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Power in the Asia-Pacific - Coggle Diagram

- - - - Militarisation of the South China Sea
        • In trying to advance and further its sovereignty claims over a large portion of the contested South China Sea, China has undertaken a multifaceted militarisation approach. This has been guided by the concept of anti-access/area deniability (A2/AD). A2/AD implies a strategy where a state uses military technology to prevent an adversary from entering a certain location (‘anti-access’) and severely restricting said adversary’s movements should they enter the guarded location (‘area deniability’).
        • For China, key aspects of this strategy include a methodical naval build-up, focusing on both its near-seas defence (known as ‘green-water navy’) and far-seas protection (known as ‘blue-water navy’) capabilities.
        • From 2012, China has continued to develop artificial islands, equipped with military facilities such as airfields, ports, surveillance systems, bunkers and missile silos.
        • China also presses its sovereignty claims on the South China Sea with a 3000-ship-strong maritime militia. The maritime militia is another example of China’s use of the asymmetric warfare tactic of grey-zone warfare.
        • Taken together, China’s militarisation A2/AD strategy in the South China Sea allows it to project power over land, sea, and potentially even air, across a very geo-strategic part of the Asia-Pacific.
        • China has ultimately manoeuvred itself into a position of military strength whereby it can enhance its long-term presence in the South China Sea, which in turn enables it to forcibly assert against rival claimant states what it perceives to be its rightful territorial sovereignty claims, as well its maritime rights and interests.
      - Use of intelligence-gathering assets
        • In 2017 and 2019, China sent an auxiliary general intelligence vessel (AGI) to study US and Australian manoeuvres during their joint-military exercise known as ‘Talisman Sabre’. An AGI is essentially a high-tech surveillance ship. For the 2021 exercise, China sent two AGIs, with both ships remaining outside of Australia’s territorial waters, but within Australia’s exclusive economic zone.
    - - Economic coercion, through ‘weaponising’ cross-strait trade
        • China’s and Taiwan’s economies have increasingly integrated since the 1990s.
        • While cross-strait trade offers mutual benefits (valued at $149.2 billion in 2019), the relationship is significantly unbalanced in China’s favour, which gives it significant economic leverage to influence Taiwan politically.
        • Relevant trade statistics:
        
        China is Taiwan's largest trading partner
        
        In 2014, China became Taiwan's largest source of imports
        
        In 2019, travellers from China made 2.68 million visits to Taiwan
        
        Despite tensions, China still accounted for 33 per cent of Taiwan's overall trade in the first quarter of 2021.
        • Taiwan’s economic prosperity is so heavily reliant on trade with China that China has arguably engineered a situation where it has achieved a reunification of sorts with Taiwan. In effect, Taiwan has been forced into a conditional surrender because it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) for Taiwan to de-couple its economy from China’s.
      - Belt and Road Initiative
        • The BRI is Xi’s flagship policy, centred on joint infrastructure projects between China and partnered states. It potentially stands to reconfigure international trade, and by extension the global economic order, in China’s favour.
        • The BRI is seen as a way for China to boost its economy, as Chinese construction companies with fewer opportunities domestically are able to seek out international business ventures through BRI contracts. A further requirement for BRI projects is the use of Chinese workers.
        • In 2019, Chinese companies had contracts worth up to $128 billion to start infrastructure projects in various countries.
      - Economic inducements versus economic coercion
        • China provided generous financial aid packages to developing states like Cambodia and the Solomon Islands in return for their support on the issues of the South China Sea and Taiwan.
        • Conversely, China placed trade sanctions against Australian exports because of Australia’s role as the first country to publicly ban China’s Huawei from its 5G network, and for calling an independent international inquiry into the origins of COVID-19.
    - - The separation of powers versus the China model • Separation of powers refers to the three branches of government, which is a model made famous by the Enlightenment philosopher, Montesquieu. In his work The Spirit of the Laws (1748), Montesquieu explained how the independent branches of the Executive Legislature and the Judiciary would ensure state power is distributed, rather than concentrated, through a system of checks and balances. Each branch in the model is responsible for different areas and able to hold the others to account through oversight measures. This serves as a safeguard against tyranny and abuses of power. • According to the streaming news service Bloomberg Quicktake, the China model, on the other hand, is a strategy for the CCP to maintain exclusive political control. It achieved this by doing away with the separation of powers and instead merging political authoritarianism with state-directed capitalism in a system underpinned by four key components that bolster China’s one-party state.
    - - China-Africa Higher Education Cooperation
        
        This cooperation is a way by which China can leverage its economic investments in Africa through educational exchanges and people-to-people links.
        
        Some of the initiatives include the Chinese Government Scholarship-China-Africa Friendship Program, the Chinese Government Africa Union Scholarship for African Students, and the China-Africa Universities 20+20 Cooperation Plan, itself part of the UNESCO-China-Africa Tripartite Initiative on University Cooperation.
        
        According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2020 Global Education Monitoring Report, China is the largest provider of university scholarships to students from Sub-Saharan Africa, with 12,000 of the total 30,000 scholarships that were distributed by the top 50 global donors being granted by China.
        
        China is able to present initiatives as an empowering experience by framing them as an example of global south collaboration among developing states.
      - Other examples
        • Stadium construction diplomacy: China ‘gifts’ (bank rolls) sports stadiums and similar infrastructure, particularly in African and Pacific Island states. This example could arguably qualify as a hard-power carrot inducement because it is transactional.
        • Face mask or vaccine diplomacy: China’s COVID-19–related medical aid to Africa, Asia-Pacific, Central and Latin American countries and even Europe, can be seen as a bid to shift the narrative away from its being the source of the global pandemic. Instead, China is seen as a responsible global leader assisting with goodwill humanitarian efforts. Note this example could also qualify as a hard-power carrot inducement, as it is transactional.
        • Patriotic blockbuster films: This is a domestically focused soft power effort to inspire national pride and, by extension, loyalty to the CCP regime. Films include Chinese box-office hits like Wolf Warrior 1, Wolf Warrior 2 and Operation Red Sea.
        • International sports and technological innovation: International sports and science and technology are alternative arenas to project power. At the 2016 Summer Olympics, for example, China took home 71 medals. China also hosted the 2022 Winter Olympics and, in 2019, as part of China’s Lunar Exploration Program, China’s Chang’e 4 mission achieved a historical first – the first ever soft landing on the far side of the moon.
    - - Example: Use of grey-zone warfare (GZW) against Taiwan
        
        China exerts military pressure on Taiwan, using aggressive tactics that deliberately stop short of an all-out shooting war, while inflicting physical, psychological and economic damage to deter Taiwan from pursuing independence.
        
        GZW enables China to bully, harass, frustrate and exhaust Taiwan. In 2020, for example, China launched regular and disruptive cyber-attacks (778,000 on Taiwanese government agencies) and probed and provoked Taiwanese airspace with Chinese jet fighters (380 sorties).
        
        The ambiguity of GZW enables China to avoid a bigger confrontation with the United States, which is seen as one of Taiwan’s major backers.
      - Government-backed security force crackdowns
        
        The anti-Christian crackdown targeting a growing underground Christian church.
        
        The ‘Strike-Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism’ (in effect, an anti-Muslim crackdown) that targets Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang.
  - - - Regime security Safeguarding CCP political control
        Example: Covert operations (in particular, foreign interference) coordinated by the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD).
      - Internal security halting separatist threats
        Example: Repression, suppression and violence against Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjang in the name of cracking down on proponents of separatist movements
      - External security Preserving territorial integrity
        Example: Opposing and containing Taiwanese independence; achieving complete reunification
        Example: Asserting sovereignty claims and safeguarding maritime rights and other interests in the South China Sea
    - - Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
        Example: Successes versus challenges/limitations related to the expansion of the BRI, slated for completion in 2049.
      - Tackling corruption
        Example: Successes versus challenges/limitations of Xi’s on-going anti-corruption campaign
    - - Regional disputes
        Example: Trade sanctions against Australia, as ‘punishment’ for being the first country to publicly ban China’s Huawei from its 5G network, as well as passing foreign interference laws that were directed at China and calling for an independent and international inquiry into the origins of COVID-19.
        Example: China is involved in a series of contested border disputes including with Japan over who owns a string of islands in the East China Sea, which China recognises as the Diaoyutai Islands and Japan recognises as the Senkaku Islands. Likewise, in the South China Sea, where China asserts sovereignty over an area disputed by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. China is also locked in a diplomatic stand-off with the island of Taiwan, which China views as a breakaway rogue province that must eventually be reunified with the PRC.
      - Regional ‘courtships’
        Example: Generous financial aid packages to developing states like Cambodia and the Solomon Islands in return for support on issues like the South China Sea and Taiwan.
        Example: China-led multilateral initiatives, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Back (AIIB) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
        
        The ‘Double-edged sword’ nature of the BRI
        Example: A significant debate regarding regional relationships has emerged. On one side is the CCP’s soft power ‘sales pitch’, presenting the BRI as a regional ‘win-win’ of mutually beneficial trade and peaceful economic development. On the other side, accusations that the BRI is more a convenient cover for China to pursue ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. In effect, this is a predatory lending pratice where China loans money to its fragile neighbours, with an ulterior motive to force them into a situation where they cannot repay the loan, allowing China to acquire a national asset from the indebted country as repayment. The Hambantota Port deal between Sri Lanka and China in 2017 is a clear example. Another interpretation acknowledges the BRI as a geopolitical ‘power play’ by China but argues against the idea of a deliberate Chinese strategy of economic coercion.
    - - International standing
        ‘own goals’
        Suspicions about how genuine China is in its own rhetoric of ‘peaceful development’
        Example: International backlash against China’s aggressive ‘Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’, with even Xi signalling the need to tone down aggressive posts. In June 2021, Xi was as quoted saying: ‘We must pay attention to a good grasp of the tone, as well as be open, confident and humble, try our utmost to portray an image of a reliable, lovely respectable China.’
        Example: International reputational damage as a result of global media reports regarding the repression of Muslim Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang, leading to calls for countries to boycott the 2022 Olympics or for China to lose hosting rights. As well as international condemnation, on July 8 2019, 22 (mainly Western) states including EU states issued a joint open letter to the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) condemning China’s repression. (Counter: China was able to lobby a coalition of 50 mostly developing states, and other non-Western states including Muslim-majority states, to produce a letter to the HRC in support of China’s human rights record, highlighting China’s growing economic, political and diplomatic influence over non-Western states and the developing world.)
      - International standing
        ‘wins’
        Good ‘optics’ allow China to present as an altruistic leader
        Example: As the world’s largest carbon emitter, China has signed the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and pledged to be carbon neutral by 2060. (Counter: China funds ‘polluting’ project as part of the BRI.)
        Example: As of June 2020, China was the tenth top contributor of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, providing 2534 troops and police. As of February 2021, China was the second largest financial contributor providing 15% of the total UN peacekeeping budget. (Counter: part of a ‘long game’ pragmatic strategy by China to shift international norms by leading and reshaping the UN.)
        Example: According to China’s state news agency, Xinhua, as of June 2021, China had delivered COVID-19 vaccines to 66 countries as medical aid. According to Reuters, this includes: 3.74 million vaccines to Europe and the Middle East and a pledge to supply 10 million doses to COVAX – the global collaboration to ensure fast development, manufacture and equitable global distribution. (Counter: Display of Chinese soft power.)
    - - Political structure – China as a one-party state and the authoritarian rule of the CCP regime
      - Significant individual – China’s paramount (and consequential) leader, Xi Jinping
      - Cultural identity – Han Chinese exceptionalism versus China’s ethnic minorities
      - Societal challenge – the CCP’s legitimacy crisis due to corruption and growing income inequality
      - Geography – China’s Malacca Strait dilemma
      - Geo-politics – the economic importance of the South China Sea as a geo-strategic prize
      - Event 1 – challenges and opportunities for China presented by the COVID-19 global pandemic
      - Event 2 – the opportunities for China between 2017 and 2020 to fill a global leadership vacuum due to the Trump administration’s retreat from the world stage with its America First agenda and isolationism.
      - Century of humiliation