that 5000 people
Workplace
Stadium Design
Fan Segregation
Liverpool Fans had a history of causing trouble
Refurished following incident in 1981
Not compliant to current safety standards
Sofronas (2022) gives an interesting insight into what constitutes a catastrophic failure in design
Active Failure to ensure safe design
CCTV & other communication
Radio function not working properly
Poor communication inside and outside stadium
Active Failure
Inadequate transfer of information
People
Liverpool Fans
History of disorderly conduct
General Fans
Volunteer St John's Ambulance
Overwhelmed
Fans without tickets
Stormed the ground when Gate C was opened
Challenger R (2011) explains how crowd related disasters can occur through a relationship with all factors
FA - Not willing to push back the start time
Latent Failure
Event sequence
97 Men, Women & Children died
Sold out event - 53,000 fans expected
Turnstiles couldn't handle the volume of people
Decision made not to delay the start of the game
Chief Superintendent Duckenfield opens Gate C
Duckenfield leaves the tunnel to Central Pen 3 & 4 open
2:53pm influx of fans into pens 3 & 4
Fans were crushed against barriers and underfoot
Parts
Pen 3
Capacity rated at 1200 - Eastwood & Partners Structual Engineers
Safe capacity rating from HSE Executive was 389
4 out of 5 gaps in barriers didn't conform with "The Green Guide"
Some of the railings inside the pens were built in 1960's and suffered from corrosion
Deng (2019) examines how corrosion fatigue is detrimental to the lifecycle of a steel structure
Gates/access point clearance should be minimum 1.1m
Actual clearance 0.81m-0.82m
Pen 4
Capacity rated at 1000 - Eastwood & Partners Structual Engineers
Safe capacity rating from HSE Executive was 540
Nicholson (1989), advises tensile strength of wrought iron tubes, Safety requirements for capacity and design of pens
Gates/access point clearance should be minimum 1.1m
Actual Clearance 0.77m - 0.79
Turnstiles
Gate C
approximately 2000 people with and without tickets entered the stadium
Design Flaw
Previous Incidents 1981/1987/1988
Pre Curser
Planning Committee
South Yorkshire Police (SYP)
Replaced experience match commander Chief Superintendent Brian Mole
Appoint Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield
Minimal experience of policing at Hillsborough
Focused on potential crowd disorder by Liverpool fans
Unclear management roles and responsibilities of senior Officers
Hillsborough Independant Panel (2012), explains roles & responsibilities of the planning committee
Sheffield Wednesday Football Club
Appointed St John's Ambulance volunteers instead of Sth Yorkshire Metro Ambulance
Inadequate Management - Policy/procedures
